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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this study is the political dynamics of the alliance relations between the 
United States, Japan and South Korea during the Cold War period. It proposes the 
concept of "triangular alliance security system" (TASS) as a new theoretical framework 
for the understanding of intra-alliance politics in Northeast Asia. 
It identifies the different perspectives on regional relations of the US, Japan and South 
Korea and it argues that the main operational principle of the US in its dealings with 
Korea at that time was active intervention to democratise the latter's polity, whilst the 
Japanese imperative was defensive intervention to preserve stability and the status quo. 
It also presents a new body of empirical facts concerning the US and Japanese 
interventions in South Korea's regime transition during 1979 and 1980, utilising primary 
materials from US, Japanese and South Korean sources and in-depth interviews with 
diplomatic actors and policy-makers. The empirical findings concerning Japanese 
intervention in the South Korean regime challenge conventional views of Japanese 
foreign policy. They suggest a much more active role for Japan in the emergence of the 
regime of Gen. Chun Doo-hwan, whilst the Carter administration was increasingly 
preoccupied with the Iran hostage crisis. 
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A NOTE ON THE TEXT 
In line with Korean convention, all Korean names in the text and notes are given with 
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As far as the footnote notations are concerned, this thesis uses a shortened form by 
citing the author, year, and pages. Due to the word limit, an abbreviated type of citation 
will also be used. For example, the US Department of State Bulletin will be noted as 
USDSB, and Foreign Relations of the United States are shortened to FRUS. In the case 
of telegrams between US Department of State and US Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, 
1979-1980, notations provide serial numbers and dates. 
The sequence of telegrams from the US Embassy in Seoul to the State Department in 
Washington in 1979 started from 79 Seoul 00132 (5 January 1979) and ended with 79 
Seoul 19442 (31 December 1979). In 1980, telegrams from the US Embassy in Seoul to 
the State Department in Washington in 1980 started from 80 Seoul 000130 (7 January 
1980) and ended with 80 Seoul 17227 (30 December 1980). Telegrams sent by the State 
Department in Washington in 1979 started from 79 State 00269 (5 January 1979) and 
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The list of interviewees and dates of interviews are provided in Appendix I, therefore the 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The central purpose of this study is to analyse the political dynamics of the alliance 
relations between the United States, Japan and South Korea during the Cold War period, 
when the three states joined together to deter the perceived communist threat in 
Northeast Asia. More specifically, the research aims, first of all, to contribute to the 
development and refinement of a new theoretical framework for the understanding of 
intra-alliance politics in Northeast Asia. Secondly, the research seeks to reveal new 
empirical data concerning the US and Japanese interventions in South Korea's regime 
transition between 1979 and 1980. 
In terms of the first of these aims, it must be stressed that hitherto the dynamics of intra- 
alliance politics have not received adequate attention in the study of Northeast Asian 
international relations. This thesis presents the case for employing a systemic approach 
to the analysis of US-Japan-South Korea relations, which are seen to constitute one of 
world's major sub-regional systems, and adopts an alliance model to investigate the 
triangular patterns of interaction. This framework is intended to cast light on four major 
issues: the key structural features of US-Japan-South Korean relations at this time; the 
I 
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factors that determined the degree of cleavage and cohesion within the alliance; the 
most distinguishable characteristics of the political interventions of the US and Japan in 
South Korean politics; and the crucial role of Japan as the middle member of this 
asymmetric triangular alliance system. 
In employing an alliance model to explain the political interaction between the US, 
Japan and South Korea, this study argues that the changing political landscape of one 
member state directly or indirectly affects the security of the other members. It seeks to 
show how the US and Japan evaluated the unfolding political events in South Korea 
between 1979-1980, and to identify the ways in which the two countries implemented a 
range of actions and leverages. In particular, attention is given to the way in which 
Japan interpreted the East Asian policies of the Carter administration, and the reasons 
why Japan supported the emergence of a new military regime in South Korea. 
In terms of the empirical contribution of this study, the whole question of US and 
Japanese intervention in South Korean politics has previously been neglected. There 
have been some studies of the US role, ' but their depth of analysis has been limited. 
Indeed, a full understanding of that role was not possible until important documents 
were declassified in 1996, and former South Korean Generals-turned-Presidents, Chun 
Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo, and their subordinates were interrogated and brought to 
trial in 1996-1997. As far as Japanese intervention is concerned, there has so far been no 
systematic academic study. ' In this respect, the present analysis seeks to fill a major gap 
' See Fowler (1999). 
2 The author investigated research papers and articles published in academic journals in Japan and South 
Korea between 1979 and 1999, and failed to discover any study of Japanese intervention in the South 
Korean regime transition. In Japan, some critical articles have appeared in party papers such as Gekkan 
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in the literature. 
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employs a macro-historical comparative and systemic approach to the 
analysis of US and Japanese interventions in the South Korean regime transition. It 
makes extensive use of recently declassified US sources and undertakes the first 
comprehensive investigation of the political role of Japan as the middle member of the 
triangular alliance security system (TASS). 
1.2.1 A Macro-historical International Relations Perspective 
In its analysis of inter-state behaviour and interaction among the three states, with 
special reference to the political interventions of the US and Japan, this study employs a 
macro-historical international relations perspective. The historical dimension requires a 
careful examination of recently declassified primary sources (see Sections 1.2.2,1.2.3 
and 1.2.4), and Japanese National Diet records and interviews. The aim is to unearth 
relevant information, especially concerning the events surrounding the South Korean 
regime transition of 1979-80. The international relations dimension draws upon social- 
scientific understanding of general patterns of alliance relations and alliance 
management in order to search for a wider logic and explanation. The study places the 
Shakaito (Monthly Policy Paper of the Japanese Socialist Party later Social Democratic Party of Japan) 
and Akahata (of the Japanese Communist Party) and progressive current affairs magazines. Research in 
South Korea did not reveal a single relevant article. 
3 
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trilateral interactions between the US, Japan and South Korea within the context of a 
systemic framework, seeing these interactions as constituting a sub-system of a broader 
"American system". ' 
The main research methods employed in this study are archival investigation, interviews, 
and an analysis of international relations theory. In terms of archival work, the problem 
has to be faced that many documents relating to the period 1979-80 remain inaccessible 
because they have not yet been released for public inspection. However, as the next 
three sections will show, this research was able to utilise valuable primary materials 
from US, Japanese and South Korean sources, and to undertake in-depth interviews 
with diplomatic actors and policy-makers (referred to Appendix I). 
1.2.2 US Sources 
Recently, the Clinton administration has declassified several thousand telegrams 
between the State Department and its embassy in Seoul for the period 1979-1980. These 
primary sources contain valuable detailed information about US rationales, motivations 
and actions with respect to the South Korean regime transition. Other important US 
sources examined for the purpose of this research include US governmental and 
Congressional papers, such as Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1968, The 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, The US Department of State 
Bulletin, and The Congressional Records, 1978-1981. 
3 The American System refers to the definition of Gilpin, the system which incorporates "the political 
understandings, military alliances, and economic agreements that the United States has entered into with 
its principal allies since the end of the Second World `Var. " (Gilpin: 1989): p. 3. 
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1.2.3 Japanese Sources 
Existing analyses of Japanese foreign policy have tended to rely upon US governmental 
sources, since there are formidable obstacles to accessing Japanese governmental 
materials relating to foreign and security policies. It seems unlikely that this restriction 
will improve significantly in the near future. The Japanese Government passed a 
Freedom of Information Act in the spring of 1999, but the new law will not be applied 
until 2002. Moreover, public access to materials relating to security and foreign policies 
will continue to be prohibited. Accordingly, researchers must base their analysis of 
those policies mainly on US papers. In order to overcome this limitation, the present 
research undertook extensive interviews with diplomatic actors and other related 
researchers and officials to obtain first-hand data, to check the reliability of the 
conventional wisdom, and to develop new perspectives. Unfortunately, many of the key 
individuals involved in Japanese policy-making towards South Korea in 1979-80, 
including former Prime Ministers, are deceased. On the other had, one of the key 
features of Japanese foreign policy-making is the influence of middle-ranking officials, 
non-career researchers and experts working in governmental institutes as public 
servants. ' Thus, unstructured and in-depth interviews with such individuals are 
potentially of great value to the researcher. For the purpose of this study, the author 
interviewed four individuals who were middle-ranking officials in 1979-80: one in 
charge of international information within the Japanese Defense Agency, two in charge 
of Korean information within the Japanese Cabinet Investigation Agency, and the then 
5 
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Japanese Ambassador to South Korea. As far as non-career specialists in the subject are 
concerned, interviews were conducted with members of two research groups dealing 
with Korean issues: Josei Kentokai (the Situation Review Study Group) and NK-kai (the 
North Korean Study Group). In addition, a former private adviser to Prime Minister 
Masayoshi Ohira provided extremely useful information. 
The new findings collected from these interviews, in spite of their importance and 
reliability, have also been verified by the scrutiny of the official governmental policy 
lines at this time. To that end, another major but often forgotten source, the Japanese 
Diet Records, has been extensively analysed. Often, studies of Japanese foreign and 
security policies tend to quote from newspaper reports of debates in the Diet without 
studying the original voluminous records of Diet proceedings. The author therefore 
spent a great deal of time studying the Diet Records, and this revealed a lot of useful 
data. In addition, the various magazines and newspapers published by Japanese political 
parties, and official government sources such as the White Paper on Defense and the 
Blue Papers on Diplomacy were studied. The author tried, without success, to gain 
access to documents and records of the Policy Investigation Council of the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party, but a major fire at the party headquarters in 1981 had led to 
the loss of most of this material. As far as the records of the Japanese Socialist Party 
was concerned, it is not known the storing location after the party has been taken over 
by the new Japanese Democratic Party in the mid-1990s. 
4 Interview with Professor M. Okonogi, Keio University. 
6 
1 Tntrnrlnrtinn 
1.2.4 South Korean Sources 
In the analysis of the South Korean regime transition, it is essential to start with South 
Korean sources. This research draws upon previously unavailable materials, for 
example the records (November 1995 to March 1996) of the interrogation of former 
South Korean Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo, and others accused by the 
Seoul District Local Prosecutors Office. One of the key sources for confirming the 
extent of Japanese intervention, The Analysis of the Intelligence Report from the 
Japanese Cabinet Investigation Agency (10 May 1980) is also given careful 
consideration. Valuable data were derived from interviews with South Korean diplomats 
who were in charge of the Asian Section of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and were responsible for political contacts with their Japanese counterparts. 
Interviews with a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Lee Tong-won, on the subject 
of South Korea's relations with the US and Japan, and with Mr. Huh Hwa-pyung, a key 
player on the emergence of the new military regime were also extremely helpful. In all 
cases, the facts and findings gathered from interviews were systematically checked with 
one another and of course with published materials. Purely speculative information, 
however interesting, was excluded from the main body of the thesis. 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The period 1979-1980 was a particularly crucial juncture for the US, Japan and South 
Korea. For Japan, it was a time of vigorous public debate over the country's new role in 
world affairs -especially in respect of the security relationship with the US-after two 
7 
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decades of economic success. If Japan had to rely less unconditionally upon the US, the 
question of the posture it should take in the international sphere was clearly of vital 
importance. In South Korea, 1979 saw the demise of the Park Chung Hee regime and a 
military coup led by General Chun Doo Hwan. Given the US concern at this time over 
human rights issues in international affairs, the response to this coup on the part of the 
Carter administration was problematic, particularly after the Kwangju massacre in 1980. 
During the last two years of the Carter administration (1979-1980), the ineffectiveness 
of US South Korean policy was one of the most significant catalysts which led to a 
deterioration of South Korea's domestic situation, the coherence of the trilateral alliance 
structure, and the Northeast Asian security environment more generally. The Carter 
administration succeeded in bringing about the demise of the authoritarian Park Chung- 
hee regime, but could not effectively engineer the establishment of a broadly based 
civilian government in South Korea. Although it reluctantly acquiesced in the 
emergence of the Chun Doo-hwan military group, the Carter administration did not 
grant the group formal recognition. By contrast, the Reagan administration did 
recognise the Chun regime and made an early decision to invite the new South Korean 
President to Washington in January 1981. 
At several critical points of the South Korean power transition after the assassination of 
President Park, Japan intervened effectively to encourage the establishment of a new 
military regime. Unlike the US, the Ohira Cabinet exerted its influence in an attempt to 
stabilise the political situation in South Korea by deliberately supporting the most 
powerful group, the new military leadership led by General Chun. Subsequently, the 
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Suzuki cabinet successfully put sustained pressure on the new regime to commute the 
death sentence against Kim Dae-jung who was one of the most prominent political 
rivals of President Park. 
The thesis consists of an Introduction (Chapter 1); three main parts, each of which 
contains two chapters; and a Conclusion (Chapter 8). Part One develops the study's 
analytical framework and historical overview of the political interactions between the 
US, Japan and South Korea. The thesis examines the operation of the Triangular 
Alliance Security System (TASS, referred to Ch. 2) and its interaction with the domestic 
political circumstances of the three member states. There is a particular focus on the 
differences between the roles of the US and Japan within the TASS. 
Chapter 2 presents the key concepts, analytical framework and hypotheses that guide 
the rest of the study. Among the key concepts, particular emphasis is placed on the 
following: "the alliance model", "the triangular alliance security system (TASS)", 
"intra-alliance politics", "alliance management", the "direct and immediate challenge" 
facing a member country, "the US flexible status quo policy" and "the Japanese rigid 
status quo policy", and the difference between US "offensive intervention" and 
Japanese "defensive intervention". 
Chapter 3 discusses the formation and evolution of the East Asian Triangular System of 
Alliance Security (TASS) from 1965 to 1978, using the key concepts and analytical 
framework developed in Chapter 2. There is a focus on the ways in which new 
immediate and direct challenges facing the US affected the cohesion of the TASS; and 
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on the responses of Japan and South Korea to US demands relating to the American war 
effort in Vietnam. The research seeks to provide an extensive inventory of the 
mechanisms that generated difficulties for the trilateral relationship and the various 
bilateral relationships in play within the East Asian anti-communist alliance system 
during the period under review. The chapter seeks to show how the TASS was 
transformed from a latent war-community into a low-level political community on the 
basis of continuous consultation and debates related to military security and political 
stability in the region. 
Parts Two and Three examine the US and Japanese interventions in the South Korean 
regime transition during 1979-80, and the related political turmoil. Part Two focuses on 
an investigation into the goals, means and effectiveness of the US and Japanese political 
interventions between January and October 1979 in terms of their respective strategies 
of offensive intervention and defensive intervention. In Chapter 4, the inter-relationship 
between the demise of the Park regime and mutually exclusive US policies, represented 
by the suspension of the troop withdrawal policy and the human rights drive, is 
examined in order to determine why and how the Park regime came to an end. 
Chapter 5 covers the period from January to October 1979. The discussion begins with 
an analysis of the Japanese evaluation of US-South Korea policy, and the rationale and 
methods of Japan's exertion of influence on South Korean politics during the regime 
transition. Japan's independent views and assumptions about the US management of 
South Korean politics are investigated as key factors underlying the distinctive policy 
decisions taken by the Japanese towards South Korea. 
10 
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Part Three spans the period from November 1979 to January 1981. Chapter 6 discusses 
the reasons for the American failure to establish a broadly based civilian government in 
South Korea. It investigates the shift of American policy priorities in the critical 
junctures of the regime transition, and the US intervention strategy after the demise of 
the Yushin System. ' The main emphasis is on the rationale behind American self- 
restraint towards the first coup led by General Chun Doo-hwan, a loyal follower of the 
late President Park Chung-hee. An effort is also made to show why and how the Iranian 
political crisis affected the South Korean policy of the Carter administration. 
Chapter 7 examines how Japan became involved in the rise of General Chun as a power 
holder of the military through the 12 December Coup 1979, and how Japan sought to 
protect Chun from the efforts of the Carter administration to make him take military 
retirement. Then attention turns to another critical juncture-the emergence of a new 
military regime-when the Chun group became the main target of opposition and 
dissident forces. The complicity of the Ohira Cabinet in the second coup of 17 May 
1980 is also discussed. Then the chapter turns to consider the actions and measures 
taken by Japan to promote the formal recognition and consolidation of the new military 
regime. The Kim Dae-jung issue is dealt with in the last part of this chapter. Each 
chapter of Part Three, as an extension of the contrast between the offensive and 
defensive interventions of the US and Japan respectively, compares the US flexible 
status quo policy and the Japanese rigid status quo policy in order to explain the 
operational principles of the two states in relation to the South Korean question. 
5 The South Korean political system under the Yushin Constitution adopted in October 1972 which gives 
predominant power to the President over any other institution including the National Assembly (see Ch. 3 
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Chapter 8, the Conclusion, summarises the main arguments of the thesis and emphasises 
the validity of the analytical framework. The implications for other related studies in 
Asian security, democratisation and regionalisation are also considered, and attention is 
given to significant research limitations and possible directions for further work. 
and Sohn (1989): p. 23). 
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PART ONE 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW OF THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY 
SYSTEM (TASS) 
Part One contains two chapters: Chapter 2 presents the analytical framework of the 
research, and Chapter 3 develops an interpretation based on this framework of the 
historical evolution of the trilateral relations between the US, Japan and South Korea. 
Chapter 2 discusses the need for a systemic approach to the analysis of the political 
interactions between the three countries. ' For the purpose, the concept of a Triangular 
Alliance Security System (TASS) is formulated and explained. There is a particular focus 
on the process of alliance management as a key aspect of intra-alliance politics. The 
rationales behind the contrasting political actions of the US and Japan towards South 
Korea are explained in terms of the distinction between the "flexible status quo" 
orientation of the US and the "rigid status quo" orientation of Japan. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to an interpretation of the evolution of US-Japan-South Korean 
relations and the formation of the TASS. It seeks to show how the "de facto" alliance, 
established as a latent war-community, was transformed into a low-level political 
community through the experience of continuous consultation and debates related to 
military security and political stability issues in the region. 
' Snyder and Diesing (1977) define the interaction of states as a "behavioral process, the actual encounters 
or communicative exchange between states. " These include any behaviour that "affects others in some way, 
including their expectations of the actor's future behavior, and/or which is influenced by expectations of 
others' responses. " 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 Analytical Framework 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: INTRA-ALLIANCE 
POLITICS IN THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY 
SYSTEM (TASS) 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to develop an analytical framework for the study of intra-alliance 
politics among the US, Japan and South Korea during the Cold War period with particular 
reference to the regime transition in South Korea during 1979-80. 
Existing studies of the South Korean regime transition are inadequate because they do not 
examine the intervening role of Japan in shaping US strategy towards that transition and 
its management. 2 The focus of the existing literature tends to be on the primacy of the US 
role behind the emergence of the Chun Doo-hwan military regime after the demise of 
Park Chung-hee's Yushin System; and usually democratisation theory is applied to 
explain how the US failed to promote democracy and ensure a smooth transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a more liberal government. These studies tend to overlook the 
2 Fowler (1999) criticises existing accounts of the regime transition in South Korea in 1979-1980, utilising 
recently declassified documents. Unfortunately, however, his study is unsuccessful in unveiling the 
rationales of US intervention and investigating the reasons for the failed promotion of democracy. The 
absence of any attention to the role of Japan is also a weakness of his research. On the application of 
systemic approaches to Middle East international relations, see Gause 111 (1999). 
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contribution of Japanese intervention and the broader trilateral political interactions 
between the US, Japan and South Korea. In order to overcome these limitations, the 
single most important question at the outset concerns the choice of an alternative 
analytical framework. In order to accommodate a general view of the trilateral relations 
between these countries, systemic alliance management theory is applied in this study as 
a particularly useful theoretical framework. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the need for a systemic approach, and presents 
the concept of a Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS) to characterise the US- 
Japan-South Korea alliance structure. Then the focus turns to the question of the 
interactive features of the three countries. A contrast is then drawn between the basic 
operating principles of the US and Japan in dealing with the South Korean question, so 
that the different political interventions of the US and Japan towards the South Korean 
regime transition of 1979-1980 can be better understood. 
2.1 A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TOWARDS AN ALLIANCE MODEL 
Bilateral explanations of the international relations between the United States, Japan and 
South Korea cannot fully reflect the complexity of these states' closely interwoven 
trilateral interdependence and interactions in the security area. This is because the system 
as a whole is more than the sum of its constituent parts. As Waltz puts it, "If the 
organization of units affects their behavior and their interactions, then one cannot predict 
outcomes or understand them merely by knowing the characteristics, purposes, and 
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interactions of the system's units. "' For instance, in discussing US-Japanese security 
relations, the broader security environment in the Korean peninsula and the changing 
political situation within South Korea are clearly of immense significance and cannot be 
ignored. By the same token, the discussions of US-South Korean security relations must 
pay attention to the functions of US military forces stationed in Japan and the scope of 
Japan's own security involvement. Similarly, studies of Japan-South Korea relations 
must take into account the nature and scope of US security commitments to both 
countries. 
Even though there have been increasing demands to develop a new analytical approach 
reflecting the unique traits of Northeast Asian international politics, ' hitherto there has 
been no systematic attempt to develop a comprehensive trilateral framework. 5 As a result, 
empirical and theoretical studies of the dynamics of political interaction between the 
three countries in the security area have not yet reached the stage where they can offer a 
convincing explanation of the past, an understanding of the present, and a prescription for 
the future. One of the main purposes of the present research is to fill this gap and build a 
new systemic perspective that is capable of revealing the complex reality of 
interdependence among the US, Japan and South Korea. However, two major factors 
have hindered the development of such an approach in this particular case: the absence of 
a formal, collective security organisation among the three countries; and the ideological 
3 Waltz (1979): p. 39. For an extended review of literature about the concept of international system, see 
Brecher and James (1986): pp. 3-12. 
4 Yamamoto (1997). 
' The series on US alliance relations in East Asia published by the Institute for International Studies, 
Stanford University clearly exposes this problem because of its lack of a systemic approach, although the 
studies do employ alliance theories. For more details, see the list of research papers published in 1997-8 at 
the following website: http: //www. stanford. edu/group/APARC/. 
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attacks of communist countries on all efforts to enhance trilateral defence readiness. In 
this chapter, the focus is on how the first of these constraints can be overcome. The 
second constraint will be discussed in more detail, with relevant examples, in Chapter 3. 
Waltz defines "system" as a set, rather than a mere collection, of interacting units. ' In 
terms of its analytical utility, he argues, any approach or theory, if it is rightly termed 
"systemic", must show how the system level, or structure, is distinct from the level of 
interacting units, how it affects the interacting units, and how they in turn affect the 
structure. 7 On the question of identifying the boundary of a certain system, Waltz 
emphasises the subjective sense of the belongingness of "self-regarding units"! In the 
case of the US, Japan and South Korea, their common threat perception and interests of 
their policy elites provide the basis of this subjective sense of belongingness and 
interdependence. In terms of its objective characteristics, according to Brecher and 
Yehuda, an international system can be identified when "a set of actors who are situated 
in a configuration of power (structure), are involved in regular patterns of interaction 
(process), are separated from other units by boundaries set by a given issue, and are 
constrained in their behaviour from within (context) and from outside the system 
(environment). "' In the Northeast Asian sub-regional system, therefore, the systemic 
boundary can be identified by observing the relatively exclusive, continual interaction of 
units among themselves. 
6 Waltz (1979): p. 40. In Buzan's terms (1991: p. 193), "a system" is "the overall searrfless web of security 
interdependence" which has "relative indifference" from other states or international actors and which 
accumulates "patterns shaped by the different intensities of the lines of amity and enmity. " 
7 Waltz (1979): p. 40. 
" Ibid.: p. 91. 
9 Brecher and Yehuda (1985): p. 17. 
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If we apply these conceptions of a systemic approach to the Cold War era, as Gilpin 
suggests, there are good reasons for describing it as "the American system, " 
incorporating "the political understandings, military alliances, and economic agreements 
that the United States has entered into with its principal allies since the end of the Second 
World War. "'O In order to maintain the American system in the Cold War era, it was 
essential for the US to attain agreements on objectives and actions to increase cohesion 
within and among allies and to meet various challenges from the Communist bloc. To that 
end, the American system needs to be examined as the ensemble of distinct regional 
sub-systems with various forms of alliance structure. 
The American sub-system of linkages with non-communist states in East Asia during the 
Cold War era was not exactly the same as the sub-systems in Western Europe or other 
regions. With regard to the variety of sub-systems, Yahuda suggests that "Such 
arrangements allowed for significant variation within the region as to how the links or 
junctions between the global, regional and local levels could apply at any given time. "" 
Therefore, the discussion now turns to the structural features of the Northeast Asian 
sub-system, within which the US, Japan and South Korea as components have 
accumulated continual interactions in pursuing their common interests in the security 
area. 
10 Gilpin (1989): p. 3. 
" Yahuda (1996): p. 9. 
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2.2 AN ALLIANCE MODEL: THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY 
SYSTEM (TASS) 
This study argues that common security interests and concerns have been the key factors 
directing the systemic political interactions of the US, Japan and South Korea; and that 
the alliance model is the most suitable framework for analysing these interactions. Some 
scholars, in analyzing alliances, are concerned only with formal "legal" mutual 
commitments. 12 In the defence field, however, various types of alliance have been 
identified. For example, Singer and Small distinguish between three distinct alliance 
forms: defence pacts, which oblige some form of military intervention; neutrality or 
non-aggression pacts, which avoid participation in conflict by some signatories; and 
ententes and alliances, which are commitments where partners agree to "co-operate in a 
crisis. "" Walt defines an alliance in a broad sense as "a formal or informal commitment 
for security cooperation between two or more states. " 14 Many contemporary states, S. M. 
Walt argues, are reluctant to sign formal treaties with their allies, and as a result precise 
distinctions-for example between formal and informal alliances-tend to distort rather 
more than they reveal. Thus, to Walt, an attempt to employ a strict typology of alliance 
commitments can easily be misleading because the precise meaning of either formal or 
informal arrangements is likely to vary from case to case. Thus, he claims, the emphasis 
should be on "changes of behavior or of verbal statements, not of the rewriting of a 
document [i. e. treaty]" as a sign of a changing security commitment. 15 
12 G. Snyder (1990): p. 104; Russett and Starr (1996): p. 88; Kegley and Witkopf (1997). 
13 Singer and Small (198 1): p. 105. 
14 Walt (1987): p. 12. 
'5 Ibid.: pp. 12-14. 
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Based on Walt's broader definition, the plausibility of the alliance model in the case of 
US-Japan-South Korea relations can now be considered in general terrns. When we 
discuss a set of countries as constituting a system or sub-system, two preconditions are 
essential: geographical proximity and the recognition of a common issue requiring 
action. 16 In terms of the latter precondition, this was met by the US aspiration for the 
building of a collective security pact with Japan and South Korea. Within a few years 
after the end of the Korean War (ended in mid 1953), the US sought to establish a 
collective Northeast Asian security system with Japan and South Korea. 17 In addition, 
during the Cold War, physical proximity bound the three countries together to deter the 
military threat from the Communist bloc. The question of geographical proximity is more 
complex because of the vast distance between the two Asian allies and the United States. 
However, due to the absence of any other substantive power in the Pacific Ocean, and the 
geopolitical importance of this part of the world to the US, the US, Japan and South Korea 
were still able to use their common security and defence interests to work together. " 
However, a truly collective security system could not be realised due to the Japanese 
constitutional constraint represented by Article 9", and the strong domestic opposition in 
16 Brecher and Yehuda (1985): p. 17; Brecher and James (1986): p. 7-10. Brecher and James, even though 
they accept that a subsystem has two strands of geographical proximity and issue, argue that "international 
systems do not require the physical proximity of actors. " (p. 10) 
17 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS, hereafter], 1955-57, VoL XXIII. - p. 15; FRUS, 1958-60, 
VoLXVIII. - pp. 13 -14. 
18 In mid-1960, the US embassy in Tokyo re-emphasised the position of Japan as a "key to the Western 
Pacific island chain" (FRUS, 1958-1960 VoL XVIII. - p. 383). Buzan defines "region" in security terms as a 
distinct and significant subsystem of security relations that exists among a set of states which have been 
locked into geographical proximity with each other. A step further is to have "shared characteristics, 
patterned interactions, and shared perceptions. " The density and significance of interaction determine a 
region as a unit of an analysis (Buzan, 1991: p. 288; 1998: pp. 68-74). 
'9 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, adopted during the US occupation, renounced war as a sovereign 
national right and rejected the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes as follows: 
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on Justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. 
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Japan to such a strategy. Therefore the US built a system of alliance security in which 
"groups of states allied with each other, principally against possible external threats. "" 
Figure 2.1 The Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS) 
The United States 
Hub-spoke 1 
Japan 
Hub-spoke 2 
South Korea 
Connection of the two spokes 
Initially, the United States set up a series of "hub-spoke" arrangements with Japan and 
South Korea (see Figure 2.1), 21 through which it conjoined non-communist countries to 
enter into a tight web of bilateral treaties as one of the major sub-systems of the American 
system in Northeast Asia. The first "hub-spoke arrangement was expressed in the 
Security Treaty between the US and Japan signed in Tokyo on 28 February 1952 and 
revised in the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security signed in Washington on 19 
January 1960. The second hub-spoke arrangement was fon-ned in the 1954 Mutual 
Defence Treaty between the US and South Korea. From the American viewpoint, these 
two treaties constituted "formal recognition of [US] responsibility for the peace and 
In order to accomplish the aim of the pereceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not recognized. " (Nonaka 
1993): p. 114. 
20 A. Roberts defines collective security a system, regional or global, in which each participating state 
accepts that security is the concern of all, and agrees to join a collective response to aggression. (1996): p. 
310). 
2' Hook uses the term "hub-and-spokes security system" adopted from officials in the US like James Baker 
(1996: p. 184). 
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security of the Far East assumed during World War II and its aftermath. "" Despite the 
two "hub-spoke" arrangements, the linking of the two "hub-spokes" was imperative and 
realised with the Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan 
signed in Tokyo on 22 June 1965 (the necessity and logic of the treaty will be explained in 
Chapter 3). 
With respect to the strategic significance of the South Korea-Japan diplomatic 
norinalisation, South Korean President Park Chung-hee declared after the conclusion of 
the June 1965 treaty: "South Korea and Japan-as free states in the Far East-are 
walking on the path where we share the same destination [in security and prosperity]. "" 
In September 1964, the Japanese Cabinet Investigation Office expressed its positive 
evaluation of the interconnection of security concerns between Japan and South Korea: 
"Japan is an indispensable base for the defence of South Korea. Conversely, South Korea 
controls the entrance to the Japan Sea and is extremely important for the security of 
Japan. "" The diplomatic non-nalisation treaty was "a framework of the international 
system" among Japan, South Korea and the US in the region, and was "actually a 
trilateral agreement in which the US was the unspoken partner, as the crucial military ally 
of both. countries. "" Thus, following Keohane's argument that "to develop a systemic 
analysis, abstraction is necessary, "" this sub-system can legitimately be termed a 
Triangular Alliance Security System (TASS) which comprises two "formal" defence 
pacts, and one "implicit and informal" alliance, or at least entente, relations. " 
22 King, Jr. (1959): p. 105. 
23 Cited in Okonogi (1985). 
" Bix (1973): pp. 212-13. 
25 Okonogi (1985): p. 20; McCormack (1977): p. 135.. 
26 Keohane (1989): p. 4 1. 
27 Based on Waltzian structural realism, Wriggins argues that "the states in each region can be seen as 
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2.3 THE SOURCES OF FLUIDITY IN ALLIANCE RELATIONS 
The question of how alliance relations operate deserves careful examination. Regional or 
sub-regional systems produce distinct patterns of interactions based on their own unique 
forms of co-operation and conflict. Within an asymmetric alliance composed of one 
superpower, one regional power, " and one local power, the national interests of the three 
countries inevitably differ due to gaps of national power, national strategy, and the 
unequal geographical distance from the threat. In the case of the TASS, as will be seen in 
Part Two and Three, these factors led to contradictory policy outcomes based on separate 
assessments of the global balance of power and the specific security envirorunent in East 
Asia, and this in turn resulted in problems of mutual credibility between the weaker and 
the stronger states. Additionally, as an intervening variable affecting the coherence and 
cleavage of an alliance, this research employs the term "direct and immediate challenge" 
for the heuristic purpose of explaining how the priority of a member state fluctuates even 
though the structural national interests of the alliance members remain the same. 
2.3.1 Endogenous Factors: Gaps in National Power and Differences in National 
Strategies 
In tenns of the intrinsic sources of coherence and cleavage of an alliance, Yahuda 
functioning within a regionalsecuritysystein in the belief that this notion leads us" to better understand the 
dynamics of [the regional] relations" (Wriggins et al., 1992: p. 7). Okonogi (1985: p. 25) sees the Japan- 
ROK Treaty as "a Japan-U. S. -South Korean tripartite system in Northeast Asia. " Opposition parties in 
Japan contended that the treaty would result in the fonnation of a Northeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(NEATO) including Washington, Tokyo and Seoul (Cho, 1967: pp. 703,720-1). More officially, Defense 
ofJapan 1997 published by Japanese Defense Agency charaterised it "quasi-alliance" (The JDA, 1997): p. 
86-87. 
28 This study uses "regional power" and "major power" interchangeably, as is the case with "global power" 
and "superpower". 
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highlights "the points of junction and disjunction between the global, regional and local 
level of politics. " This is of great significance in the case of the TASS, given the 
alliance's "multi-layered power structure" consisting of one superpower (the US), one 
regional power (Japan) and one local state (South Korea) . 
29The 
asymmetric spheres of 
influence of the three countries in the security area, reflecting different national powers 
and strategies, results in different perspectives in foreign policy-making that distinguish 
the US from Japan and from South Korea. 
Table 2.1 Asymmetric Spheres of Influence of the US, Japan and South Korea 
Sphere of 
Influence 
Predominant Security 
Interests 
I Military Concerns I 
TSA Global Global stability USA 
Japan Regional Regional stability Japan 
S. Korea Local National survival and 
Territorial integrity 
S. Korea 
*I indicates the direction of the active priorities of the country in question. 
The US, Japan and South Korea shared the primary Cold War objective of deterring the 
threats of communist adversaries. However, the primary security interests and military 
concerns of the three countries were not identical. As indicated in Table 2.1, in the case of 
a global challenge, the interests of all three countries would lead them to work together 
under the leadership of the US. In the case of a regional challenge, Japan and South Korea 
would co-operate, but the US might not do so if it did not consider such action to be vital, 
or if it faced more pressing concerns in other parts of the world. In the case of a local 
challenge, the US and Japan would be active provided the challenge seemed to be vital, 
and there were not other more pressing concerns elsewhere. In order to understand this 
29 Yahuda (1996): p. 7. 
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idea of different spheres of influence, it is necessary to investigate the gaps in the national 
power parities of the three countries. 
The measurement of a nation's power parity is a complex task. Table 2.2 brings together 
some commonly used indices, from a range of sources, relating to the situation of the US, 
Japan, South Korea and the USSR in 1980. 
Table 2.2 Power Capability Rankings (1980) 
GNP Cline Singer German Nuclear 
Warheads 
Rank Norm Rank Norm Rank Norm Rank Norm 
USA 1 1000 2 1000 2 1000 2 1000 12000 
Japan 3 406 5 355 3 356 3 220 0 
S. Korea 25 21 10 152 13 74 13 39 0 
USSR 2 469 1 1509 1 1 1127 1 1253 10 
Sources: Adapted from Taber (1989): p. 36 (with regard to the components of each index, see pp. 33-4) 
and Kugler and Abertman (1989): p. 77 (nuclear warheads). 
Disparities of national power cause strains in alliance relations because they lead each 
member country to perceive specific threats differently, and affect the scope of the 
alliance activity, even though the existence of strains and stresses is one of the inevitable 
dynamics of any alliance system. They have a direct impact on the shaping of national 
strategies of each country, and on the objectives of alliance policy. 
Because of the predominant influence of the US in the TASS, a brief summary of US 
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national strategy needs to be made at this point. US strategy in the post-World War 11 era, 
according to National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum NSC-68, on 14 April 1950, 
was designed "to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive 
and flourish. "" This core objective is to be achieved by embracing "two subsidiary 
policies. " First, there was "a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international 
community", which must be pursued "even if there were no Soviet threat. " Then, the 
policy of "containing the Soviet system" followed, which became "the most durable 
foreign policy priority" and "a national fixation. "" The memorandum asserted that 
"These tNvo policies are closely interrelated and interact one another. "" Here, the raison 
d'&re of American unilateralism, coupled with the US global sphere of influence (Table 
2.1) and its superpower capability (Table 2.2), led to the core aim of protecting the 
American system as the single highest priority in US foreign policy. The clear implication 
was, and is, that this ultimate goal will not be discarded as long as the US retains its status 
as a superpower. From the start, the US insisted that its Asia policy should be 
subordinated to this line (in NSC 48/5 adopted on 17 May 195 1): 
United States objectives, policies and courses of action in Asia should be designed to 
contribute toward the global objective of strengthening the free world vis-A-vis the Soviet 
orbit, and determined with due regard to the relations of United States capabilities and 
commitment throughout the world. " 
While. the US attached priority to security concerns, Japan placed a higher value on 
economic rehabilitation, insisting on the principle of the "separation of politics from 
30 FRUS, 1950, VoLP p. 252. 
31 Ibid.: p. 252; Gaddis (1992): p. 18. 
32 Ibid.: p. 252. 
33 FRUS, 1951, VOL VL p. 34. 
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economics (seik-ei bunri). " As a result, there had remained significant differences in the 
national strategies of the two countries, despite the treaty and continual dialogues and 
exchanges of ideas. " However, this does not necessarily mean that the alliance relations 
between Japan and the US have been a simple "marriage of convenience. "" It must also 
be appreciated that there have inevitably been variations in American and Japanese 
national policies. Gaddis classifies various levels of containment policy towards the 
Soviet Union: overthrowing the regime; confining Soviet influence within the boundaries 
of the USSR; competitive coexistence; co-operative coexistence and changing the 
USSR's internal structure. " When the US pursued the fourth and fifth of these aims, its 
allies regarded it as a retreat into isolationism, sometimes under the banner of d6tente, and 
sometimes in the name of moralistic leadership emphasising human rights objectives. 
Japan has also exhibited one major variation from seikei bunri strategty in accepting US 
demands for burden-sharing. These variations suggest that there has been some room for 
the reconciliation of differences in national strategies between the US and Japan. By 
contrast, as indicated in Table 2.1, South Korea, at least during the Cold War era, had no 
alternative but to stick to the security-first policy against the North. 
With regard to the differences of objectives of alliance policy, Morgenthau classifies 
alliances into two types: the alliance versus world domination, and the alliance versus a 
counter-alliance. " A scrutiny of these two broad categories reveals two added 
dimensions: an alliance built upon the strategic consensus emerges from the first type, 
34 Gilpin (1987: pp. 3-8,10) stresses the potential for conflicts because of 'the fundamentally differing 
attitudes of the two countries toward their relationship" which might lead to "a serious breakdown in 
American-Japanese relations. " 
35 Tsuchiyama. (1997): p. 19. 
3' Gaddis (1992): pp. 18-46; see FRUS, 1955-1957 VoL XIX: pp. 30-6. 
37 Morgenthau, (1985): pp. 207-13. 
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and an alliance built upon the counter-balance in a particular condition emerges from the 
second type. Relating these propositions to the characteristics of the North-East Asian 
asymmetric alliance structure, it seems that an alliance versus world domination was the 
goal of US alliance strategy at the global level, since this strategy targeted at an 
adversarial superpower, the Soviet Union. This principle has continued to underpin 
American interests in the post-Cold War era, even though the Soviet Union collapsed. " 
By contrast, the strategies of Japan and South Korea fit into the pattern of an alliance 
versus a counter-alliance. In the former case, the aim is to achieve defence against a 
regional security threat; in the latter case, the aim is to achieve a local level of deterrence 
against North Korea. 
The differences between their national strategies of the three countries remained fairly 
constant throughout the Cold War era. In consequence, the political dynamics between 
the three constituent nations of the TASS have resulted in a definite fluidity of the 
alliance's internal structure. 
2.3.2 The Exogenous Factor: Direct and Immediate Challenge 
Coupled with endogenous factors, external stimuli to the cohesion of the TASS must also 
be taken into account in order to explain the dynamics of alliance relations. For heuristic 
purposes, these factors, as an intervening variable, will be referred to by the tenn "direct 
and immediate challenge". " In particular circumstances, a state confronts a "challenge" 
38 Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (1992): p. 5. 
31 it is necessary to distinguish a "direct and immediate challenge" from a "crisis". J. M. Roberts (1988: pp. 
9-10) summarises the difficulty of defining "crisis": "It is because definitions are either too specific and 
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that directly threatens its vital interests, value systems, international prestige, and the 
continuing existence of the incumbent administration by testing its legitimacy. Such 
threats are exacerbated by their dominating presence in the mass media and their 
consequent elevation to the status of major public interest issues. Such direct and 
immediate challenges tend to be abrupt and unpredictable, which obstructs their effective 
resolution. In some instances, on the other hand, a threat may not be regarded initially 
with sufficient gravity and seriousness. These characteristics imply that situation- 
assessment and response decisions must be enacted in highly volatile and unpredictable 
circumstances under which ajoint, optimally effective reaction among member countries 
of an alliance is quite difficult. 
As a direct and immediate challenge gains and loses momentum, cleavage or cohesion 
within an alliance is prone to appear. Each challenge is likely to be assessed in different 
ways and allocated a different priority by the member states of the alliance. Considering 
the fact that the TASS is asymmetrical and hierarchical, and includes three uneven 
members, the types of challenge confronted by the US are particularly significant in 
maintaining the overall coherence of the system. As junior partners of the US, Japan and 
South Korea have on occasion sought to exploit events and circumstances to their own 
advantage. Sometimes, however, they have voiced protests and antagonised the senior 
partner at the risk of generating cleavage within the alliance. Therefore the kinds of direct 
and immediate challenges that individual member countries face offer an important 
starting-point for analysing the state of convergence and divergence in the TASS at 
therefore not applicable to a variety of situations, or so broadly inclusive as to blur distinctions between 
crisis and non-crisis. " The word "crisis" comes from the ancient Greek medical analogy of "a turning point", 
which suggests that "in a disease ... the outcome is to be recovery or death. " In other words, the outcome 
may be favourable or unfavourable. 
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different times in the alliance's development (The reliability of the term "direct and 
immediate challenge" will be discussed in Chapters 3,5 and 7). 
In general, as Morgenthau observes, "a typical alliance is imbedded in a dynamic field of 
diverse interests and putposes, "" with the central concerns being the mutual benefits in 
the security area. At the same time, alliance durability has been rooted in the self-restraint 
of the three countries, therefore, the members have a strong tendency not to terminate an 
alliance by excessive pursuit of adverse policies. Put differently, members of an alliance 
continue to keep changes "below the threshold of reversibility. "" In case of the TASS, 
the national strategies of the three members states have remained relatively constant. This 
makes possible the task of extracting distinctive patterns of interaction among the three 
countries. 
2.4 THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF THE TASS AND "DISSIMILAR- 
INTEGRATIVE" TYPE INTERACTION 
Alliance relationships during the Cold War era were rigidly structured. A 
"corresponding" and "regular" interaction process in a certain system, 42 reflecting "a set 
of mutual expectations among members regarding the behavior of the other partners, "" 
emerged in the rigid structure of the bipolar world. In conjunction with an understanding 
of the sources of internal fluidity, it is also essential to know why an asymmetric alliance 
40 Morgenthau (1985): p. 19 1. 
41 Brecher and Yehuda (1985): p. 19. 
42 Ibid.: p. 17. 
43 Russett and Starr (1996): p. 88. Brecher and James argue that "a system has both static and dynamic 
components" (1986): p. 10. 
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can, as in the case of TASS, work reasonably well for several decades. In other words, the 
limits of intra-alliance conflicts need to be determined. 
As discussed in Section 2.3, there have been persistent differences in national strategy, 
which reflect and determine individual interests, threat perceptions, assessments of the 
global and regional balance of power and the security environment, between the US, 
Japan, and South Korea. " As a result, as Simmons puts it, "One state may view a bonding 
relationship as being one type of alliance, while another will perceive the linkage in a 
different light. This asymmetry of expectations by alliance partners will lead to 
unbalanced demands and commitments. "" In the case of the TASS, some of the alliance's 
basic features have placed limits on the extent of intra-alliance conflict. The fundamental 
basis of the TASS is the US military presence in Japan and South Korea. US combat 
forces in South Korea are of particular significance in that South Korea is a projected 
46 force that shares a geographical border with hostile forces (in North Korea). Due to 
geographical proximity, US forces in South Korea, as a "trip wire" triggering automatic 
American military intervention in any military dispute with North Korea, are a tangible 
expression of the US security commitment to Japan. Thus, the self-serving interests the 
44 J. Roberts (1988): p. 27. 
45 Simmons (1975): p. 259. 
" Although the United States-South Korea defence treaty did not obligate the US to station its combat 
troops on South Korean soil, successive US administrations continued to maintain the constant level of 
military strength in the Korean peninsula during the Cold War era. From the earliest stage -- before the 
Korean War -- the role of the US combat forces was not solely confined to the external and internal security 
of South Korea and the US national interest there, but also had to consider the repercussions on the US 
position in Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. (FRUS, 1949, VoL VII: pp. 942-52,969-78). In addition to 
its effective deterrence of North Korea's possible aggression, the other purposes of US military policy in 
South Korea can be summarised as follows: (1) to avoid hegemony by any major power in the Korean 
peninsula; (2) to exert a restraint on South Korea's unilateral military actions; (3) to provide an umbrella for 
South Korea's continued economic expansion; (4) to give tangible assurance of US support for South 
Korea's peaceful initiatives toward North Korea; and (5) to serve as a symbol of America's continuing 
interest in the overall stability of the region, especially with regard to Japan. (Lee and Sato, 1982): p. 102. 
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US have been turned into overriding common interests between the three countries. At 
the same time, any change to the status of the US military presence has been regarded as 
one of the most serious sources of disruption to the cohesion of the alliance. 
In order to examine the established patterns of interaction with the TASS that have led to 
reasonable alliance stability, the comment of Hermann is pertinent: "critical variables 
must be maintained within certain findts or the instability of the system will be greatly 
increased" (emphasis added). " As long as a certain grouping of states is called an alliance, 
there are inevitably spoken or unspoken limits to divergent interests and the disruptive 
actions that members can initiate. 
Table 2.3 Four Types of Interactive Patterns in Sub-systems 
Type Content 
Similar-Integrative Homogeneity in religion and culture facilitates negotiations and 
compromise among actors in a system. 
Similar-Disintegrative The presence of ethnic minorities of similar origin in contiguous states 
increases turmoil and the tendency to hostile bebehaviour. 
Dissimilar-Integrative Economic and technological heterogeneity among actors leads to 
increasing interdependence, specialisation and mutual co-operation. 
Dissimilar- Political regimes with different ideologies induce competition for 
Disintegrative leadership and sphere of influence. 
Source: Adapted from Brecher and Yehuda (1985): p. 17. 
Brecher and Yehuda distinguish between four different types of interactive patterns in a 
system, and their typology is based on a variety of factors-economic, military, social, 
political and cultural-all of which can contribute to a system's heterogeneity or 
homogeneity. The case of the US-Japan-South Korea alliance, matches the third 
47 C. Herman (1972): p. 10. 
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("dissimilar-integrative") type (see Table 2.3). The US has provided Japan and South 
Korea with a strategic defence capacity through its military presence and nuclear 
umbrella. This US security commitment is the fundamental foundation of the TASS. In 
response, Japan had supplied material facilities and economic support. " South Korea, 
standing on the front line against communism, has shouldered the biggest cost (i. e. the 
risk of total war in its own territory) and provided manpower readiness. In terms of 
economic capacity, the US and Japan, as global leaders, may be regarded as 
homogeneous, but South Korea's level of development introduces a degree of 
heterogeneity into the triangular alliance. In terms of military capability, due to its 
possessions of nuclear weapons, US enjoys a superior position, and thus the alliance is 
characterised by heterogeneity. Both Japan and South Korea depend on the US security 
commitment and military presence in their countries. In a sense, they share a 
homogeneous perception of their own insecurity. This is reinforced their geographical 
proximity and cultural homogeneity, which lessens miscommunication between Japan 
and South Korea. " The question of politics, the central theme of this research, is more 
complex. The US and South Korea could hardly be more different, with the former 
having a liberal democratic political system and the latter being subject to authoritarian 
rule until the end of the Cold War era. Between these two extremes, Japan has the 
characteristics of both a Westernised democratic state and a regime based on one-party 
dominance (Chapter 5 will investigate how the close cultural and political homogeneity 
between Japan and South Korea affects their alliance interests positively). The most 
important observation here is that Japan, as a middle member and the rear base of the 
alliance, has played the role of cementing the relationship between the US and South 
K. Sakamoto. (1997): p. 6. 
Buss (1982): p. 105. 
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Korea when political obstacles to the enhancement of alliance goals have emerged. In 
general, despite the differences between them in terms of national power parity and 
strategy, the US, Japan and South Korea have secured sources of interdependence as a 
systemic unit. 
2.5 ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF THE US AND JAPAN ON 
THE KOREAN QUESTION: THE FLEXIBLE STATUS QUO AND THE RIGID 
STATUS QUO 
The contrasting intervention strategies of the US and Japan in relation to the regime 
transition in South Korea (1979-80) can be explained in terms of the fundamental 
difference between the two countries' basic orientations: while the US followed a flexible 
status quo policy linked to offensive intervention, Japan followed a rigid status quo policy 
in accordance with defensive intervention. 'O 
2.5.1 Political Intervention 
One of the key tasks of diplomacy is to contribute to order and change in foreign 
countries, 51 and an alliance is one of the main diplomatic tools used by large nations to 
control and dominate smaller alliance partners, and by smaller allies to manipulate larger 
'0 For one classic example revealing the different views of the status quo among members of an alliance, see 
Morgenthau (1985): pp. 484-5. He compares the British interpretation with others such as the Austrian, 
Prussian, Russian and French in the Holy Alliance in the early nineteenth century. Unlike the British 
interpretation, the latter countries understood that they could intervene in the internal affairs of all nations in 
which the institution of the absolute monarchy seemed to be in danger. 
5' Cited in Barston (1997): p. 2. 
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alliance partners. " An alliance security system is created to provide an order and an 
environment in which the alliance leader is safe and secure. In order to maintain the 
equilibrium of alliance objectives, the leader controls and restrains the behaviour of 
allies. " In practical tenns, the US has taken account of the disruptive pressures in the 
TASS, both internal and external, and tried to resolve them in its favour. Employing 
vanous means to prop up a friendly regime or undermine a hostile regime by the secret 
channeling of funds, arms, and organising a military coup against the opposition" falls 
certainly into the category of intervention. In contemporary international relations, 
intervention is a fact of life, for a feature of the international system is that it creates a 
self-perpetuating web of interdependence. In the political sense, Surhke suggests that 
intervention means "an act aimed at the political structure of the target nation, and one 
which departs from existing policy of the intervening nation. "" From the vantage point of 
a leading state in an alliance, continuous political interactions among allies can be called 
"alliance management" because of "an acute awareness of the many risks of sharing their 
fate with allies. "" In terms of the rationales for intervention in an alliance, Kegley and 
Witkopf argue that states "must control the behavior of their own allies" in order to 
"ensure that allies' commitments to one another are faithfully honored, " "discourage each 
member from reckless aggression against its enemies" and "deter defection from 
alliance. "" Thus, in an asymmetric alliance a leading country sometimes intervenes to 
secure the optimal state of the domestic politics of the junior ally that will serve the 
maximum interest of the major partner in an alliance system. The contents of the optimal 
state are inevitably different from one member state to another in a mulitilateral security 
52 Aron (1968): p. 45; Russett and Starr (1996): p. 90. 
'3 Ibid.: p. 90. 
'54 Berridge (1995): p. 5 1. 
'5 Surhke(1973): p. 512. On various means of intervention, see Buzan (1991): pp. 88-90. 
56 Kegley, # and Witkopf (1997): p. 447. 
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system, and the actual types of intervention are also not identical. In particular, as Said, 
Lersche Jr. and Lersche III point out, the defensive and offensive fonns of intervention 
need to be distinguished: 
Defensive intervention aims at the preservation of a particular regime or system, whereas 
offensive intervention is directed at altering a particular regime or a system. Defensive 
intervention has most frequently been based on the assumption that a state, particularly a 
great power, cannot permit the distribution of power in the system to be materially changed 
to its disadvantage by another state's change of government policy. Offensive intervention 
is expansive and has been used to bring about a change of policy or government in another 
state or to eliminate its independence completely. " 
In general, the interests of the US and Japan in South Korea has run parallel in reducing 
North-South tensions and in preventing a renewed large-scale military conflict in which 
either of the two countries could become involved. " The two countries had a common 
interest in the emergence of a strong Korean buffer state. In this sense, they shared an 
emphasis on securing the status quo in the Korean peninsula. Consequently, both 
countries generally intervene in South Korean politics in a defensive and also hiendly 
way. Sometimes, however, as will be explained in Parts Two and Three, US intervention 
became offensive. The US and Japan did not base their interventions on the same 
commanding principles, " and the substance of the status quo did not have the same 
Ibid.: p. 445. 
Said, Lersche Jr., and Lersche 111 (1995): p. 98. 
Weinstein and Kamiya (1980): p. 42. 
60 About a month after General Park Chung-hee's military coup, which toppled the civilian leadership in 
South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi told US President J. Kennedy (on 20 June 1961 in 
Washington) that: "The record of Japan's long history testifies to the fact that the security of Korea is, in 
effect, a domestic problem for Japan. Japan has a very vital stake in Korea. Japan is willing to accept even 
the present regime since it is anti-communist. Although it is important to bring about an improvement in the 
present situation, it is even more essential to prevent a communist takeover of South Korea. " 
(FR US, 19 61-19 63, Vo L XXIL p. 49 0) 
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implications for the two countries. The maintenance of the status quo, as Buzan argues, 
means that "the essential structure of the local complex - its distribution of power, and 
pattern of hostility - remains fundamentally intact", but "for this outcome to occur does 
not mean that no change has taken place. "" In this study the term "flexible status quo" is 
used to denote the imperative of US policy towards the Korea, while the term "rigid status 
quo" denotes the imperative of Japanese policy. 
2.5.2 The US Flexible Status Quo Policy 
The US has continued to place an enormous emphasis on the value of South Korea for its 
national interest. During the Cold War era, only the US has had the capability and will to 
provide South Korea with assurance and assistance necessary for its security and 
defence. 62However, the US security commitment has not been unconditional . 
6' From the 
start, the US made it clear that its policy towards the Korean peninsula and South Korea 
in particular would be determined by the state of the changing pattern of US-Soviet 
structural rivalry and other related issues. " It meant that US-South Korea policy has 
never been based entirely on the need to deter aggression by North Korea. The value of 
South Korea to the US national interest has tended to fluctuate according to changes of 
American global strategy. In order to ensure that South Korea serves US strategy, the US 
61 Buzan (1991): p. 216. Similarly, Oran Young was precise in defining stability both statically and 
dynamically. "In static terms, stability refers to the continuance of the essential variables of an international 
system (i. e. actors, structure, processes, and context) within the bounds of recognizability over time. 
Stability in this sense implies, therefore, an absence of qualitative changes. In dynamic terms, stability can 
be thought of as the tendency of a system to move in the direction of equilibrium following disturbances. " 
Cited in Brecher and James (1986): pp. 14-5. 
62 Han (1980): p. 1084. 
63 See "NSC 8/2", FRUS, 1949 VoL VIL- pp. 955-7. 
64 FRUS, 1949, VoL VII, Part 2: p. 940); see also FRUS, 1955-1957 VoL XIX. - pp. 355,365,429-30. 
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tends to impose external pressure when South Korea is not ready to follow the changing 
focus of US foreign policy. It is occasionally extended in an attempt to force changes in 
the South Korean political system, it combined a flexible status quo orientation and a 
strategy of offensive intervention. From the US point of view, the political unity of South 
Korea has been a crucial requirement as a basis for its alliance strategy. 
For South Korea, the reliance on the US for security has been of critical importance in 
ensuring the survival of South Korea as a state. In such conditions, as Walt notes, "The 
ability to attract and maintain allied support can be a fon-nidable asset, prudent leaders 
will pay close attention to the forces that bring states together or drive them apart. 956S 
South Korean governments have been very sensitive to even small changes in American 
foreign policy and domestic politics, especially in relation to the status of US forces in 
South Korea. Any reduction of US forces in South Korea, let alone possible withdrawal, 
66 has been regarded as abandonment. As Surhke observes, in order to assume a strong 
position for obtaining the alliance leader's economic assistance, political support and 
military commitment, "the smaller partner must maintain internal order, fulfil alliance 
obligations, and isolate domestic conditions from the external functions of the alliance. "" 
In an asymmetrical alliance, the leader must continuously manage the followers' foreign 
and even domestic policies, and the weaker state will seek to realise its national interests 
through constant exertion of its own influence towards the leader. The weaker state 
cannot afford to rely totally on the other party's good will. The position of South Korea 
'5 Walt (1977): p. 156. 
"" FR US, 1949 VoL VII. - pp. 990-9 1. 
67 Surhke (1973): p. 512. 
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within the TASS can be defined as that of a "projected state" located next to its 
communist adversary, and supported by US air and anny bases. " Standing in the front 
line against a possible North Korean attack, South Korea has been able to exert 
disproportionate influence within the alliance above the actual level of its material 
power. " 
Under such conditions, Morgenthau's definition of political power is helpful for 
explaining the political dynamics within an alliance. He defines political power as "a 
psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. 
It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the 
former exerts on the latter's minds. "" Since, in alliance relations, the exertion of the 
leading state's influence is confined to less coercive means, the leader's political power 
implies the followers' voluntary loyalty to the leadership (See the discussion in Chapter 
6). Snyder and Diesing observe that there is an essential tension, "due to the lack of 
realignment options, " between the asymmetry of power dependence between superpower 
and ally and the virtual certainty that the superpower will defend the allies . 
71 j. M. 
Roberts develops this argument as follows: 
The allies can be controlled, but also they can be adventurous if they want. The point is that 
the ally knows that the superpower has an interest in defending it ... Similarly, the degree 
of control that a superpower has over an ally depends upon how much the superpower 
68 Russet and Starr (1996): p. 90. On the concrete aspect of South Korea as a projected state in relation to US 
security concerns, see Mar-tin (1988): pp. 186-7. 
69 Morgenthau (1959). 
70 Morgenthau (1985): p. 30. As a superpower, the US, in order to maintain the American system, had to 
implant the confidence and complete conviction in the minds of its allies that "U. S. strategy and policy 
serve their security as well as its own, and that the United States is committed to their defense and possesses 
the capability to fulfill that commitment. "(FRUS, 1955-1957, VoLXIX. - p. 293) 
71 Snyder and Diesing (1977): pp. 440-2. 
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needs that alliance member. The more it needs a particular state, the less its control over 
that state. 72 
Thus, any change of internal order in South Korea have been seen by the US as dangerous 
if they threatened to contradict the goals of the alliance. In turn, this proposition suggests 
that there was always the possibility that the US, as a superpower, would acquiesce in 
military take-over in an ally as long as the newly emerging military power in a 
strategically valuable location was anti-communist. 
The US-South Korea alliance is a two-way alliance in which both countries make 
strategic gains, but in different ways. This reciprocity has to some extent restricted the 
unilateral freedom of action by either side. " Furthermore, the long-term interaction 
among allies tends to make relations more complicated. As observed by Suhrke, "One 
well-known tactic is to exploit internal dissent within the larger state. This requires some 
familiarity with the political processes of the larger power and a willingness to take the 
risk of associating oneself with the political fortunes of particular domestic factions in the 
larger state. "" In a sense, therefore, alliance management is a delicate and uneasy task to 
implement, and in particular, it is difficult to achieve a specifically designated goal. 
2.5.3 The Japanese Rigid Stants Quo Policy 
Kegley and Witkopf define the relentless pursuit of the junior or second-tier alliance 
partners' independent spheres of activities as bi-polycentrism: "Although the 
72 J. Roberts (1988): pp. 20-3. 
73 Nam (1986): p. 154. 
74 Surhke (1973): p. 511. Keohane also stresses the rewards of this tactic (Keohane, 197 1). 
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superpowers remained dominant militarily, this less-rigid system allowed other states to 
perform new foreign policy roles, other than simply aligned or nonaligned. "" This 
principle can be applied not only to the relations between a junior member of an alliance 
and a superpower of the other alliance (e. g. in US-Romanian relations and Soviet-French 
relations) but also to the relations between junior partners within an alliance when they 
have their own intrinsic common interests or face common threats. It is not easy to 
compare the degree of US and Japanese vital interests in the Korean Peninsula. Certainly, 
the level of Japanese interests has never been less than that of the US" (see Chapter 3); 
but at the same time the level of US interests has tended to fluctuate, especially during the 
Carter administration, when South Korea was no longer perceived as a "vital" interest. 
Referring to the sources of conflict and strain in an alliance, J. M. Roberts argues that: 
"Each ally has different interests, and may feel threatened in different degrees from 
different quarters as a result of geographical locations and particular conflicts with 
different members of the other alliance. "" In this respect, the US and Japan have not 
shared the same perception of insecurity of South Korea, and accordingly there has been 
no agreement between the two countries on the best way to introduce a politically 
desirable system to South Korea. From a Japanese perspective, the prospects for the 
Korean security have depended largely on what the United States is prepared to do. 
Because of their different status quo orientations, the US and Japan have developed 
'5 Kegley Jr. and Witkopf (1997): p. 454. 
76 Nucchtcrlein (1979: p. 85) suggested that vital interests could be categorised into value and cost/risk 
factors. The former are proximity of danger, nature of threat, economic stake, sentimental attachment, type 
of government, effect on balance of power, national prestige at stake, attitude of key allies; while the latter 
consist of economic costs of military hostilities, estimated casualties from hostilities, risk of protracted 
conflict, risk of enlarged conflict, cost of stalemate or defeat, risk of public opposition, cost of UN 
opposition, cost of Congressional opposition. 
" J. M. Roberts (1988): p. 19. 
41 
Part 12 Analytical Framework 
different attitudes to the presence of US forces in South Korea, the understanding of the 
South Korean political system, and the treatment of North Korea. Thus, Japanese 
discussions of Korea's future have tended to become debates about US policy, and Japan 
has inevitably viewed US policy toward Korea as an indicator of the strength of the US 
commitment to Japan itself" At the same time, Japan has seen the Korean peninsula as a 
source of potential insecurity, and, not unnaturally, Japan has sought to limit the 
emergence of hostile forces and to establish its own influence in South Korea no less 
deeply and directly than the US does. 
Reviewing the past experience of the TASS (see further the discussion in Chapter 3), 
there have been many occasions when common general interests among the US, Japan 
and South Korea prevailed. At the same time, it is also discovered that Japan and South 
Korea have their own particular interests separated from general interests common with 
the US within the TASS. Because of the geopolitical proximity between Japan and South 
Korea, and the South Korean position as a projected state confronting the communist 
threat, any distinction between the strategic value of South Korea and Japan to the United 
States would have been meaningless. Japan's role in the TASS can be explained in terms 
of particular interests with South Korea and/or threat perceptions. In that sense, Japan and 
South Korea have had particular interests which have not always been identical with 
American national interests. " Japan and South Korea, as non-communist states in 
Northeast Asia, have shared a common feeling of insecurity because of their geographical 
proximity to the sources of threats and the American policy of support at a distance. At 
78 Weinstein and Kaniiya. (1980): p. xi. 
79 Snyder and Diesing distinguish between two categories of interests: (a) particular interests (strategic or 
intrinsic); and (b) general interests (interests with respect to the power configuration in the system) (1977: p. 
424). 
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the same time, there has been a clear difference between the two states' feelings of 
insecurity: South Korea perceives "a defined threat, a visibly prepared aggression, " 
mainly from North Korea, whereas Japan perceives that "the mere imbalance of forces" 
can "create insecurity. "" It is the central root of the rigid status quo policy of Japan 
towards the Korean peninsula. These shared but somewhat different sources of insecurity 
tied the two countries together in the defence area during the Cold War. Any conflict with 
a hostile communist power on the Korean peninsula would have an immediate and direct 
impact on Japanese security. This dilemma extends to the role of Japan towards internal 
conflicts in South Korea. Thus, it can be said that the gap between the national strategies 
of the US and Japan is significantly wider than that between those of the US and South 
Korea. At the same time, the geopolitical proximity of Japan and South Korea has 
compelled these countries to overcome the gap in their national strategies. 
Japan's version of the status quo has allowed very limited room for flexibility to cope 
with the changing international and regional security environments because of its limited 
military capability. The emphasis is placed on minimising the changes in the Korean 
peninsula in an effort to avoid dismantling of the existing balance of power in the 
Northeast Asian region. In other words, Japan seeks to shield the Northeast Asian region 
in general and the Korean peninsula in particular from the negative impact of changes in 
global power parity. It also included a desire to minimise the changes in South Korean 
politics and, if necessary, to respond accordingly to the fluctuation of US containment 
policy towards the Soviet Union, and of its East Asian policy. 
80 Schuman observes that: "The feeling of insecurity is not always due to a defined threat, a visibly prepared 
aggression. The mere imbalance of forces that is maintained by the stronger and not compensated for by 
serious international guarantees in favour of the weaker suffices to create insecurity. " Cited in Grosser 
(1978): p. 154. 
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To sum up, Japan plays a significant role as the middle member between the US and 
South Korea in seeking to maintain the alliance's equilibrium at times when changes of 
US policy towards East Asia and the Korean peninsula in particular have threatened to 
upset the balance. In fact, Japan played three different roles as mediator, facilitator and 
initiator. The role of mediator involves in settling disputes between two or more 
international entities in a belief that the actor benefits from the absence of conflict 
between parties in the dispute in the international system. " As will be discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 5, the main Japanese role in the TASS has been that of mediator, trying to 
ensure that the US has continued to provide its security commitment to South Korea. As 
long as Japan has benefited through the settlement of disputes between the US and South 
Korea, it has tended to, as a facilitator of the TASS, increase its defence burdens in 
military, economic and political terms (see Chapter 3). The role of initiator has involved 
redirecting US policies towards East Asia and South Korea (see Chapter 5 and 7). 
CONCLUSION 
Hitherto studies of the political dynamics between the US, Japan and South Korea have 
remained underdeveloped because of the complexity of the issues involved and the lack 
of reliable analytical tools: a new analytical framework is necessary which combines a 
systemic approach and alliance theory. In particular, the aim is to overcome the 
limitations of previous democratisation approaches to the South Korean regime transition 
of 1979-1980. 
8' M. Herman (1987): pp. 168-9. 
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In order to explore and explain the contrasting US and Japanese policies towards South 
Korea, and the resulting responsive measures taken by South Korea, the following 
chapters will closely investigate the member states' changing attitudes to the TASS, 
major policy changes, the issue of the US military presence in South Korea, the limits of 
alliance management of the Korean question, and patterns of intervention by the US and 
Japan in South Korean domestic politics, including contacts with North Korea over the 
heads of the South Korean leadership. The rest of the dissertation is devoted to showing 
precisely how the fundamental basis of the TASS and the limits of intra-alliance conflicts 
have emerged and shifted to reflect the changing agenda of political interaction among 
the three countries. 
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CHAPTER3 
3 Historical Overview 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS), 1965-1978 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to trace the evolution of the TASS since its formation and to 
investigate how the modus operandi of the alliance has been established. In particular, the 
chapter seeks to show how the TASS evolved towards a low-level political community 
through the experience of continuous consultation and debate related to military security 
and political stability issues in the region. This perspective is then developed in the 
following chapters into an analysis of the political interventions of the US and Japan in 
the regime transition in South Korea during 1979-80. 
Kupchan identifies three behavioural patterns of co-operation in an alliance: consultation, 
facilitation and compensation. ' interaction is a dynamic feedback process of actions and 
expectations. In reality, therefore, the inter-state patterns of behaviour in an alliance 
inevitably consist of both co-operation and conflict, reflecting differences of national 
powers and strategy, and the distribution of benefits. In terms of US-Japan-South Korean 
relations, especially in the security area, the dominant pattern has been that of co- 
operation. At the same time, as this chapter seeks to show, relations have sometimes been 
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divergent and strained. 
3 Historical Over-view 
The chapter presents a systemic analysis of the political interplay between the US, Japan 
and South Korea between 1964 and 1978, a period which covers the two waves of 
fluctuations in the cohesion of the alliance: from the Johnson administration to the Nixon 
administration, and from the Ford administration to the first years of the Carter 
administration. Section 3.1 deals with the evolution of the alliance during the Johnson 
Presidency, and the loss of momentum during the Nixon administration (Section 2). 
Section 3.3 concentrates on the regaining of cohesion during the Ford administration, and 
Section 3.4 examines the return to friction during the first half of the Carter 
administration. Throughout these phases, Japan played a crucial 'third party' role in the 
triangular alliance security system. 
3.1 THE FORMATION OF THE TASS IN THE JOHNS ON-SATO-PARK PHASE, 
1964-1968 
Despite its failure to bring Japan into a collective security arrangement, the US succeeded 
in building the triangular alliance security system (the TASS) in East Asia as a counter- 
alliance by leading Japan and South Korea to normalise their diplomatic relations in 1965. 
The Johnson-Sato-Park years, between 1964 and 1968, saNv an underlining of the basic 
structure of the TASS. The Vietnam War-an immediate and direct challenge to the vital 
interests, values and international prestige of the US-had a great impact on the initial 
formation and consolidation of the TAS 
S. 2 
Kupchan (1988): p. 322. 
On the various factors involved in alliance fonnation, see Walt (1988). 
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3.1.1 US Logic and the Anticipated Benefitsftom the TASS 
3 Historical Overview 
The escalation of US intervention in Vietnam heightened the importance of strengthening 
the US alliance structure to promote the effective mobilisation of Japanese and South 
Korean support? Prior to 1965, US security treaties in East Asia were generally based on 
bilateral agreements, e. g. with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. ' 
Although these treaties covered the major "rims" around the Sino-Soviet bloc in the 
region, the Johnson administration decided to add two important bilateral "spokes" with 
Japan and South Korea (refer to Table 2.1) in order to mobilise the support of those two 
countries more effectively when the US became deeply engaged in the Vietnam War and 
received what it perceived to be inadequate support from its European allies. ' 
Consequently, policy-makers in the State Department and the White House began to re- 
emphasise the importance of South Korea-Japan diplomatic normalisation for 
strengthening free world unity in Northeast Asia. Hence there was unprecedented US 
6 
pressure on Japan and South Korea to achieve non-nalisation before the end of 1965. On 
their part, the Japanese and South Korean governments welcomed US involvement, for 
they were both anxious to stem the tide of militant protest by their political opponents. 
After the conclusion of the nonnalisation treaty in 1965, President Johnson sent 
congratulatory messages to both Sato and Park, who in turn released the messages to the 
press and expressed genuine appreciation of America's contribution. The ratification 
exchange ceremony between Japan and South Korea was held in Seoul on 18 December 
'Buss (1982): pp. 79-80. 
4FRUS, 1955-1957 VoL XXI. pp. 98-101. 
'Even before the conclusion of the diplomatic normalisation treaty, the US could in part forestall trouble 
between Japan and South Korea through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) (FRUS, 1955- 
1957 XXI : pp. 225-6). For American public opposition to the US war effort in Vietnam, see Andrews 
(1976). 
' Cha (1996): p. 132; MacDonald (1992): p. 134. 
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1965, thus effectively marking the creation of the TASS. 
Through the 1965 normalisation treaty, the Johnson administration succeeded in 
mobilising two key Asian allies to support its war effort in Vietnam. The US rearranged 
its Northeast Asian alliance system by providing human and material resources, and 
strategic leadership, and was able to move towards reducing the mounting cost of its total 
defence effort in South Korea. 7 At the same time, Japan provided an indispensable 
logistics centre together with political and moral support; and South Korea provided the 
US with essential manpower. In ten-ns of systemic interdependence and the spillover 
effect of the treaty, a framework was established for South Korean military participation 
in Vietnam, Japanese economic expansion into South Korea, and the integration of Japan 
and South Korea into the overall US military strategy for Northeast Asia. ' From then 
onwards, security concerns became inextricably linked with the three states' broader 
economic and political interactions. 
3.1.2 Japanese Logic and the Anticipated Benefitsfront the TASS 
For Japan, the Vietnam question was exceedingly complex. The Sato administration's 
view of the roots of the conflict in Vietnam was not the same as that of the US: from the 
Japanese perspective, the main problem was the political fragility of the South 
Vietnamese government. The Japanese government was also concerned that America's 
intervention in Vietnam was extremely unpopular with Japanese people. For these 
7 FRUS, 1955-1957 VoLXIX. - pp. 533-5. 
8 Baldwin (1974): p. 25. 
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reasons, the Sato cabinet's active role in supporting the US war effort requires careful 
explanation. 
In spite of the critical importance of Japan's logistical support to US military operations, ' 
American expectations extended further to moral support and political, diplomatic and 
military co-operation. In responding to US demands, the Sato government had to consider 
four main factors: the domestic political landscape in Japan; the need to maintain a good 
relationship with the USA; the importance of not exacerbating problems in relations with 
the People's Republic of China, which had successfully conducted nuclear tests in 
October 1964; and Japan's claim to sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands. " The Sato 
cabinet's chosen strategy was, first, to emphasise the second of these factors by lending 
moral and diplomatic support to the US (while refraining from sending Japanese 
manpower to the South-East Asian battlefield), thus avoiding a repetition of the political 
misjudgment of the Kishi cabinet when dealing with the revision of the US-Japan security 
treaty in 1960. Secondly, it was decided to press for a restoration of the Okinawa Islands 
to Japanese jurisdiction. Inevitably, however, one consequence of these decisions was 
that Japan's relations with the PRC deteriorated, even though Sato repeatedly denied that 
his government viewed the PRC as a "hypothetical enemy. "" In other words, the US 
succeeded in keeping its key Asian ally from defecting to the opposing camp. " 
Mendl (1995): p. 42. 
Kim Hong-nak (1973); Powell (1965). 
Emerson (1969): p. 357. After the revision of the security treaty with Japan in 1960, the US wanted Japan 
to be "military counterweight to the rising power of Communist China" (FRUS 1961-1963, VoL YxII. p. 
354). The Johnson-Sato communiqu6 on 13 January 1965 endorsed the US view that the regime in Taiwan 
was the legitimate government of the whole of China. 'Me November 1967 joint communiqu6 confirmed 
Japan's anti-PRC policy. 
" Xiang (1992); Hosoya (1984); Foot (1996). 
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Japan's willingness to lend support to American intervention in Vietnam was 
compensated by the US. Relying on a close personal relationship with President Johnson, 
and in response to the growing popular opposition to Japan's support of the US war 
efforts in Vietnam, the Sato administration judged that the US would be receptive to its 
claim to regain sovereignty over the OkinaNva Islands as a symbol of the completion of 
Japan's "independence". The US perceived that the growing nationalistic mood in Japan 
might hinder the extension of the security treaty between the US and Japan, and a 
compromise was thus regarded as inevitable. " The joint communiqu6 issued on 15 
November 1967 in Washington represented official US recognition of the Japanese claim 
to administrative rights over the Islands in exchange for Japan's "full" support of US 
policy in Vietnam. 14 This helped Sato to avert a political crisis during, the subsequent 
discussions on extending the US-Japanese security treaty in 1970. Without committing 
itself to direct intervention in the war, Tokyo turned US involvement in Vietnam to its 
own advantage in both economic and politico-diplomatic terms. 15 
3.1.3 South Korean Logic and the Anticipated Benefits: Political Legitimacy and the 
Deployment of Troops to Vietnam 
For the Park regime, diplomatic normalisation with Japan presented both dangers and 
opportunities. Park's greatest fear was the possibility that, as a result of the treaty with 
Japan, US commitment to South Korea would be downgraded in favour of greater 
" Destler et aL (1976): p. 29. With regard to South Korean anxiety that the Okinawa reversion might result 
in a lessening of American involvement in the area, see Lee Chong-sik (1985): p. 70. 
Masumi (1995): p. 101. 
Japanese industries earned at least SI billion a year by providing goods and services to the United States 
and South Vietnamese forces (Havens, 1987): p. 5. 
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security responsibilities for Japan. On the other hand, Park's greatest hope was that he 
would succeed in gaining Japan's voluntary economic and security support while at the 
same time retaining American political support and commitment to South Korean 
security, with its concomitant economic advantages. Such developments could only 
enhance the domestic legitimacy of the Park regime. 
The US respected Park's desire. Dean Rusk visited Seoul in January 1964 and in April 
1965. The key issues were threefold: the earliest diplomatic normalisation between Japan 
and South Korea; American political support for the Park regime; and the continuation of 
basic US policy for the maintenance of the security commitment to, and the provision of 
economic assistance for development in, South Korea. " Similar confirmations and 
assurances continued to follow in the form of presidential letters and summit talks 
between Johnson and Park. In December 1964, Johnson assured Park in a letter that 
American forces stationed in South Korea would not be withdrawn without prior 
consultation with the South Korean government, and that the United States would pay the 
cost of maintaining South Korean troops dispatched to Vietnam. At the Washington 
summit meeting in May 1965, President Johnson told Park that the US military and 
economic assistance to South Korea would not be affected by the normalisation of South 
Korea-Japan relations. " Soon afterwards, in July 1965 in Seoul, General Dwight E. 
Beach, Chief of UNC in Korea, and Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown jointly confirmed 
that there would be no reduction in US force levels without prior consultation with the 
Park regime The next year saw a renewal of these strong conu-nitments when US Vice- 
See United State Department ofState Bulletin (hereafter USDSB) (11 October 1965): pp. 593-6. 
The Public Ppapers ofPresident of United States (hereafter PPPU), Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965-1 (1966): p. 
551. 
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President Hubert Humphrey visited Seoul in February. " Furthermore, when President 
Johnson visited Seoul in November 1966, he reaffirmed in the joint communiqu6 with 
President Park "the readiness and detennination of the United States to renderprompt and 
effective assistance to defeat an armed attack against the Republic of Korea. "" 
The Park regime deployed its combat forces directly to Vietnam, enhanced its diplomatic 
leverage, enjoyed double patronage; and was able to strengthen its political legitimacy. 
After obtaining repeated assurances of the US security commitment, Park then refused 
US requests for an increase in its South Korean troop levels in Vietnam. On the other 
hand, the regime sought to ensure that the US would reject any peace settlement that 
could be regarded as a sign of appeasement towards the Viet Cong. Thus, the Park regime 
could be seen to exhibit a characteristic tendency of an alliance game by striving to 
expand its benefits and reduce its obligations. 
US-South Korea relations entered a particularly crucial phase in January 1968. On 21 
January, a 31-member commando team from North Korea attacked President Park's 
official residence in an attempt to kill him. Just two days later, North Korean forces 
captured the US intelligence ship Pueblo. Stunned, the Park regime tried to persuade the 
United States to launch an air strike against North Korean military installations. However, 
the US was not at all willing to open a second front in East Asia. From the outset, it was 
impossible for South Korea either to lead the US to join in a combined offensive or to 
gain American support for South Korea's unilateral military retaliation against North 
Korea. Instead, tNvo compensatory measures-a $100 million aid package for South 
Lee and Sato (1982): p. 43. 
USDSB (November 21 1966): p. 778. 
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Korean military modemisation and the establishment of the annual US-South Korean 
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) at ministerial level (commencing in May 1968)- 
were taken. However, these could not prevent a heightening of South Korean suspicion 
towards the US at a time when US involvement in Vietnam was drawing to a close. The 
reversal of America's escalation policy threatened to weaken the bargaining power 
secured by South Korean military participation in the war. Moreover, the US began to see 
divided Korea itself as "another Vietnam", with a communist northern territory and a 
southern regime whose legitimacy was questionable. 
3.1.4 A New Startfor Japan-South Korea Relations, 1965-1968 
From a systemic point of view, Japan could have avoided US pressures to join direct 
military operations in Vietnam by passing this responsibility on to South Korea. In so 
doing, the Sato cabinet could have placated its political opponents, who had accused the 
government of integrating Japan with South Korea under the umbrella of American 
military strategy towards Northeast Asia. At a broader level, during the Vietnam War 
Japan became deeply involved in regional politics. The difficulties confronting the US in 
South-East Asia reminded Japan of the fact that South Korea, as a buffer zone and 
forward base, the projected state, played a vital role in defend Japan from Northeast Asian 
communism. 
Bilaterally, after diplomatic normalisation with Seoul, Japan offered economic assistance 
and diplomatic, but not military, " support to facilitate the security of South Korea. By 
" In substance, Japan developed a defacto security cooperation scheme represented by the Three Arrow 
Study (Afitsitya Kenkyu), whose contents went far beyond the Guideline revised from 1996 onwards, final 
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1967, within two years of diplomatic normalisation, Japan had overtaken the US as the 
primary trading partner of South Korea. In South Korea's First Five-Year Plan (1962- 
1966), the Japanese contribution constituted 29 per cent of South Korea's total foreign 
capital requirement ($630.3 million). In the Second Plan (1967-1971), this dropped to 
19.3 per cent of the substantially enlarged total capital requirement ($2,858.9 million). 21 
As a result of this economic contribution, Japan was able to exert an increasingly 
significant influence on South Korea in the spheres of security and defence. This was 
evident from the rapid growth of official contacts between the two countries. " These 
co-operative efforts led eventually to the establishment of annual ministerial meetings in 
1967, prior to the US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting in 1968. Other 
organisations and networks embracing members of the top political and business circles 
in both countries were also established, and many of them lobbied for policies favourable 
to South Korea's interests in both Japan and the US. 
The strengthening of diplomatic and economic ties between Japan and South Korea was 
accompanied by the reaffirmation of a shared strategic outlook. In August 1968, the 
Second Annual Ministerial Meeting declared that "the security and prosperity of [South] 
Korea have an important influence on that of Japan, "' a statement which underlined the 
Korean Clause in the Nixon-Sato Communiqu6 of November 1969. The declaration 
revealed a key element of interdependence in the security sphere between Japan and 
Guideline bill presented in 1997, passed in 1998, in terms of military cooperation with the US and South 
Korea. In late June 1963, the Japanese Defence Agency completed its proposal regarding the security 
interconnection of the three countries. According to the study, Japan would be an integral part of the US 
strategy in the Far East and serve as the base for US operations, and the Self-Defense Forces would be 
involved in joint or combined operations with US forces (Hughes, 1999): p. 113. 
Kim Hong-nak (1977): p. 163. 
Lee and Sato (1982): p. 29. 
23 Ibid.: p. 3 1. 
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South Korea, even though this was a symbolic gesture signifying that Japan was prepared 
to assume more responsibility in regional politics as a prerequisite for the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. In this sense, Japan's enthusiasm for South Korean 
security served primarily as a diplomatic lever to influence the US. 
In summary, the US-Japan relationship, like that between the US and South Korea, 
solidified during the period of escalated American military intervention in Vietnam under 
the Johnson administration. Within the structure of the TASS, the normalisation treaty 
was particularly important as a mechanism for reordering alliance relationships and the 
division of labour between the US, Japan and South Korea. The US was undoubtedly the 
pivot of East Asian security, an irreplaceable strategic military resource, the source of the 
nuclear umbrella, and hence the final guarantor for the defence of Japan and South Korea. 
Japan played a key role in providing logistical support, while South Korea, as a front-line 
state, shouldered a heavy burden not only in terms of manpower readiness but also in 
allocating a very high proportion of GNP to defence expenditure. " In exchange, South 
Korea wanted the US and Japan to stand firm on the side of the South, while at the same 
time promising non-interference in the South's internal politics. The fundamental basis of 
the TASS, the US military presence in South Korea, was never seriously shaken during 
the Johnson-S ato-Park phase, and the ideological solidarity and joint involvement of the 
three countries in the US war effort in Vietnam, as well as two military disputes with 
North Korea, kept the US and Japan from opening direct channels with North Korea 
without the approval of the Park regime. In general, therefore, from 1964 to 1968, the 
cohesion of the TASS remained intact. 
" During the Cold War era, on average, South Korea spent about 6% of GNP for defence expenditure while 
Japan constantly kept about 1%. The US spent about 3% of GNP for the defence expenditure. 
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3.2 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, 1969-1974: FROM VIETNAM TO 
DETENTE 
The overriding factor in the dramatic changes in US foreign policy during four 
consecutive administrations was the defeat in the Vietnam war. The problem was, as 
McConnick argues, that the lessons of the war were viewed in different ways by different 
American leaders: "While some believed that Vietnam heralded the decline of American 
hegemony and the need for the United States to accommodate to changing circumstances, 
others thought that Vietnam dramatised the need for the US to increase its military 
strength in order to regain its hegemonic position. "" The fon-ner conclusion was 
dominant in the Nixon era; the Reagan Presidency embraced the latter view; and the Ford 
administration's foreign policy fell somewhere between the two extremes. President 
Carter, who questioned the entire post-war policy of his predecessors, returned to the first 
view. The radical redirection of US foreign policy away from the rigid containment 
strategy which, "had projected America into the front line of every international crisis, "" 
began during the Johnson administration. "No more Vietnams", "Asia for the Asians" and 
"negotiation, not confrontation" were rapidly emerging as key slogans in the debates on 
post-Vietnam foreign PoliCy. 
21 
The implementation of a policy of assistance from a distance weakened US relations with 
its Asian allies, especially Japan and South Korea. During the Nixon administration, it 
became evident that when the global design of the US assumed primacy, it increasingly 
diverged from the Northeast Asian regional policy. More specifically, when the scope of 
McComiick (1990): p. 10. 
Kissinger (1994). 
"Nixon (1970). 
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US foreign policy extended beyond the scope of the East Asian regional level, the 
divergence of interests among the three members of the TASS increased. During the 
Nixon presidency, the degree of systemic cohesion rapidly declined as the member states 
attempted to follow their own independent paths. This section examines how shifts in US 
foreign policy affected the convergence of the TASS, and how Japan and South Korea 
attempted to cope with these changes during the Nixon Presidency. The issue of 
America's China policy is dealt with in terms of its impact on the cohesion of the TASS 
and on the incumbent governments of Japan and South Korea. 
3.2.1 US-Japan Relations ditring the Mvon Administration, 1969-1974 
The new Nixon administration redirected foreign policy beyond the limits of the TASS, 
which no longer had the same significance for the US following the defeat in the Vietnam 
War. A dual-track Asia policy was developed in 1969 on the basis of disengagement from 
Vietnam: one track, aimed at the Asian junior allies, was unveiled in the Guam Doctrine; 
and the second track, seeking to tilt the balance to US advantage by inviting the PRC into 
international society, was revealed in the Shanghai Communiqu6. " On the surface, in the 
first track, the role of Japan was elevated to a higher position than in the Johnson 
administration's foreign policy. However, in the second track, Japan had to yield its 
position of strategic importance to the PRC in the eyes of the US. 
" Tle main theme of the Guam Doctrine is as follows: "The US would provide a shield if a nuclear power 
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival to our security. ... In a case 
involving non-nuclear aggression, the US would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the 
responsibility of providing the manpower for defence. " Meanwhile the Shanghai Communiqu6 stated that: 
"Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the US is in the interest of all countries; 
both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; neither should seek hegemony in the 
Asia-Pacific region; each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such 
hegemony. " (Kissinger, 1994): pp. 709,729. 
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Before its rapprochement with the PRC, the Nixon administration urgently sought to 
settle the question of disengagement from Vietnam. The disengagement process required 
the US to adjust the allocation of responsibility for East Asian regional security with 
Japan in exchange for the reversion of the Okinawa Islands to Japanese sovereignty. At 
last, on 21 November 1969, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato issued a long joint 
communiqu6. Three important points were agreed: the reversion of Okinawa to Japan by 
1972; the increased responsibility of Japan in the security area; and the renewal of the 
US-Japan security treaty and its further automatic extension every ten years as long as 
both parties were agreed. The first outcome clearly favoured Japan; the second favoured 
the United States; and the third was to their mutual advantage. As far as the Korean 
question was concerned, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that "the. security of the 
Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. "" In addition, he reconfirmed 
his position on the China question: "The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan 
area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan". " Sato wasted no time in 
utilising this accomplishment for the enhancement of his political career. Soon after his 
return to Japan, he dissolved the Diet and called a general election for December 1969. 
The ruling LDP gained a resounding victory. "A significant proportion of the electorate 
welcomed the joint communiqu6 and supported the U. S. -Japan relationship on security 
issues. "" The first year's dealings with the Nixon administration were quite promising. 
The US-Japan Security Treaty, which was to expire on 22 June 1970, was approved by the 
Diet without serious difficulty. However, considering the undercurrent of movement 
toward rapprochement between the US and the PRC in 1969, the Nixon-Sato 
USDSB (15 December 1969): p. 555. 
Ibid.: p. 555. 
Ito (1970): p. 103 1. 
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communiqu6 in 1969 went too far in standing firm in diplomatic recognition terms with 
the Republic of China. Indeed, the communiqu6 was criticized by the PRC and North 
Korea when Chou En-lai and Kim 11-sung met at Pyongyang from 5 to 7 April 1970. " 
Tokyo did not seem to take the criticism seriously, but expressed its willingness to assume 
responsibilities in the lessening of international tension and in the creation of a new order 
for world peace. " 
While these developments were taking place, the diplomatic rapprochement between the 
US and the PRC proceeded rapidly. At 10: 30 p. m. on 15 July 1971 (11: 30 a. m. on 16 July 
in Japan), President Nixon announced that he would visit China before May 1972. The 
news reached the Japanese Prime Minister's residence at 11: 27 a. m., when Sato was 
34 
reviewing the draft of the next day's opening speech before the Diet. In that speech he 
emphasised the continuity of his foreign policy: "It is most important for our country to 
maintain and promote friendly and amicable relations with the Republic of Korea, the 
Republic of China, and other neighbouring countries. "" Japan's pro-Taiwan policy had 
repeatedly been reiterated at summit meetings with American Presidents up until 1970. 
Therefore, Japan regarded the Nixon administration's approach to the PRC as 
"diplomatic betrayal", "a severe blow", and "a slap in the face. 9936 The unilateral US 
approach to the PRC gave the impression that the US did not treat Japan as an ally, and 
that American interests did not always coincide with those of Japan. Suddenly, the Sino- 
Ibid.: p. 103 5. 
Gaimusho, Maga Gaik-ono KinAyo 1970. 
Masumi (1995): p. 109. 
Ibid: p. 58. 
Lee and Sato (1982): p. 57; Masumi (1995): p. 109; Kamiya (1972): p. 720. In fact, Japan did not 
completely fail to perceive the subtle change of US policy regarding the responsibility of Japan for regional 
security. See Mendel (1970): p. 1047; Farnsworth (1972): p. 49. 
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American rapprochement overshadowed the diplomatic achievements of the Sato cabinet. 
This turn of events directly undennined Sato's political legitimacy and decisively 
dismantled one of the staunchest pro-American cabinets in Japan. 
On the face of it, Japan's seikei bunri principle (separation of politics from economics) 
was more compatible with a good relationship with the PRC than US containment policy 
was. Therefore, the US-PRC rapprochement did not necessarily narrow the range of 
Japan's diplomatic activity. However, the Japan-PRC rapprochement demanded the 
change of Japanese cabinet. As soon as new Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, came to 
office on 6 July 1972, the movement towards diplomatic normalisation between Japan 
and the PRC gathered pace. Within only a few months, on 25 September 1972, Tanaka 
visited Peking with his Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, and tenninated "the state of 
war" by the normalisation. of relations between China and Japan. " The speedy 
nonnalisation ostensibly reflected the extent to which the Japanese public viewed the 
improvement of Sino-Japanese relations as a counterblow to the US. Moreover, it also 
confirmed that normalisation was in accordance with the framework of Japan's overall 
Cold War strategy. 
3.2.2 US Policy Towards South Korea: The Impact of D9tente, 1970-1974 - The 
Mvon-Park Phase 
As the weakest member of the TASS and a projected state, South Korea's scope for 
autonomous diplomacy was considerably restricted when the US shifted from 
" Lce and Sato (1982): p. 63. 
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confrontation to d6tente. This sub-section examines the political impact on the Park 
regime of that shift. 
Shortly after Nixon became President, North Korea, on 15 April 1969, shot down an 
unanned reconnaissance plane with 31 men on board. The Nixon administration chose 
not to respond with any military means"-- a decision which seriously eroded South 
Korean confidence in the strength of the US commitment to South Korea. Furthermore, a 
review of the presence of American ground forces on the Korean peninsula, which the 
Park regime had desperately wished to avoid following the Guam Doctrine, reached a 
conclusion in 1970. This was when more than 50,000 South Korean combat troops were 
fighting in Vietnam. President Park thought that South Korea had secured a "special 
relationship" with the US through South Korea's military participation in Vietnam. The 
unilateral US decision to reduce its military presence in South Korea caused Park to panic, 
and led him to protest bluntly to US Ambassador William Porter that the United States 
had no right to remove its troops in this way. The Seoul government proceeded to take 
several extraordinary actions, 39 and demanded a return to the normal state of the US 
security commitment as established during the Johnson administration. When Vice- 
President Agnew visited Seoul in August 1970, President Park called unsuccessfully for a 
written guarantee that no additional American troops would be withdrawn. Eventually the 
US did withdraw its Seventh Infantry Division in line with the Guam Doctrine, some 
22,000 men out of 63,000 troops stationed in South Korea, in March 1971. After this 
withdrawal, in August 1971 another decision was made to reduce the Second Infantry 
Nixon (1978): p. 382. See also USDSB (5 May 1969): p. 382. 
For example, the government threatened to leave a portion of the DMZ unmanned, hinted at South 
Korea's disengagement from Vietnam, and advertised against US troop withdrawal in The Washington Post 
(25 September 1970). 
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In December 1971, Park concluded that the situation amounted to a national emergency 
for South Korea. He accordingly adopted three main policies: (1) influence-buying 
activities to attract US attention in the security area; (2) a self-reliance strategy of 
accelerating the development of heavy and chemical industries and procuring substantial 
amounts of new weaponry systems; and (3) a controlled reduction of tension with North 
Korea to a desired level. However, the first option could not reverse the reduction of the 
US arrny presence in South Korea, and in the end became one of the most serious sources 
of US-South Korea diplomatic strain. The second policy could not achieve tangible 
results in the short term. From the outset, the third option could not possibly bear fruit: the 
legitimacy of both authoritarian regimes (in the North and the South) relied on the 
continuation of the military confrontation. Therefore, the Park regime's proposal for 
dialogue with the North was little more than an expression of frustration following the 
United States' reduction of ground forces in South Korea and the consequent diplomatic 
isolation of South Korea. 41 
The US departure from Vietnam thus inevitably led to a substantial weakening of the Park 
regime's political basis, and this called for a domestic resolution. Democratisation may 
have been considered, but it was certainly not a viable solution for the authoritarian Park 
regime from the beginning. In due course, frustration in dealing with America's shifting 
foreign policy forced President Park to undertake a risk-laden political adventure: in 
October 1972 he introduced martial law, and the following month he promulgated a new 
Lee and Sato (1982): pp. 102-3. 
See Sohn (1989): pp. 24-28. 
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constitution to ensure the perpetuation of his dictatorship. The new Yushin Constitution 
empowered the President to appoint one-third of the National Assembly members. He 
rushed to enact the National Emergency Measures-which became the symbol of his iron 
rule-through the National Assembly in December 1972. " Under the new constitution, 
the President was to be chosen indirectly by an electoral college, and Park was duly able 
to commence his fourth term in December 1972. From then on, he had irresistible 
coercive power backed by his full control of the armed forces. 
This repressive power could not be challenged as long as economic growth was sustained 
and support from the major allies continued. In other words, when the US observed the 
bottom lines of alliance management, i. e. by abiding by the principles of non-interference 
in South Korean domestic politics and restraining from all direct dealings with North 
Korea over the heads of the South Korean regime, the latter's political legitimacy was not 
seriously damaged. In that sense, the Park regime benefited from the realism adopted by 
the Nixon administration in its apparent tolerance of human rights infringements in South 
Korea. 
3. Z3 Japan's Policy towards South Korea, 1969-1974: The SatolTanaka-Park Phase 
US exploitation of the rift between the Soviet Union and the PRC was bound to have a 
negative effect on US-Japan relations, and this in turn darnaged Japan-South Korea 
relations. Japan's adoption of the Korean clause in the Nixon-Sato joint communiqu6 of 
November 1969-a clause that officially endorsed Japan's commitment to South Korean 
" Lee Chong-sik (1985): pp. 81-2. 
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security-seemed to be promising to the Park regime. Sato reaffirmed the security nexus 
between Japan and South Korea in a speech at the National Press Club after the summit 
meeting: 
If South Korea or Taiwan came under attack, Japan would regard it as a threat to the peace 
and security of the Far East, including Japan, and would take prollipt and positive measures 
in order that the United States could use its military bases and facilities within Japan (which 
would include Okinawa after 1972) to meet the armed attack, mainly from North Korea. 43 
These sentiments were later reiterated by Sato in a speech in the Diet in February 1970. 
The Korean Clause amounted to one of the most significant adjustments of the role of 
Japan within the TASS: "the most precise public expression" of Japan's commitment to 
the South Korean regime. 4' From then onwards, the Korean Clause, coupled with Japan's 
public recognition of the existence of a military threat from the North against the South at 
the ministerial talks between the two countries, came to be regarded as one of the most 
useful barometers by which security interdependence and the general state of bilateral 
relations could be measured. It was certainly as significant as America's own Korean 
clause, with its reference to "prompt and effective assistance"(see Sub-section 3.1.3). 
Despite the significance of the introduction of the Korean Clause for the TASS, it was in 
essence Japan's "Korea carV-a product of diplomatic expediency-designed to 
reinforce Japan's position vis-A-vis the US. Because of this expediency, the Japanese 
position fluctuated. In fact, the Sato cabinet raised the issue of the reconsideration of the 
" Lee and Sato (1982): pp. 40-4 1. 
"McCormack (1977): p. 135. 
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Korean Clause in 1971 and 1972. Only one month after the Nixon shock of the US-PRC 
diplomatic contacts of July 1971, the fifth Japan-South Korea Joint Ministerial 
Conference omitted any reference to the close relationship between the security and 
prosperity of the two countries. In a month, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda advocated a 
revision of the Korean Clause at the Japanese-American ministerial meeting. At last, on 8 
January 1972, Prime Minister Sato himself also raised this question at a news conference 
in Tokyo. The Japanese Foreign Minister officially stated in the Diet on 16 May 1972 that 
the Korean Clause had in effect lost its validity because of the newly stabilised situation 
on the Korean peninsula. " The rapidly changing posture of the Sato cabinet was directly 
related to its relationship with the US and its attempts to normalise relations with the PRC, 
higher priority of Japan's foreign policy compared with its relations with South Korea. " 
The pro-PRC policy of the new Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, further 
weakened security relations with South Korea. During the tenn of the Tanaka cabinet, the 
Korean Clause was generally utilised as an indicator of where Japan stood in relation to 
East-West rivalry and in the confrontation between the two Koreas. Foreign Minister 
Toshio Kimura claimed, on 29 August 1972, that there was no need for Seoul to fear a 
North Korean invasion; 4' and on 5 September he denied that the South Korean regime 
was the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. This attempt to adopt an 
equidistant approach to both Koreas-one of the prerequisites for Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement-was viewed by the Park regime as evidence that Japan had renounced 
the basic principle enunciated in the South Korea-Japan normalisation treaty, namely that 
"' Lee Chong-sik (1985): pp. 75-6. 
16 See Overholt (1973): p. 713. 
" Park Yung-H (1976): p. 767. 
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Japan regarded the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate government on the peninsula. 
Once estrangement had commenced, Japan-South Korea relations deteriorated even 
further during the later part of the Tanaka premiership as a result of two incidents: the 
kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung by the Park regime from a hotel in Tokyo on 8 August 1973, 
and another attempt to assassinate President Park in August 1974. The kidnapping of Kim 
Dae-jung was politically resolved when the Park regime guaranteed the dissident's 
freedom and promised that he would not be tried for any action he had taken in Japan, and 
the Japanese government agreed to drop the issue. " The Kim Dae-jung incident gravely 
damaged the image of the Park regime among a large proportion of the Japanese 
population, in particular among intellectuals, and became one of the most important 
political issues underpinning relations between Japan and South Korea. The second 
incident occurred in August 1974. Mun Se-gwang, a second generation pro-Pyongyang 
Korean living in Japan, attempted to assassinate President Park, who was delivering a 
message commemorating the anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan. Park survived 
the bungled assassination attempt, but the first lady, Mrs. Young-soo Park, was shot 
dead. " 
Only the mediation of the US, through the Ford administration, could bring the two sides 
together again, and on 19 September 1974 the Japanese government dispatched 
Etsusaburo Shiina to Seoul to convey two statements of regret. As a result of these 
incidents, however, the Japanese government, for the first time, suspended ministerial 
talks with South Korea and subsequently reduced official economic development 
" Lee Chong-sik (1985): p. 83. For a more detailed study about the Kim Dae-jung issue, see Welfield 
(1988): pp. 341-4. 
" On the political implications of the incident of the death of Mrs. Park between the Park regime and the 
Japanese cabinet, see Lee Chong-sik (1985): pp. 84-5. 
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assistance. Attempts to reverse Japan's recognition of the interdependence of Japanese 
and South Korean security illustrate how easily an alliance can lose its cohesion when the 
members change their perceptions and discover their divergent national interests. 50 
In summary, the Nixon-Sato-Park relationship, for a brief period between 1969 and 1972, 
revealed clearly the weak basis of the TASS. The first year of the Nixon-Sato-Park phase 
saw an epoch-making enhancement of the TASS thanks to the Korean Clause of the 
Nixon-Sato communiqu6, which expressed Japan's willingness to make an overt 
commitment to South Korean security. The movement became a useful lever whereby 
Japan could regain sovereignty over the Okinawa islands. Thus, the Korean Clause was, 
from the beginning, a product of expediency and could just as easily be discarded 
according to the changing dynamics of US-Japan relations. The Nixon administration 
succeeded in leading the -US 
from passive defeatism after the Vietnam War to active 
manipulation by transforming the bipolar global system into a trilateral balance-and- 
check system. The achievement of this goal damaged the relationships of the US with its 
junior allies in East Asia. As Spanier observes, "In the era of d6tente, the various nations 
were no longer so willing to give priority to alliance interests. "" 
After the Tanaka cabinet emerged in 1972, the Nixon-Tanaka-Park phase revealed how 
the junior alliance members, Japan and South Korea, were making efforts to establish 
direct communication with the PRC. Even though the momentum of American policy 
changes increasingly bewildered Japan, Japan could catch up on the path the US explored. 
" Tanaka had four policy speeches in the Diet (once in the 70'h, 71" sessions and twice in the 72" session) 
but the name of South Korea or Republic of Korea never appeared other than in reference to the Korean 
peninsula. 
" Spanier (199 1): p. 216. 
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As Buckley observes, "the Tanaka cabinet simply went into China through the door left 
ajar by the United States. "" While Japan adapted to the shifting American diplomacy, the 
Park regime failed to do so and became isolated by the new regional trends. In 
consequence, the regime had to seek a strategy of survival domestically. This was the 
rationale behind the Yushin Constitution. 
3.3 THE FORD ADMINISTRATION, 1974-1976: THE RECOVERING 
COHESION OF THE TASS DURING THE FORD-MIKI-PARK PHASE 
1974 saw the resignations of both President Nixon (in August as a result of the Watergate 
scandal) and Prime Minister Tanaka (in November after the Lockheed scandal). 
Coinciding with the emergence of the Ford Presidency, the Cold War mood gradually 
revived. The Ford administration sought to deal with the Korean question linked to 
Japanese security. As a result, from late 1974 onwards the cohesion of US-Japan-South 
Korea ties recovered very quickly. The collapse of the South Vietnamese government in 
April came as a major shock to the three countries. The summer of 1975 was one of the 
most crucial junctures in the history of triangular interaction in the security area. The fall 
of Saigon forced the US, Japan and South Korea to recover their strained relations during 
the Nixon-Tanaka-Park phase, and the security of South Korea became a key issue in 
bilateral talks (at various levels) between Japan and the United States. 
"Buckley (1995): p. 132. 
69 
Part I 3 Historical Overview 
3.3.1 The Collapse of the South rietnamese Government and its Impact on the TASS 
In April 1975, North Vietnamese troops destroyed the South Vietnamese army, entered 
Saigon and unified the country under communism. Shortly afterwards, communists took 
over Cambodia and Laos. President Ford chose Japan and South Korea as his first 
destinations for presidential visits in November 1974. In return, Prime Minister Miki paid 
a visit to Washington and had summit meetings with President Ford on 2 August 1975. At 
the news conference, the two leaders stated that their countries had reached an agreement 
to discuss the contents of concrete co-operation at the Security Consultative Meetings. In 
addition, they revived the Korean Clause in the joint statement on 6 August which stated 
that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance for peace on the 
Korean peninsula, which in turn was necessary for the peace and security in East Asia, 
including Japan. "" The Korean Clause in the Nixon-Sato communiqu6 in 1969 was 
adopted at a time when the US intended to depart from Asia by encouraging Japan to 
assume responsibility for regional security. The inclusion of the Korean Clause in the 
Ford-Miki communiqu6 was a clear sign of a US rollback in Asia, and this did much to 
assuage the apprehensions of South Korea and Japan. Subsequently several further 
actions to restore security co-operation were taken by the three countries. 
Immediately after the Ford-Miki summit meetings, US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger 
visited Japan and had talks with Director of the Japanese Defence Agency (the JDA), 
Michita Sakada, on 29 August. Once again, South Korean security was a key agenda item. 
Sakada formally demanded that "American troops in South Korea be maintained on a 
" USDSB (8 September 1975): p. 383. 
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long-term basis. "" Schlesinger accepted the request. " In exchange, Sakada reconfirmed 
that in the event of any direct threat to South Korea's security, the US would have 
"continued use" of bases in Japan, and he pledged to strengthen Japan's self-defence 
capabilities. A further step was Prime Minister Takeo Miki's expression of his 
apprehension to Schlesinger: "The Korean problem is unique given the nature of 
confrontation there. ... The security of the ROK and peace on the peninsula are 
important 
to Japanese security. We feel it in our bones. "" Responding to Miki's proactive approach 
to the security issue, the US assured the Japanese cabinet that the level of US ground 
forces in the Korean peninsula would not be significantly reduced, even in the future. " 
Then, in a news conference in Tokyo on 29 August, Schlesinger stated that "Japan already 
is playing a role in South Korea's defence. The capacity of the Japanese air-defence 
forces is exerting influence on the defence of Korea. "" The military integrity between 
Japan and South Korea was confirmed. 
Just a few months later, on 7 December 1975, Ford declared "A Pacific Doctrine of Peace 
with All and Hostility Toward None" that: 
The preservation of our Asian friends and allies remains a paramount objective of 
American policy... In Korea tension persists. We have close ties with the republic of 
Korea: and we remain committed to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, as the 
presence of our forces there atteStS. 59 
Far Eastern Economic Review (14 November 1975): pp. 28-9. 
Park Yung-H (1976): p. 772. 
Cited in Murata (1998): pp. 13-4. 
57 Ibid.: p. 14. 
" Ibid.: pp. 14-5. 
'9 USDSB (29 December 1975): pp. 914-5. 
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The declaration was backed up by an increase in American defence spending -- the first 
since 1969 . 
6' At the same time, Ford's new Asia policy urged Japan to increase its 
defence posture. Burden-sharing now emerged as one of the most important issues on the 
agenda of US-Japan relations. As a result, in the second half of 1976, the Miki cabinet 
approved the National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO), designed to upgrade the 
Japanese Self-defence Forces (JSDF) in order to meet and repel a "limited and small- 
scale aggression. "" The basic assumption of the NDPO was that there would be no 
62 
significant change in the global and regional security enviromnents. In order to facilitate 
the military capability of the TASS, Japan was allocated its share of responsibility. 
3.3.2 The US Commitment to South Korean Security, 1974-76: The Ford-Park Phase 
The decline of d6tente caused the US to return to the issue of South Korean security in the 
Ford administration. In November 1974, three months after assuming office, the new 
President paid a two-day visit to Seoul in order "to dispel South Korea's fear of a further 
application of the Guam Doctrine. ', 63 The phrase 'ýproinpt and effective assistance " in the 
event of an armed attack by the North reappeared in the Ford-Parkjoint communiqu6. In 
" Between the fiscal years 1969 and 1975, while US spending declined by about 3 per cent per year in real 
terms, Soviet defence spending increased by an equal amount. During his term of office, Ford tried to 
reverse those trends in a dramatic fashion. He sought to increase US defence spending from $86 billion in 
the fiscal year 1975 to $150 billion by the fiscal year 1980, an increase of 74 per cent over five years. (Korb, 
1979): pp. 422-3. 
" Tsurutani (1981): p. 73-6. 
6' The NDPO made the following assumptions: (1) The US-Japan Security Treaty would continue to be 
effectively maintained. (2) The US and the Soviet Union would continue to avoid nuclear war and large- 
scale conflicts that could escalate into nuclear war. (3) Even if there was a partial improvement in Sino- 
Soviet relations, this would not lead to a resolution of the fundamental conflict. (4) There would continue to 
be moderation in Sino-US relations. (5) A large military conflict would not break out on the Korean 
peninsula. (Defence ofJapan 1994): p. 260. 
" Lee and Sato (1982): p. 103. 
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addition, the US promised to support South Korea's military modernisation programme 
and defence industries. ' The renewed security commitment from the Ford administration 
in late 1974 was confirmed immediately after the Vietnam debacle in early 1975 by a 
symbolic increase in the level of the US military presence. 
At a news conference in May 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger stressed that there was no 
ambiguity about the US commitment to South Korea or East Asia in general: the US 
would never withdraw its support. " A week later, lie warned North Korea not to make the 
mistake of testing the US security commitment to South Korea. " Then, in June, Secretary 
of Defense Schlesinger pledged to repel North Korea's armed aggression with massive 
retaliation, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. The 
Ford administration fully recognised the security nexus of Japan and South Korea. 
Kissinger, in a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit on 24 November 1975, 
reiterated that US-South Korean relations were "a bond forged by common sacrifice in 
war" and that the security of Japan was "directly linked to the security of Korea. " 
Therefore, "we will resist with detennination any unilateral attempt to change or upset the 
equilibrium on the peninsula. "" 
It was not long before North Korea decided to challenge these commitments. On 18 
August 1976, a group of North Korean anny guards killed two US officers in the joint 
security area, Panmunjom. The US reacted immediately by deploying an aircraft carrier, 
fighter aircraft, and bombers (based in Guam) to South Korea. The timely military moves 
" USDSB (23 December 1974): pp. 877-8. 
65 USDSB (26 May 1975): p. 669. 
66 USDSB (2 June 1975): p. 734. 
61 USDSB (15 December 1975): p. 847. 
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forced Kim 11-song to express regret over the incident. Thus, US action had confinned the 
reliability of the "prompt and effective assistance " pledged in the Ford-Park joint 
communiqu6. 
In line with the reinforcement of the fundamental basis of the TASS, the US military 
stationing in South Korea, and the guided retaliatory measures to the killing of two 
American soldiers, the Ford administration did not make an issue of the human rights 
situation in South Korea, even though there was a growing sense in the US that President 
Park's repressive regime might turn South Korea into a South Vietnam-type internal 
conflict. To sum up, during the Ford administration US-South Korea goverm-nental 
relations returned to normalcy, restoring the fundamental military basis of the TASS (by 
assuring the status of US combat forces in South Korea) and observing the two bottom 
lines, non-interference by the US in South Korean domestic politics and no direct dealing 
with North Korea. 
3.3.3 The Roles of Japan as Mediator within the TASS 
The feeling of insecurity prevalent in Japanese society led the Miki government to play an 
active role in the revival of the TASS, which had been seriously strained during the 
Nixon-Tanaka phase. Upon coming to office, in early 1975, Miki dispatched Foreign 
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to Washington to ascertain US intentions regarding the Korean 
peninsula. Miyazaiva sought to impress upon the US the continuing validity of the 
Korean clause in the Nixon-Sato communiqu6. In early May, Tokyo invited South Korean 
Premier Kim Jong-pil for a series of talks with Miki and Miyazawa. Miki affirmed on this 
occasion that South Korea's security was essential to that of Japan and expressed his 
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willingness to re-open the ministerial talks that had been cancelled in the last year of the 
Tanaka premiership in 1974. " 
Japan's increasing economic investment in South Korea (Japan became the top-ranking 
foreign investor in 1974) and the impact of post-Indochina events compelled the new 
Miki government to restore relations with Seoul to the level obtaining before the Kim 
Dae-jung affair. " The South Korean-Japanese Friendship Association (Nikkan Giin 
Konshinkai), whose central objective was to exchange ideas over Asian security, peace 
and prosperity, " was replaced in June 1975 by the Japan-South Korean Parliamentarian 
League in order to strengthen the ties of the two countries in response to the communist 
victory in Vietnam and the explicit North Korean intention to militarily liberate South 
Korea. " The new organisation included more than 170 LDP Dietmen and all 
Democratic-Socialist Party (DSP) legislators. The mutual security concerns enhanced the 
need for systemic thinking by the US, Japan and South Korea. Almost every statement 
and presentation about security made it clear that Japan and South Korea ought to 
recognise the alliance's inseparable common security interests, share a common sense of 
crisis, and commit themselves to full-scale co-operation to deter any recurrence of hostile 
action by North Korea. The League decided to send its joint statement to Japanese Prime 
Minister Miki, South Korean President Park Chung-hee, US President Ford and the 
Speakers of the US Senate and Congress. " This uncharacteristically proactive strategy of 
the Miki government extended to the removal of a political impasse when Japanese 
" Watanabe (1999). 
"Park Yung-H. (1976): p. 773. 
Nikkan Gin Renmei (1992): pp. 74-80. 
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Foreign Minister Miyazaxva declared in the South Korean-Japanese foreign ministerial 
talks on 23 JulY 1975 that the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping incident was resolved. In the area 
of economics, Japan promised continued co-operation and support, with aid, loans and 
investment activities, to South Korea. 
There were, however, some clear limits to the recovery of Japan-South Korea relations. 
Despite the re-consolidation of Japan-South Korea security ties, the Miki cabinet did not 
aim at the direct enhancement of Japan's military co-operation with South Korea. In 
essence, Japan's efforts were diplomatic manoeuvres designed to recall the US to East 
Asia. Once this goal was accomplished, the Miki government wanted to consolidate the 
diplomatic achievements of the Tanaka cabinet in its dealings with the PRC and the 
continuation of lukewarm contact with North Korea. This basic approach would 
subsequently be developed into the omni-directional diplomacy of the Fukuda cabinet. 
An over-view of US-Japan-South Korea relations during the Ford-Miki-Park phase 
(1975-76) shows that there was little misperception among the three countries. The US 
govemment recognised the counterproductive outcomes of any intervention in its allies' 
internal politics and the importance of non-separation the security of Japan from that of 
South Korea . 
7' At his last address to the US Congress, on 12 January 1977, President Ford 
evaluated positively his achievement with East Asian allies: "In my two trips to Asia as 
President, we have reaffirmed America's continuing vital interest in the peace and 
security of Asia and the Pacific Basin, established a new partnership with Japan, 
confinned our dedication to the security of Korea, and reinforced our ties with the free 
73 USDSB (13 October 1975): p. 556. 
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nations of South East Asia. "" At the same time, the role of the Japanese government was 
conducive to the increasing cohesion of the TASS. Even though the sense of crisis 
reached a peak in the middle of 1975, the Park regime was able to enjoy the joint 
patronage of the US and Japan. When the Japanese government reassured South Korea of 
its readiness to offer further support, including economic assistance, the US reconfirmed 
its security commitment through the continuation of its military presence in South Korea. 
While the Ford administration made strenuous efforts to minimise the aftermath of the 
debacle of the South Vietnamese government, the full scale re-direction of the realist 
Republican foreign policy gained momentum. This paved the way for the Carter 
administration's completely new approach to coping with the domestic and international 
crises faced by the US. As a result, the strengthening of the cohesion of the TASS during 
the Ford administration did not endure. 
3.4 THE FIRST YEARS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
ROLE OF JAPAN, 1977-1978 
When the Carter administration came into office, US foreign policy did not merely turn to 
isolationism. The administration intended to transform the fundamental basis of the East 
Asian security environment, thereby removing the necessity for a US military presence in 
South Korea. Apart from the traumatic defeat in the Vietnam War and the political turmoil 
of the Watergate scandal, the PRC-Soviet Union split in the Communist bloc also led to a 
re-thinking by the Carter administration of America's global strategy. In particular, Carter 
74 USDSB (7 February 1977): p. 98. 
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believed that the US would no longer need to confront the Soviet Union through a head- 
to-head posture. Moscow was treated both as a potential partner in an ambitious anris 
control initiative and as an object of American human rights policies. " As a result, Carter 
downplayed the Soviet threat, and this perception effectively devalued the military 
importance of America's East Asian allies. Rather, South Korea was viewed as nothing 
but a trouble spot similar to Vietnam. Accordingly, the new American administration 
initiated the policy of the withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea. The 
emphasis was now placed on cultivating the security environment by relieving military 
tension in the Korean peninsula by encouraging the development of political 
liberalization in the South. From the US perspective, the North-South dialogue had not 
resulted in any tangible outcomes because of the North Korean denunciation of the 
dictatorial Park regime. Carter's new approach clearly implied the dismantling of the 
fundamental basis of the TASS and the breaching of the key US commitments to non- 
interference in South Korean domestic politics and no direct dealing with the North. 
Not surprisingly, a serious cleavage within the TASS emerged, and in these circumstances 
the role of Japan as a facilitator of sound trilateral relations was increasingly demanded. 
This section will discuss the rationale of the US withdrawal policy and the human rights 
drive towards South Korea, the response of the Park regime, the Japanese attempt to 
reverse the withdrawal policy, and the remarkable increase of political interaction 
between the Fukuda cabinet and the Park regime. 
" Spear and Williams (1988): pp. 198-99. 
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3.4.1 The Basic Assumptions of East Asian Policy under the Carter Administration: 
Japan as a Cornerstone and South Korea as a Trouble Spot in the Asia-Pacific Region 
As one of the vital elements in the transfon-nation of the TASS, the Carter administration 
attempted to distinguish between the strategic value of Japan and South Korea to the US. 
Japan was elevated to the status of the "primary Pacific ally" and "a cornerstone" in East 
Asian policy, while South Korea was regarded as "a dangerous trouble spot" and treated 
as "a pariah state. "" Following the promulgation of the Yushin Constitution in 1972, the 
kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung in 1973, and the exposure of influence-buying activities in 
the US, the Park regime was abhorrent to most Americans . 
7' The US therefore increased 
its intervention in South Korean politics with explicit and open criticism of the 
authoritarian rule of the Park regime. South Korea now had less opportunity to discuss 
directly the vital issue of the withdrawal question with the US. Paradoxically, this 
discrimination expanded the room for Japan to exert its influence on US-South Korea 
policy. 
In terms of alliance management, the aims of the US-South Korea policy initiated by 
President Carter, who believed that the Vietnam War was the end product of the realist 
approach to US foreign policy since the Truman administration, 78 was to uproot the 
"Vance (1983): p. 449. Harkavy (1977) defines pariah states as those characterised by "extreme diplomatic 
isolation and widespread, obsessive and unrelenting global opprobrium, directed against them for reasons 
other than economic status or the nature of their economic systems. " These states tend towards the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons because of weak, declining or nonexistent security guarantees from major 
powers. Harkavy cites examples in the late 1970s of pariah states such as Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and 
South Korea. He himself rated the possibility of South Korea becoming a nuclear power as relatively high, 
and predicted that a further decline of US support might encourage ftirther nuclear proliferation. (pp. 623- 
5). 
" Lee and Sato (1985) 
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tripwire which might drag the US into another land-war in Asia by establishing a broadly 
based civilian government in South Korea. At the peak of the presidential election 
campaign, on 8 September 1976, Carter made clear his intention to adopt the troop 
withdrawal policy as a way of influencing America's allies to move towards greater 
domestic political freedom: 
There are those regimes, such as South Korea, which openly violate human rights, although 
they themselves are under threat from communist regimes which represent an even greater 
level of repression. Even in such cases, however, we should not condone repression or the 
denial of freedom. On the contrary, we should use our influence to increase freedom in 
those countries that depend on us for their very survival. " 
Carter explicitly declared the US strategy of aggressive intervention. The withdrawal of 
US ground forces from South Korea, after the election, the new US President still 
believed, would not affect the military balance if enhanced air cover and security 
assistance were provided to improve South Korea's own military capability. Shortly after 
his inauguration, at a press conference on 23 February 1977, President Carter expressed 
his concern about political prisoners in South Korea. " Two weeks later, on 9 March, he 
announced the removal of travel restrictions on American citizens who wanted to go 
North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba or Cambodia. At the same time, he reiterated his 
commitment to withdraw American ground troops from South Korea. " South Korean 
Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin had to experience the bitterness of the policy shift at his 
first meeting with Carter on that day. Carter spent most of the time talking about human 
rights violations in South Korea, but was not willing to discuss the issue of US troops 
"Ibid.: p. 147. 
USDSB (4 April 1977): p. 252. 
USDSB (4 April 1977): pp. 305-7. 
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withdrawal. At a press conference on 26 May 1978, Carter explained that there had never 
been a policy for the permanent placement of ground troops in Korea, and the time had 
come for "a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a period of 4 or 5 years. "" The 
decision to withdraw 6,000 men by the end of 1978 and the remaining troops by 1981 or 
1982 was final: "A decision has been made. President Park has been informed. ý983 
One possible course open to the Park regime in order to remedy the likely damage of the 
withdrawal plan was a strategy of self-reliance. " However, that strategy seemed to be 
inadequate in the face of the wholesale dismantling of the fundamental basis of the TASS. 
The South Korean regime could not cope with this challenge alone. That is why it was 
anxious to encourage Japanese intervention in the bilateral conflict between South Korea 
and the US. 
3.4.2 The Influence of Japan on US Wthdraival Policy, 1977-1978: The Carter- 
Fitkuda Phase 
In contrast to President Carter's optimistic assessment of East-West rivalry, Japan's 1977 
ff7ifte Paper on Defense stated that the Soviet Union's anned strength had for the first 
time surpassed that of the US, and that the safety of the sea and air lanes of Japan was 
being jeopardised. This apprehension prevailed not only within the Self-Defense Forces, 
the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry, but also among a large section of the 
public. " The source of Japan's sense of insecurity in the late 1970s and the early 1980s 
was not only the increase in Soviet military power but also the oscillation of US foreign 
"PPPU, Cartei-1977 (Book I): p. 1018. 
" Ibid.: pp. 10 18-9. 
"The US also intervened to restrict the independent promotion of South Korean military capability. In 
particular, the US was extremely sensitive to the nuclear development programme of the Park regime. 
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policy towards Asia. The presence of the US army in South Korea was widely regarded as 
a necessary guarantor not only of the status quo in the Korean peninsula but also of the 
broader stability of the whole East Asian region. The withdrawal of American troops 
implied that there would be no tripwire forcing the US to intervene automatically in a 
military conflict in the peninsula. The removal of a front-line bulwark would dismantle 
the whole basic assumptions of the National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO), 
adopted only a year previously at the recommendation of the Ford administration. The 
Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) made it clear that it would "carefully monitor" the 
situation in the Korean peninsula after the withdrawal policy was implemented. " 
From the Japanese point of view, US policy towards South Korea represented by the 
withdrawal plan and human rights pressures had to be reconsidered. At the same time, the 
Park regime relied on the Japanese role of mediator to support its own interests. In terms 
of the modus operandi within the TASS, the role of Japan during the Fukuda 
administration was far more extensive in seeking to reverse America's withdrawal policy. 
Explaining how Japan and South Korea collaborated to reverse the policy of withdrawal, 
Masataka Kosaka observes that "South Korea and Japan made persistent efforts quietly 
to change the mind of President Carter and, with the help of a number of Americans, 
succeeded. "" Japan was now able to use its enhanced status as America's "primary 
Pacific ally" as one of its most powerful levers of influence. The Carter administration 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of prior consultation and close co-operation with 
Japan. This emphasis restrained the US from bulldozing the implementation of the 
Drifte (1983): p. 109. 
Defence ofJapan 1977 (1977): p. 42. 
Kosaka (1985): p. 13. 
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withdrawal plan. Various actors inside and outside the Japanese government worked 
ceaselessly to stop the progress of the withdrawal plan, since the presence of US troops in 
South Korea was vital to the security of Japan. " The JDA was worried that Japan's strong 
opposition to the withdrawal policy might lead the US to criticise Japan as a security free- 
rider and to demand that Japan should itself assume more responsibility for the security of 
South Korea. " The Japanese leadership, however, attached more importance to its own 
insecurity than to the possibility of a negative American reaction. 
On 31 January 1977, the day before US Vice President Mondale's visit to Tokyo, Prime 
Minister Fukuda emphasised the importance of not changing the international structure 
which had buttressed the security of the East Asian region. " The Japanese Foreign 
Minister added in an interview: "If you look at history, it is a fact that the war occurred in 
Korea because of the withdrawal of US troops there. Hence, our anxiety. "" On the 
following day, Fukuda expressed his ideas to Mondale about human rights and the 
presence of US forces in South Korea: 
Japan, as a neighbor, understands ROK problems although it knows that the Park 
government has probably gone too far ... [However] the allied military posture in the South 
is a totally separate problem and should not be linked with human rights. " 
This remark testifies to the political and cultural homogeneity of Japan and South Korea 
within the framework of the TASS, a factor that strengthened Japan's capacity to redirect 
the withdrawal plan. The outcome of the Fukuda-Mondale talks was in some respects 
" Lee and Sato (1982): pp. 107-8. 
"Mainichi (17 January 1977). 
' Tanaka (1999). 
9' Murata (1998): pp. 1-15. 
83 
Part I 3 Historical Overview 
quite positive. Mondale, in a news conference statement in Tokyo on I February 1977, 
stated that "I emphasized the fact that the Administration does not intend to turn its back 
on Asia. We should and will remain an Asian-Pacific power.... [W]e will phase down our 
ground forces only in close consultation and cooperation with the Governments of Japan 
and South Korea. "" At the same time, a draft of guidelines for US-Japan Defence 
Cooperation was delivered to Japan. " 
Two months later, Fukuda, before a summit meeting with Carter on 21 March in 
Washington, proposed that the joint communiqu6 should use the word "reduction" 
instead of "withdrawal". However, Carter was adamant in standing by the pledge that he 
had made during his election campaign. At the same time, he admitted that "[H]is basic 
foreign policy can be expressed, as he said; that's the 'duck' diplomacy-everything is 
very calm on top, but paddling like mad underneath. "" The joint communiqu6 dealt with 
the Korean question as follows: 
The President and the Prime Minister noted the continuing importance of the maintenance 
of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for the security of Japan and East Asia as a 
whole. They agreed on the desirability of continued efforts to reduce tension on the Korean 
Peninsula and strongly hoped for an early resumption of the dialogue between the South 
and the North. In connection with the intended withdrawal of United States ground forces 
in the Republic of Korea, the President stated that the United States, after consultation with 
the Republic of Korea and also with Japan, would proceed in ways which would not 
endanger the peace on the Peninsula. He affirmed that the United States remains committed 
to the defense of the Republic of Korea. " 
" Ibid.: pp. 15-6. 
9'USDSB (7 March 1977): pp. 189-90. 
"Murata (1998): p. 16. 
" PPPU, Carter 1977-1: p. 473. 
16 Ibid.: p. 480. 
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After the Japanese opposition to the withdrawal plan was made clear, the disagreement 
within the Carter government represented by the Singlaub protest" in May 1977, 
impelled President Carter to press ahead with his campaign pledge. On 24 May, US 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Habib and Chainuan of the JCS Gen. 
George Brown visited Seoul and Tokyo with the intention of underlining the President's 
firm resolve to implement the withdrawal policy. " However, Japan did not abandon its 
own resolve, and its own variation of "duck diplomacy" was asserted when Fukuda met 
US Defense Secretary Brown in Tokyo in July 1977. " On 14 September, Foreign 
Minister Zentaro Kosaka was given an explanation of the US withdrawal policy by 
National Security Advisor Brzezinski. In response, within a week, the US-Japanese 
Parliamentary Conference on the Korean question was held in Washington. Forty-seven 
hawkish members from both countries expressed their support for the peaceful 
unification of Korea. 
As the year 1978 began, Carter's adherence to his election pledge was unexpectedly 
weakened because of an increase of the Soviet military capability in the Far East. The 
Fiscal Year 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act instructed the President to 
implement a "gradual and phased reduction" of US ground forces in a way which was 
consistent with the security interests of South Korea, the US and Japan. The 1978 State of 
the Union Message given by Carter avowed to implement the Act in principle. " After the 
9' On 19 May 1977, President Carter instructed the Secretary of Defense to order Major General John 
Singlaub, Chief of Staff of the US Forces in Korea, back to the US to report to the President after the 
General had publicly voiced his disagreement with the withdrawal policy. Singlaub was subsequently 
transferred to another position. (Ibid.: pp. 10 18-2 1 and 1030. ) 
" Choi, Chang-yoon (1980): p. 1132; Murata (1998): p. 18. 
99 NYT (2 8 September 1977). 
" PPPU, Carter 1978-1: p. 122. 
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re-adjustment of the withdrawal plan in late 1978, "' the leak of new intelligence data 
concerning North Korean military strength in January 1979, which indicated that North 
Korea excelled in almost every category over South Korea, cast serious doubts on the 
feasibility of the whole withdrawal policy. 
Even though it is not easy to gauge exactly the extent to which Japan was instrumental in 
achieving the suspension of Carter's withdrawal plan, there can be no doubt that the 
Fukuda cabinet played an important role challenging the plan explicitly and implicitly 
from the initial stage of the Carter Presidency. "' In fact, American politicians were more 
attentive to Japanese views on Korea than the self-serving views of the South Koreans. 'O' 
The Carter-Fukuda phase reveals the novelty of the Japanese goverrunent intervening 
directly to persuade the Carter administration to reconsider its withdrawal policy and to 
reduce the political pressure on the Park regime concerning the human rights issue. This 
marked an important new stage in the US-Japan relationship, with Japan now beginning 
to take a more active part in the triangular alliance. Japan's role as mediator demonstrated 
the high degree of common interest between Japan and South Korea which arose out of 
their respective relations with the US. However, the opposition to the withdrawal policy, 
from Japan's point of view, could not be carried forward without cost. The Fukuda 
cabinet introduced the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in November 1978, 
only two years after the adoption of the National Defense Programme Outline (the 
NDPO). 
Ibid.: p. 768. 
Kwak and Patterson (1983): p. 271; Sohn (1989): p. 119; interviews with Sato, Okazaki, Kim Tae-ji; 
Heiwa. Anzenhosho Kenkyu-sho (1979): p. 197.. 
"' Lee Chong-sik (1985): p. 82. 
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3.4.3 The Enhancement of Japan-South Korea Relations in the Security and Political 
Areas: The Japanese Role as Facilitator 
The stream of exchange visits of high officials and politicians from the ruling parties 
between Japan and South Korea continued throughout 1977-78. The purposes were 
multiple: to share information about US policy; to express Japanese interests in the 
continuing presence of US ground forces in Korea; and to strengthen the countries'joint 
efforts to reverse the troop withdrawal plan. " Soon after Mondale's return to 
Washington, the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarian League, which included 243 
Japanese Dietmen, expressed its concern that any reductions of US ground forces in 
South Korea would produce instability not only on the Korean peninsula but also 
throughout Northeast East Asia. "' Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin and Deputy Prime 
Minister Nam Duck-woo's visit to Tokyo for the Ninth Japan-South Korea Ministerial 
Meeting in September, and Former Prime Minister Kishi's visit to Seoul on the occasion 
of the Fourteenth Japanese-South Korean Co-operation Committee meeting in Seoul 
followed. Exchanges of infon-nation and co-operation over the troop withdrawal issue 
were high on the agendas of these meetings. 
On 22 June, after Habib took trips to Seoul and Tokyo, former KCIA Chief Kim 
Hyung-wook, in a testimony before the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee sub- 
committee on international organisation, exposed South Korean political bribery 
activities in Japan and the US, including the Kim Dae-jung affair. The next day, however, 
" Former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil's visit to Tokyo, 14-19 February 1977; the Japan-South Korea 
Parliamentarians League's 6th general meeting in Tokyo 15 February; on 17-19 February, Korean Foreign 
Minister Park Dong-jin's visit to Tokyo to talk with his Japanese counterpart; in early June, the LDP 
Dietmen's talks with President Park. (Watanabe, 1999). 
'O'Lee and Sato (1982): p. I 10. 
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Prime Minister Fukuda asserted that the political settlement of the Kim Dae-jung 
kidnapping should not be influenced by this testimony. Japan's role as a political shield in 
defending the Park regime did not stop at the implicit diplomatic offensive from 
Washington, which later inevitably prevented the Japanese cabinet from supporting Kim 
in the political regime transition after the death of President Park (see Chapter 7). 
A similar pattern of co-operative visits continued in 1978. The Japanese-South Korean 
Parliamentary League held its seventh general meeting in Seoul in January; Foreign 
Minister Park Dong-jin stopped over in Tokyo on his way home from the US and Europe 
in February; and in late July the Fifteenth meeting of the Japanese-South Korean Co- 
operation Committee was held in Tokyo. The Fukuda cabinet's expression of concern 
over South Korean security reached a climax with the statement by Shin Kanemaru, 
General Director of the JDA, at the National Politics Study Group [Kokumin Seyi 
Kenkyukafl on 31 July, that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were a destiny-sharing 
community [uninei kyodotai]. The co-operative mood culminated on the last day of the 
Japanese-South Korean ministerial meeting, 4 September, when Japanese Foreign 
Minister Sunao Sonoda conveyed Fukuda's proposal for a summit meeting to President 
Park. "' One and half months later, the Japanese-South Korean Friendship Festival in 
Seoul gave further expression to this mood. 
Standing firmly on the side of the Park regime on security and political matters, the 
Fukuda government had to face the denunciation by the Soviet Union that Japan had 
" The subjects of the meeting were (1) the state of international politics and the Japanese-South Korean 
bilateral relations; (2) the economic state of both countries and the Japanese-South Korean economic 
relations, and (3) other issues. The joint statement issued on 4 September 1978 revealed that: " the Japanese 
minister (Foreign Minister Sonoda) 
88 
Part I 3 Historical Overview 
effectively moved into a US-Japan-South Korea military bloc. "' Even the PRC, which 
planned to sign the friendship treaty with Japan, criticised the contents of the joint 
communiqu6 of the Carter-Fukuda summit meeting. 108 At the same time, in defending the 
Park regime, the Japanese government minimized its political interaction with the 
opposition/dissident forces in South Korea. 
CONCLUSION: AN APPRAISAL OF THE TASS, 1964-1978 
Between 1964 and 1978, US foreign policy changed substantially through the course of 
four administrations, and this had a profound effect on US relations with Japan and Korea. 
In particular, the role and status of the txvo East Asian allies changed substantially. 
During the Johnson-Sato-Park phase, the three countries' involvement in the military 
conflict in Vietnam opened up a wide range of mutual interaction. Both South Korea and 
Japan had helped the American position with military participation in the Vietnam War, 
and had done so to their own advantage. The Johnson administration strengthened its 
obligations to Japan, by asserting its readiness to counter any sort of aggression, including 
a nuclear attack by the PRC, and to South Korea by promising "prompt and effective 
assistance" in the case of a North Korean invasion. 
Overall, the Nixon-Sato/Tanaka Park phase showed how easily and rapidly an alliance 
could experience the growing divergence of its members' national interests and the 
discarding of their treaty obligations. When Nixon's Asia policy became part of his 
Lee and Sato (1982): p. I 11. 
Ibid.: p. 112. 
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reformulation of global strategy, which concentrated mainly upon the Sino-Soviet 
antagonism, South Korea's role in the changing US policy was minimal, and indeed 
maintaining the security of South Korea became rather burdensome to the US. During the 
Nixon administration, however, there were no references to "prompt and effective 
assistance". 
The Ford-Miki-Park phase quickly moved towards a recovery of coherence due globally 
to the decline of d6tente, and regionally to the debacle of South Vietnam in April 1975. 
The return to normality within the TASS progressed very quickly in August 1975. There 
can now be no doubt that in practice the outcome of US intervention towards junior allies 
in the Third World was "the establishment and defense of authoritarian political and 
social arrangements ... as a support for the maintenance of international order and 
stability. ""' The revival of the Korean clause in the Ford-Miki joint communiqu6 aimed 
at the preservation of the Seoul regime in the interests of the US and Japan. "' 
After the fall of Saigon, US alliance management towards the Third World confronted a 
new challenge. But by the 1970s, popular mass movements were spreading against 
repressive political systems and the structures of authoritarianism and dictatorship began 
to crumble, above all, in US client regimes, with the result that a general crisis of elite rule 
began to develop in the Third World. "' This challenge was strong enough to introduce the 
issue of liberalisation or democracy promotion, but it was not sufficiently powerful to 
override the concern with national security. In consequence, the Carter-Fukuda-Park 
Robinson (1996): p. 15. 
See McCormack (1977): pp. 143-4. 
Robinson (1996): p. 15. 
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phase was complex: the Carter administration discriminated between the strategic value 
of Japan and South Korea. However, when US relations with the Soviet Union became 
aggravated, the basis of US foreign policy experienced unprecedented oscillation and 
inconsistency, even though national security concerns were always of primary 
importance. 
Unlike the declining relations between the US and South Korea, bilateral relations 
between South Korea and Japan improved on the basis of a new niodus vivendi in the 
security area during the Park-Fukuda phase. Risking the possibility of US pressure on 
Japan to accept a heavier burden in the defence area, the Japanese government elected to 
raise a serious alann bell over US's Korea policy. Japan was in a better position than 
South Korea to monitor the development of the withdrawal plan. As Sohn puts it, "It 
seems obvious that the Japanese government was kept closely informed of developments 
on the issue. "' 12 At the same time, South Korea could obtain changes in the withdrawal 
policy via the Japanese government. It also needs to be stressed that the geographic 
distance between the US and South Korea and the close relations between the US and 
Japan resulted in a fundamental problem. American signals conveyed through the 
Japanese prism were not always identical with signals from Japan. To Japan, the key issue 
was whether the withdrawal plan should be implemented; while to the US, it was a matter 
of how to implement the plan. For Japan, as long as the US hinted at the possibility of a 
reversal of policy, this was enough; but the actual process of reversal was of great 
significance to the Park regime. As a result, when the US attempted to restore its relations 
"' Almost every movement of the withdrawal programme was disclosed in advance by high-ranking 
officials of the Japanese government, especially those in the JDA. (Yoiniuri (23 February and 15 March 
1978)); also 26 March and 6 April 1979, cited in Sohn (1989): pp. 119-120. 
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with South Korea from the end of 1978, it was inevitable that the strains of the alliance 
game hindered the process of genuine recovery, led to insurmountable diplomatic and 
political frictions between the Carter administration and the Park regime, resulted in the 
collapse of the Park regime, and left a complex agenda of regime transition for both the 
US and Japan. 
In the operational pattern of the TASS, it has been customary for the United States, the 
most influential member, to call the diplomatic tune, while Japan and South Korea have 
tended to follow. An example is the establishment of the "Cold War mindset", signaled 
and initiated by the US and adopted by the other two members of the alliance. Internal 
tensions tend to arise, however, when the equilibrium is disturbed by the calling of a 
different tune, for example, when the US abruptly changed its China policy on 15 July 
197 1. It was difficult for the Sato cabinet to follow this new direction, and impossible for 
the Park regime, the weakest member of the group and the one occupying the most geo- 
strategically vulnerable position. The hierarchical nature of the TASS, the geographical 
distance of the two countries from defined sources of threat, and the gaps in national 
power parities were acutely exposed by these events. In consequence, it was therefore of 
the utmost importance for South Korea, as a projected force and an exposed state, to 
attract and strengthen the US commitment, and to follow up independently the changing 
basis of US foreign policy. 
In addition, this chapter's historical review of trilateral alliance relations suggests that the 
nature of the US-Japan relationship at any particular moment has determined the nature of 
the Japan-South Korea relationship. Thus, when Japan enjoyed a good relationship with 
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the US, as it did during the Presidencies of Johnson, Ford and Reagan, its relationship 
with South Korea was also amicable. In contrast, when Japan-US relations encountered 
difficulties, the Japan-South Korean relationship also showed signs of strain, as seen in 
the last years of the Sato cabinet and during the Tanaka and Suzuki governments. These 
characteristics highlight the importance of Japan's role as intermediary, a role that has 
occasionally been extended to the role of initiator. 
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PARTTWO 
UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE INTERVENTIONS IN 
SOUTH KOREA, JANUARY-OCTOBER 1979 
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
As discussed in the last section of Chapter 3, from late 1978 onWards, US policy 
towards South Korea seemed to be assuming a more traditional form. In particular, from 
early 1979 the Carter administration signaled the possibility of reconsidering the troop 
withdrawal plan, and of restoring relations with the Park regime. Most tentatively were 
arrangements for Carter-Park summit meetings in Seoul, 29 June-I July 1979. Only in 
about four months after the summit talks, however, the Park regime had fallen. On 26 
October 1979, President Park Chung-hee, who had stayed in power for eighteen years 
since 1961, was assassinated by Director of the KCIA, Kim Jae-kyu, at a dinner party. 
Kim had recently made many recommendations and suggestions, but because of the 
influence of Cha, the head of the Presidential Protective Force, the President did not 
accept them. There were a series of arguments between Kim and Cha. 1 During the meal 
both President Park and Cha criticised Kim for his handling of political challenges from 
opposition party leader, Kim Young-sam and political riots in Pusan and Masan in late 
October 1979. Kim Jae-kyu had become embroiled in an argument with the head of the 
Presidential Protective Force, Cha Ji-chol, over how to respond to the political crisis 
represented by the uprisings in Pusan and Masan. Kim believed that the Park regime 
should pursue a policy of conciliation, while Cha argued it was time to suppress. 2 
1 79 Seoul 16369 (28 October 1979). 
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Part Two seeks to answer the following questions: (1) Why did the Park regime come to 
an end when the Carter administration's Korean policy had changed so much in its 
favour, and what link can be established between the death of President Park and the 
Korea policy of US President Carter? (2) What were the roles of the US and Japan in 
the regime transition in South Korea? (3) How can we understand the whole process of 
the US and Japanese interventions through a systemic approach focused on the 
dynamics of intra-alliance politics? In order to answer these questions, it is first 
necessary to investigate the basic policy formula of the Carter administration towards 
the North-East Asian region in general and South Korean politics in particular. This is 
followed by a brief discussion of the Japanese perspective on US alliance management 
with South Korea. 
Kwak and Patterson distinguish between the US short-range goal of "the protection of 
South Korea territorial integrity and political interdependence" and the US long-range 
goal of the "promotion of favourable conditions for Korean unification by easing 
tensions in Northeast Asia, particularly by creating an international climate conducive to 
,, 3 inter-Korean d6tente. Together, these American goals sought to keep South Korea 
(and a unified Korea) "oriented towards the United States" and "consistent with U. S. 
security interests 14 In terms of alliance management, the US has pursued its long-range 
goal without endangering its short-range goal. Thus, the priority given to the territorial 
integrity and political independence of South Korea was consistent with the aim of 
easing tension in Northeast Asia. At the same time, however, the US did not always 
regard its long-range goal as subordinate to its short-range goal. In essence, the two 
goals were complementary and symbiotic. Thus, especially for the Carter 
2 Keesing's: p. 30217; Fowler (1999): p. 267. 
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administration, the long-range goal of exerting pressure for liberalisation was intended 
to facilitate a better environment for the territorial integrity of South Korea by removing 
one of the key obstacles to the alleviation of tensions between the two Koreas. 
The Carter administration's approach ("the Carter formula") to managing South Korean 
politics, including the regime transition of 1979-80, embraced three inter-related 
dimensions: global, regional and local. First, the Carter administration sought to deter 
Soviet expansionism by inviting the PRC into the US global network of containment. 
Secondly, in terms of the regional dimension, the US attempted to increase Japan's 
share of the defence burden. Thirdly, reliant upon these policies, at the local level, 
political reconciliation or the alleviation of tensions between the two Koreas was 
imperative for the stability in the region. To that end, the Carter administration's plan 
was to attract North Korea to the side of both the PRC and the US by removing two 
major obstacles: the presence of US ground forces in the Korean peninsula and the 
dictatorial regime in South Korea. Even though the chances of establishing good 
relations with North Korea seemed to be slim, the Carter administration never 
abandoned that possibility. Furthermore, even after it was decided to suspend the 
withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea, the US did not relinquish its 
pressure for the liberalisation of South Korean politics. On balance, this pressure was 
not merely based on the human rights issue or a Wilsonian idealistic approach but on a 
systematic concept of alliance management. 
Japan's main role in the security sphere was to make an indirect rather than direct 
3 K%vak and Patterson (1983): pp. 332-3; see FRUS 1958-1960 VoLXVII. - pp. 699-713. 
4 Ibid.: pp. 700-701. 
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contribution to the maintenance of the regional order. 5 Japan, after enhancing its 
friendly relations with South Korea since the diplomatic normalisation of 1965, 
maintained limited contacts with North Korea. 6 For Japan, the status quo in Northeast 
Asia meant "stability in the Korean peninsula" and the "security of South Korea. ,7 The 
first of these imperatives was mainly a reflection of the power correlation and of 
strategic alignment among the US, the Soviet Union and the PRC in the Cold War era; 
while the second was a matter of maintaining economic and political security within 
South Korea and deterring the military threat from the North. Thus, Japan's common 
interests with the South were much more important than its relations with the North. Put 
another way, the realisation of a rigid status quo in the Korean peninsula was 
synonymous with the pursuit of military, political and economic stability in South 
Korea. Because Japan did not develop any reliable means to leverage North Korean 
behaviour, it had to invest in human and material resources in the South. As a result, the 
interdependence of Japan and South Korea has deepened: the degree of sharing fate 
between them has increased. 
When it comes to the discussion about the Japanese posture between the US and South 
Korea, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Japanese Fukuda cabinet had viewed the US 
foreign policy, and its moralist approach and human rights policy in particular, under 
the Carter presidency with scepticism. H. Abe, one of senior researcher of Nihon 
Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu-sho, the umbrella institute of the MOFA, criticised that the 
Carter administration's emphasis of the American value would bring about "unrealistic 
Hook (1996). 
Izumi (1985): pp. 179-81. 
7 Ibid,: p. 180. Similarly, Lee Chong-sik argues that "rhe frequent changes in Japanese political leadership 
during this era (1965-1978) also demonstrate the meagre impact that personal and factional political 
differences had on Japanese policy toward Korea. " (1985: pp. 103-4). 
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and irrational" policies towards its allies. 8 As far as the impact of the US-South Korea 
relations the US human rights policy caused was concerned, from the Japanese 
viewpoint, President Park's deviant response to the US concerns about South Korean 
human rights issues were natural: Park told on 2 February 1977 that "the protection of 
the human rights in Korea is to defend 35 million South Korean people from the 
communist threat. "9 By the same token, the Ohira cabinet was sceptical to the Carter 
administration's formula to induce North Korea to the dialogue with South Korea. 10 
Part Two of the study considers US and Japanese political intervention towards South 
Korea in the last year of the Park regime given the argument that the US adopted a 
flexible status quo policy linked to a strategy of offensive intervention, while Japan 
adhered to a rigid status quo policy linked to a strategy of defensive intervention aiming 
at the preservation of the existing regime in South Korea. Part Two consists of two 
chapters: Chapter 4 discusses the way in which the US affected the decisive weakening 
and demise of the Park regime and covers the period between January and October 
1979. Chapter 5 analyses the first term of the Ohira premiership, from January to 
October 1979. It discusses Japanese views about the dislocation of economic 
development and the political system in South Korea, and Japan's discontent with the 
continuation of US pressure on the Park regime to undertake political liberalization. 
The "dissimilar-integrative" type of interaction introduced in Chapter 2 will also serve 
in each chapter as a useful tool explaining US-Japan-South Korean relations. 
8 Abe (1978): pp. 556-7,559-60. 
9 Ibid.: p. 554. 
10 Heiwa. Anzenhosho Kenkyu-sho (1979): p. 202. 
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CHAPTER4 
US POLICY FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH KOREA, 
JANUARY-OCTOBER 1979: THE DEMISE OF THE PARK 
REGIME 
INTRODUCTION 
From mid-1978 onwards, the Republican Party's criticism of President Carter gained 
popular support, and the Carter administration recognised that it must seek to reduce 
public criticism of its human rights-oriented policies. " One of the results was Assistant 
Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific Region, Richard Holbrooke's speech about US-South 
Korea policy on 6 December 1978 before the Far East-American Council and the US- 
Korean Economic Council that the "past problems" were "resolved or on the way to 
resolution. 1912 Most importantly however, this did not mean that the Carter 
administration would end US pressure for political liberalisation in South Korea "where 
an obvious security interest was at stake. " 13 Rather, the administration wanted to secure 
gradual political liberalisation in South Korea in exchange for the suspension of its own 
withdrawal policy. To that end, the summit talks proved to be a highly effective device 
for expressing the US security commitment not only to South Korea but also to the 
Northeast Asian region as a whole, and for pressing the liberalisation of the Park 
regime. The visit of President Carter to Seoul 29 June-I July 1979 was arranged as a 
11 Brzezinski (1985): p. 401. 
12 Ibid.: p. 3 1. 
13 Brzezinski (1985): p. 127. 
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symbol of "the passing of the severe strains" and "the return to normal relations. " 14 
However, as this chapter seeks to explain, the reconciliation of the goals of the Car-ter 
Administration and the Park regime was not achieved. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.1 discusses the shift of US policy 
towards the Park regime in early 1979, and the regime's reluctance to change its ruling 
style. Section 4.2 considers the friction between the Carter administration and the Park 
regime before the summit meetings of 29 June-I July 1979. Section 4.3 examines the 
domestic political confrontation leading to the death of President Park. Finally, the 
conclusion summarises the main points of argument developed in this chapter. 
4.1 THE SHIFT IN US-SOUTH KOREA POLICY IN EARLY 1979 AND THE 
ROOTS OF DISCORD WITH THE PARK REGIME 
For the previous two years, the legitimacy of the Park regime had been undermined 
substantially by two factors: the economic recession caused by the second oil crisis in 
1978, and the Carter administration's refusal to offer unconditional support to the 
regime. The South Korean people lost their confidence in the capacity and legitimacy of 
the Park regime. The result of the National Assembly election on 12 December 1978, 
when the opposition New Democratic Party outpolled the DRP candidates by 1.1%, 
alan-ned the Park regime. 15 The opposition/dissi dent forces believed that they now had 
a springboard to launch a more aggressive struggle against the Park regime. 16 The 
Carter administration interpreted the result positively: "the government had a lesson in 
14 79Seoul 01625 (3 February 1979). 
15 C. I. E. Kim (1979): pp. 523-32. 
16 79 Seoul 01620 (2 February 1979). 
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The Carter administration's efforts to balance principle and power did not mark a 
complete return to the foreign policies of the Nixon and the Ford administrations, which 
had sought to distinguish clearly between international affairs and allies' internal 
political concerns. The US goals and objectives for Korea in 1979 were twofold: the 
"prevention of armed conflict and reducing tensions" and the "promotion of greater 
political liberalization in the ROK without provoking a nationalist, regressive 
reaction. "' 8 If the recovery of strained relations with the Park regime could be achieved, 
the US believed, it would be possible to persuade the regime to move ahead towards 
political liberalisation by "hiendly and unobtrusive counsel". 19 
The Carter administration first announced its intention to readjust the timing and rate of 
the withdrawal plan on 9 February 1979. The most pivotal issue, which caused serious 
deterioration in the bilateral relationship, thus seemed to be resolved . 
20 The 
administration believed that the existing global strategic parity was not disadvantageous 
to the US: the SALT 11 aimed to "provide reasonable, practical, and verifiable 
constraints" on the anns race .21 Moreover, Carter, who was already feeling a sense of 
humiliation about the troop withdrawal policy, 22 was sceptical of the validity of the new 
17 79 Seoul 01427 (31 January 1979). 
18 79 State 04087 (17 February 1979). The telegram, entitled, 1979 U. S. Goals and Objectivesfor Korea, 
consisted of four parts; 1. U. S. Interest; II. Key Policy Issues Facing the U. S. in the Next Two Years; 111. 
Goals and Objectives; and IV. Explanation of Changes from the Last Goals and Objectives Statement. 
The core was the pursuit of "prevention of armed conflict and reducing tensions" and "promotion of 
greater political liberalization in the ROK without provoking a nationalist, regressive reaction" as a basis 
for the "development of long-range policy blueprint for U. S. -Korea relations in the post patron/client 
Fý criod. " 
9 Ibid. 
20 C110S1,11 llbo (6 January 1977). 
21 USDSB (July 1979): p. 65; Buss(1982): p. 153. 
22 Vance (1983): pp. 127-30. 
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intelligence assessment concerning North Korea's military superiority over the South. 23 
He was reluctant to embark upon a drastic policy change, even if it was necessary to 
make some adjustments. Instead, the US sought to utilise the withdrawal issue as much 
as possible to induce a process of liberalization in South Korea. In addition, the US 
President attempted to lessen the tension between the two Koreas by arranging tripartite 
talks between the US and the two Korea in the hope that the long-tenn presence of 
American soldiers in Korea would become unnecessary. 24 Short- and long-term goals 
were pursued simultaneously. In consequence, diplomatic strains appeared in the pre- 
consultation period for the Carter-Park summit meeting and in the Park regime's 
responses to opposition challenges within South Korea. 
From the Park regime's point of view, due to the new intelligence data concerning North 
Korean military strength in January 1979, the Car-ter plan for troops was stillborn. 
President Park wanted to retain US support without changing his ruling style in the 
belief that a consensus supporting the suspension of the withdrawal policy was building 
up in Washington. In his new year press conference on 19 January 1979, declaring the 
end of the "uncomfortable relations" of the past two years with the United States, " 
President Park proposed that there should be a summit meeting with President Carter, 
while at the same time he rejected the adequacy of "Westem style democracy' and 
refused to lift Emergence Measure-9 [EM-9, hereafter] . 
25 Signs of a return to non-nal 
relations were seen in Washington with a series of visits by South Korean national 
Assemblymen. 26 Most significantly, the visit of Korean Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin 
to Washington on 14-24 February 1979 was regarded as a successful pre-summit 
23 Oberdorfer (1998): p. 103; Niksch (1981): pp. 325-41. 
24 Ibid.: p. 105. 
25 79 Seoul 0075](19 January 1979); Emergency Measure 9 prohibited any kind of criticism of the 
Yushin Constitution. The maximum penalty for violation of this rule was death. 
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consultation. It can be seen, therefore, that from the outset the efforts by the US and 
South Korea to restore their relations involved muddled perceptions between the two 
countries' governments. This was a situation well captured in Neustadt's observation: 
"each friend misreads the other, each is reticent with the other ... each replies in kind. A 
spiral starts, and only when one bows low before the other's latest grievance does the 
spira stop. 7927 
4.2 THE POLITICAL STRAINS BEFORE THE SUMMIT MEETING OF 29 
JUNE-1 JULY 1979 
The recovery of relations between the Carter administration and the Park regime was 
not realized, and the outcome of the summit meeting was bound to be disappointing. 
There were three main sources of difficulty: President Carter's attachment to human 
rights; the Park regime's incapacity to further absorb US demands; and the strength of 
oppositi on/di ssi dent forces in South Korea. The muddled perceptions inevitably led to 
disappointed expectations on both sides, and caused political strains. Unfortunately, the 
spiral did not stop until President Park was dead. 
4.2.1 The US Approach to the Summit Meeting and the Reaction of the Park Regime 
From the early stage of the pre-summit consultation, the war of nerves cast a dark 
shadow over the bilateral efforts to return to normal relations in 1979. In order to find 
an optimal way of balancing the issues of security and human rights, Assistant Secretary 
of State Richard Holbrooke visited Seoul in mid-March 1979 and met President Park, 
26 79 State 028864 (3 February 1979). 
27 Neustadt (1970): p. 56. 
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the Foreign Minister, the Director of the KCIA, and also some political dissidents. 
Foreign Minister Park called for the US to "leave the matter to the ROK so that progress 
could be made. " By contrast, the dissident groups emphasised that "if there were a 
summit, President Carter should raise human rights issues .,, 
28 The dissident groups were 
detennined to utilise the visit of Carter to strengthen their struggle against the Park 
regime. The Park regime was clearly not happy with Hobrooke's visit and especially his 
contacts with dissidents. Ten days after the visit, on 27 March, Foreign Minister Park 
complained to the US Ambassador about Holbrooke had conveyed President Carter's 
letters to three dissident leaders, Yun Bo-sun, Kim Dae-jung and Ham Sok-hun, without 
giving notice to the regime. 29 
This episode created the widespread impression that the summit talks would fail to 
achieve their goals. US pre-summit pressure for the improvement of human rights in 
South Korea had no significant effect. Therefore, the US Ambassador to Seoul, William 
Gleysteen, recommended that Washington should move towards "the close of a very 
unhappy chapter in U. S. -ROK relations . 7730 He predicted that making South Korea "a 
pariah state"(see Chapter 3) would result in the weakening of US influence vis-h-vis 
South Korea, and that the latter would respond by treating its patron, the US, as a pariah 
too. 31 However, Washington did not welcome this recommendation. Holbrooke 
continued to emphasise the desire at "the highest level" for human rights progress prior 
to the Presidential visit to Korea. 32 On 10 April, Washington's proposal for the summit 
was conveyed to South Korea: 
28 On 17 March, after meeting President Park, the Assistant Secretary had talks about human rights with 
KCIA Director, Kim Jae-kyu. (79 Seoul 04547 (29 March, 1979)). 
29 79 Seoul 4269 (23 March 1979) 
30 79Seoul 04141 (21 March 1979). 
31 79Seoul 0511 (7 April 1979). 
32 79 State 086093 (7 April 1979). 
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(A) It is the president's belief that the major aim of the visit is to consolidate the US- 
ROK relationship and our cooperation in a wide sphere ranging from security and 
reduction of regional tensions to economics; 
(B) The value of a summit meeting will obviously be affected by the atmosphere in 
which it takes place; 
(C) It is the president's hope that internal development in Korea as well as bilateral 
matters between us will contribute to a constructive atmosphere. 
(D) A visible gesture of ROK political liberalization could make a very important 
contribution to overall U. S. -Korean relations. 33 
The message was quite clear: the US President intended to consolidate US-ROK 
relations if there was clear evidence of political liberalisation in Korea. The 
requirements of Article (A) of the Washington proposal could only be met if Article (D) 
was respected. The roots of miscommunication and disappointed expectations were thus 
established in the pre-summit consultation. Washington expected the lifting of the 
draconian EM 9-which it saw as "greater than required to meet the threats" to Korea's 
security and stabi lity,, 34 -as a visible gesture of South Korea's desire to return to 
normal relations with the US. 35 However, this proposal was unacceptable to the Park 
regime. 
In mid-June, only ten days before the summit, the Ambassador met Kim Jae-kyu, 
Director of the KCIA. At the meeting, Gleysteen spoke "in quite blunt terms" about 
"some further gesture to signify human rights progress. " At the same time, he drew a 
red line "to avoid actions which would signify regression" before, during, and after the 
33 79 State 089493 (10 April 1979). See also President Carter's meeting with editors and news directors 
on 13 April 1979, cited in PPPU, Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book 1: p. 627. 
34 79 Seoul 07654 (25 May 1979). 
35 79 Seoul 07665 (25 May 1979). 
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SUMMit. 36 These demands met with a completely negative response, and indeed the 
South Korean government proceeded to confine about thirty dissidents to their homes in 
late June 1979.37 
4.2.2 The Carter-Park Summit Meetings, 29 June-I July, 1979 
The Washington Post described Carter's visit to Seoul as "a delicate diplomatic mission 
of showing support for the country's security without appearing to embrace a 
government that is persistently at odds with his human rights poliCy.,, 
38 The summit 
talks dealt with three major issues: the US security commitment, including the status of 
the US combat forces in South Korea; the three-way official talks between the US and 
the two Koreas; and the human rights issue. 
The joint communiqu6 of the summit meetings gave a guarded impression that the 
unhappy relations between the two countries had come to an end. Out of the 
communiqu6's 23 articles, 14 were directly or indirectly related to security. 39 The 
communiqu6 offered an assurance to Park: "the United States will continue to maintain 
an American military presence in the ROK to ensure peace and security, " and "prompt 
and effective assistance" was promised in the event of an armed attack against South 
Korea. 40 However, these pledges need to be viewed together with the unexpected and 
contradictory inclusion of the proposal for three-way official talks between the US and 
the two Koreas. President Carter attached so much importance to this idea because 
otherwise the policy of linkage between the human rights issue and the withdrawal plan 
36 79 Scoul 09082 (20 June 1979). 
37 79 State 161752 (23 June 1979). 
38 The Washington Post (30 June 1979). 
39 pppU, Jimmy Carter 1979, Book 11: pp. 1207-11. 
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would be broken. 41 In a sense, the initiative was the outcome of the Park regime's 
political compromise. The resumed dialogue between the South and the North in early 
1979 had reached deadlock by March. In American eyes, the Park regime did not want 
to improve relations with the North. Therefore, the acceptance of the three-way official 
talks initiative was regarded by the US as the Park regime agreed to follow the Carter 
formula for the making of East Asian security environment, the formula which intended 
the US military presence unnecessary. The Park regime clearly agreed to the three-way 
official talks in order to obtain the suspension of the US withdrawal policy and to avoid 
being pressurized further on the human rights issue. For its part, the Carter 
administration revised its withdrawal policy in order to get agreement on the three-way 
official talks. However, the hoped-for response from the Park regime on human rights 
was not forthcoming. 
Behind the outward appearance of success was the reality that the summit meetings had 
not really achieved the desired goals of either the Carter administration or the Park 
regime. Carter was clearly unhappy about giving up the withdrawal policy, feeling that 
his hand was being forced, 42 especially since the issue of human rights issue was still 
unresolved. The only chance for the US to press the Park regime further was in face-to- 
face talks between the two Presidents. In a two-hour meeting on 30 June 1979 Park was 
indifferent to the difficulties Carter was facing in the domestic political arena, while 
Carter resented Park's one-sided preaching on the issue of troops withdrawal and his 
refusal to enter into serious discussion of human rights. As Park continued his lecture, 
Carter passed a memo to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown: "If 
40 Ibid.: p. 1208. 
41 Oberdorfer (1998): pp. 104-5. 
42 Vance (1983): p. 129. 
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he goes on like this much longer I'm going to pull every troop out of the country. ', 43 
Vance recollected Carter's reaction in vivid terms: 
We could almost feel the temperature in the room drop as Park continued, through an 
interpreter, his assault on the policy. Sitting between the President and Harold Brown, I 
could feel the contained anger of the President. 44 
Carter was extremely annoyed: "Korean policy hung in the balance. "45 In contrast, Im 
Pang-hyun, Spokesman of the Blue House [the South Korean Presidential Office], 
, 46 stated that the first summit talks took place "in a very ffiendly atmosphere. In fact, at 
the evening toast on 30 June, Park praised the Yushin system as the one which "best 
suits our actual circumstances" and is "the most effective in solving our own 
problems. , 47 Apparently, Park regarded the outcome of the summit meetings as quite 
promising. 48 From his point of view, everything was clear: North Korea was in essence 
opposed to any idea of peaceful unification, so the US should ally itself closely with the 
South. 
The US response was immediate. The US President expressed his sympathy with 
oppositi on/di ssi dent forces in meetings with South Korean church and opposition 
leaders . 
49 He actually spent more time with opposition party leader Kim Yong-sam than 
with the ruling party leaders. Kim revealed that: "Carter gave instructions to 
Ambassador Gleysteen to discuss various problems [such as the North-South dialogue 
and the democratisation of Korean politics] with me continuous I y. "50 Thus, the Carter 
43 Oberdorfer (1998): p. 106. 
4" Vance (1983): p. 129. 45 Ibid.: p. 130. 46 C110S, 11, Rbo (I July 1979). 
47 pppUS, Jimmy Carter 1979, Book 11: pp. 1208-10. 48 Interview with Dr. Lee Tong-won. 
49 Chostin 11bo (3 July 1979). 
50 Ibid. 
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administration transgressed one of the bottom lines of the triangular alliance. 
The proposal for three-way official talks as a "realistic solution" was rejected by the 
North just ten days after the joint communiqu6 was issued .51 From the US point of view, 
the peace initiative in the Korean peninsula turned out to be a failure, but the issue of 
human rights was kept alive in order to facilitate the alleviation of tension for "the 
Carter fon-nula" (as already referred to the introduction of Part Two). 
4.3 POLITICAL UNREST IN SOUTH KOREA, US INTERVENTION, AND THE 
DEATH OF PRESIDENT PARK (26 OCTOBER 1979) 
After the Carter visit to Seoul, the Park regime and the oppositi on/di ssi dent forces 
sought to turn the outcome of the visit to their own advantage. The regime regarded the 
summit as President Park's personal political triumph and had the guarded expectation 
that Carter would not interfere in the internal affairs in South Korea. 52 On balance, 
however, the combination of political challenges from the domestic 
opposition/dissidents forces and pressures from the US meant the Carter administration 
effectively "discarded" the Park regime. 53 As explained in Chapter 2, the Park regime 
was not ready to serve US foreign policy objectives in East Asia generally, and in the 
Korean peninsula in particular, and this therefore prompted a US strategy of offensive 
intervention. 
51 Chosim 11bo, (12 July 1979). 
52 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung. 
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South Korean opposi tion/di ssi dent forces had been inspired by the disintegration of the 
Shah's regime in Iran in early February 1979 to pursue the same goal in their own 
country. From their point of view, if the US did not wish to see a repeat of the Iranian 
situation, it should stop giving support to President Park. This belief led them to initiate Z-11 
more aggressive challenges to the Park regime, which itself drew its own lesson from 
Iran: it was costly for the state to make concessions to dissidents. 54 Unlike Nixon and 
Ford, Carter had consistently threatened Park's political legitimacy by applying human 
rights pressure even after the summit meetings. No matter how indirect and mild the 
pressure might be, it was sufficient to weaken the regime's legitimacy and to provide 
leverage for the opposi tion/di ssi dent forces to exploit. 
Aggressive US intervention affected the readiness of opposition/dissident forces to 
struggle against the Park regime. In the escalating political confrontation during 1979, 
the central figure was Assemblyman Kim Young-Sam, one of the New Democratic 
Party leaders. His tough struggle against the Park regime was largely motivated by the 
prospect of the forthcoming visit of the US President to Seoul. After meeting with 
President Carter, Kim Young-sam attacked the Park regime vehemently. Rejecting 
President Park's suggestion of a meeting with other ruling parties' leaders, on 14 July 
Kim Young-Sam for the first time stated that only a change of government could help 
South Korea overcome its economic diffiCUltieS. 
55 On 23 July in the National Assembly 
Kim urged Park to make a "courageous decision" to prepare for a peaceful transition of 
power. He also emphasised that he was willing to meet Kim 11-sung to discuss the issue 
53 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung. 
54 79 Seoul 02486 (17 February 1979). 
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After the suspension of the troop withdrawal plan until 1981 (announced on 20 July 
1979), the level of US intervention in South Korean politics increased. The signals from 
Washington encouraged the oppositi on/di ssi dent forces. On 23 July, Secretary of State 
Vance delivered an address before the National Urban League in Chicago in which he 
reiterated: "We promote our long-term interests - including our security interests - 
when we encourage democratic change and social and economic justice. v157 Even more 
significantly, a previously postponed visit to Seoul of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights Issues and Humanitarian Affairs, Mark L. Schneider, was implemented 
from 24 to 31 July. He encouraged opposition and dissident forces: "The US would try 
to help by making its concerns known to the ROKG in a frank and visible manner. "58 
For the Park regime, the situation now steadily worsened and its tolerance of US policy 
reached the limit. When the US Department of State denounced EM-9 as inconsistent 
with international standards of human rights protection, on 8 August the MOFA 
protested strongly against such "interference in Korean internal affairs. "59 The US was 
just as finn: "If the US was to give credit for positive actions taken by the ROKQ it 
,, 60 must also be expected to register its displeasure. Also on 8 August, the YH incident 
occurred in Seoul: 200 female workers of the YH company were invited by Kim Young- 
sam to engage in a sit-in demonstration at the headquarters of the opposition NDP to 
55 79 Seoul 10620 (11 July 1979); 79 Seoul 10885 (16 July, 1979); 79 Seoul 11250 (23 July, 1979); 
Chosim Ilbo (24 July 1979). 
56 Before Carter's visit, Kim announced on II June his readiness to meet Kim II-sung, General Secretary 
of North Korea, for talks on peaceful unification. This was in line with the US formula to transform the 
East Asian security environment and was a deliberate test of the Park regime's reaction. 
57 USDSB (September 1979): p. 8. 
58 79 Seoul 12003 (7 August 1979) 
59 79 Seoul 11841 (2 August 1979). 
60 Ibid. 
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demand the right to manage the company by themselves. At 2 a. m. on 11 August, some 
1,000 riot policemen stormed the NDP headquarters, resulting in the death of one 
female worker. More than 100 people, including NDP National Assemblymen and 
reporters, were injured, and about 200 others were arrested. 
61 
Washington viewed this incident as an inexcusably "excessive and brutal" action, and 
the Park regime was blamed for the deteriorating situation. 62 The Korean Ministry of 
Home Affairs rebuked this attack publicly: "interference in internal affairs deserves 
moral critiCiSM.,, 63 Soon afterwards, the ruling DRP and Yujonghoe Assemblymen 
jointly denounced both the NDP and the Carter administration. The political strain 
between the Carter administration and the Park regime was now at breaking point. On 
17 August, Gleysteen called on the MOFA to wam that: "[The Home Ministry's] 
charge ... might 
boomerang and seriously damage our relationship ... 
A recent pattern of 
events might foreshadow a human rights clamp-down ... [as an] aftermath of the 
Carter 
ViSit.,, 64 By contrast, Gleysteen's luncheon meeting with Kim Young-Sam on 20 August 
seemed to fan the flames of the controversy, especially since it was covered in most 
major South Korean newspapers. 65 President Park now retaliated directly against Kim 
Young-Sam by disqualifying him from the NDP Presidency, manipulating NDP intra- 
party fragmentation and thus plunging the party into chaos, and forcing Kim out of the 
National Assembly. On 8 September, the local court temporarily suspended Kim from 
the Presidency of the NDR 66 Two days later, Kim declared his intention to seek the 
61 Lee Chong-sik (1980). p. 66; 79 Seoul 12234 (11 August 1979). 
62 79 State 211446 (14 August 1979). 
63 Ibid.: p. 1. 
64 79 Seoul 012520 (17 August 1979). An almost identical conversation took place on the same day in 
Washington between the Korean Ambassador to Washington, Kim Yong-sik, and Assistant Secretary R. 
Holbrooke, who said: "quietly we must keep the pressure on the ROKG to move in a constructive 
manner" (79 State 216349 (18 August 1979)). 
65 79 Seoul 12586 (20 August 1979). 
66 Lee Chong-sik (1980): p. 68. 
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overthrow of the Park regime by all possible means. 
4.3.2 The Diplomatic Strain with the Carter Administration 
From September 1979, the confrontational line was drawn clearly between the Park 
regime and the US and domestic opposition/dissident forces. As the mutual suspicions 
and misperceptions of the two states increased, a spiral of tension quickly developed. 67 
On 13 September 1979, the. State Department began to use the term "political turmoil" 
to describe the South Korean situation: "The time is ripe for a major confrontation with 
the government .,, 
68 At this juncture the Carter administration stood on the 
opposi tion/di ssi dent side. Ambassador Gleysteen, on 15 September, conveyed a 
"particularly important" US concern to President Park's aide, Choi Kwang-soo: "the 
government [should] avoid heavy handed repression ... like the arrest of Kim Young- 
Sam or others who had been so recently associated with President Carter during his 
ViSit. "69 The direct impetus for the Park regime to attack Kim was his interview with 
The New York Nines released on 16 September: "The time has come for the United 
States to make a clear choice between a basically dictatorial regime and the majority 
who aspire to democracy.,, 70 In response, the Carter administration endorsed Kim's 
demand. 
On 26 September in New York, about a week before the Park regime expelled Kim 
Young-Sam from the National Assembly, and one month before the death of President 
Park, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin was given a stem warning by Assistant Secretary 
67 R. Snyder (1999): p. 266. 
68 79 State 2412112 (13 September 1979). 
' '9 79 Seoul 14107 (15 September 1979). 
70 Lee Chong-sik (1980): p. 68. 
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Holbrooke: "Additional arrests of religious figures and apparent harassment of Kim 
Young-Sam were most unhelpful. ... Recent developments [should] not seriously 
threaten our excellent progress together on so many fronts in the past year. "71 In the 
Foreign Ministerial talks, Vance made it clear to the Korean Foreign Minister that the 
US would not stand aside. 72 
When Vance made a speech on US policy toward Latin America before the Foreign 
Policy Association in New York on 27 September 1979, it was clear that his words were 
applicable to the South Korean situation: 
The competition between democracy and authoritarianism is far from over ... but the 
currents are moving in favorable directions. The transition to more stable and open 
system is underway and gaining momentum. These moves toward more democratic and 
open societies in Latin America are distinctly in our interest. The great strength of 
democracy is its flexibility and resilience. It opens opportunities for broadly based 
political and economic participation. By encouraging compromise and accommodation, it 
fosters evolutionary change. 73 
On the other hand, Vance assured that: 
While the United States is ready to help nations making political changes leading to 
pluralism and respect for human rights, it would oppose efforts by the Soviet Union or 
Cuba to exploit hemisphere upheavalS. 74 
The clear message was that the US would guarantee external security when domestic 
political changes were initiated. President Park gave his response in two Presidential 
messages on the national commemoration days of I and 3 October. Without giving any 
appreciation of the role played by the US in defending Korea, he underlined that the 
7179 State 08026 (27 September 1979). 
72 Ibid. 
73 USDSB (October 1979): p. 14. 
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Yushin system was "an independent and productive system suitable to our reality and 
situation .,, 
75 The expulsion of Kim Young-Sam from the National Assembly was now 
inevitable. On 4 October, the ruling parties passed the necessary resolution, accusing 
Kim of defamation of national prestige by inviting the intervention of a foreign country 
for his personal political advantage. When the Department of State spokesman, Hodding 
Carter, described the expulsion as "regretful", the DRP and Yujonghoe spokesmen 
responded by stressing that the matter was "none of US business. 7176 On 7 October, 
immediately after the expulsion of Kim Young-Sam, the Carter administration recalled 
Ambassador Gleysteen to Washington. Six days later, the NDP announced an en masse 
resignation of its 69 Assemblymen. 77 Kim asserted that "Park should revise the 
constitution and hold direct presidential elections. ... If not, South Korea will see a 
student revolution as violent as that which toppled Syngman Rhee or that which ousted 
the Shah in Iran .,, 
78 At this critical juncture, seemingly, the Park regime sought to defect 
from the triangular alliance by entering into contact with the Soviet Union at the civilian 
level. 79 It was unknown how much this gesture was counterproductive for the Park 
regime to stop the US pressure on political liberalisation, nonetheless it was unhelpful 
in trying to deflecting the pressure from Washington. 
An even bigger American blow to the Park regime came from Tokyo. On 9 October, the 
US Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, told reporters that "the Republic of Korea 
lies outside the US Pacific defense perimeter. "80 Mansfield's remarks-were reported to 
every South Korean newspaper in detail near top front page-seemed to nullify the 
74 Historic Documents of 1979: p. 714. 
75 79 Seoul 15182 (4 October 1979). 
76 79 Seoul 15291 (5 October 1979). 
77 79 Seold 15282 (9 October 1979); 79 Seoul 15359 (10 October 1979). 
78 Ibid.. p. 2 
79 The Hayashi Collection 
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Carter-Park summit meeting, since they apparently contradicted the statement of 
President Carter in Washington on the same day that the US would take every measure 
to counter the Soviet Union's military expansion. 81 The Park regime, unlike South 
Korean mass media which had strong critical postures towards the remarks, "has been 
,, 82 low-key, limited in essence to a request for the facts. 
In terms of the linkage of security commitment with the human rights issue, the 
Departments of Defense and State issued a joint statement on 15 October: "If 
demonstrably positive trends do not soon emerge then recent events will create 
,, 83 multiplying problems in many areas of our relationships. On the same day, in a radio 
interview, President Carter added further weight to the demand that political prisoners in 
South Korea must be released before or after the SCM meeting. 84 
4.3.3 The Pusan and Masan Uprisings and the Demise of the Park Regime 
Throughout the period from early August to late October, in addition to being subject to 
strong US pressure, the Park regime was considerably isolated and had to face the 
combined opposition of the churches, journalists, intellectuals, and the student and 
labour movements. Student demonstrations became stronger and more persistent. 
Eventually, in Pusan, the second largest city and the political home of Kim Young-Sam, 
events took a dramatic turn. On 16 October, more than 5,000 students succeeded in 
80 79 Seoul 15356 (10 October 1979) 
81 Ibid.: pp. 3-4. 
82 79 State 268137 (13 October 1979). 
83 79 State 269523 (15 October 1979) 
84 79 Seoul 15591 (15 October 1979). 
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reaching the downtown area of Pusan, and their protest continued until well after dark. 85 
One of the most conspicuous features of the demonstrations was the participation of 
ordinary citizens. As night fell, violence erupted. Two broadcasting stations, a 
newspaper building, and many police boxes were attacked and several police vehicles 
were damaged. Unable to prevent subsequent demonstrations, the Park regime declared 
martial law as "a final unavoidable step" in Pusan on 18 October. Under the provision 
of martial law, a total of 3,700 marines and special forces were deployed to Pusan on 18 
October, the day on which the SCM opened. Such a hard-line measure, however, could 
not totally prevent further student demonstrations in Pusan. There was more violence, 
and it quickly spread to nearby Masan and Changwon. In response. the regime instituted 
a Garrison Decree, one step below Martial Law, in Masan and Changwon at 12.00 on 20 
October. 
At this critical juncture, arriving in Seoul on 18 October for the SCM, Defense 
Secretary Brown paid a visit to President Park with Gleysteen. After handing over 
President Carter's letter and the list of political prisoners whose release was demanded, 
Brown gave a clear indication that the US security commitment to South Korea might 
be reconsidered: 
It was not our intention to allow the current situation to affect our security ties with the 
ROK, but as a practical matter, it would be difficult for us if there were no return to the 
more liberal trend associated with President Carter's visit to Korea. 86 
Gleysteen advised Park to move as quickly as possible to open opportunities for 
85 Reportedly, a MOFA official indicated that "the South Korean government will check on the issue at 
the ROK-US SCM next week. " (79 Seoul 15356 (10 October 1979)); 79 Seoul 15750 (17 October 1979). 
86 79 Seoul 15823 (18 October 1979). 
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compromise with the NDP. 87 In response, after listening to the two US representatives, 
President Park made it clear that in his view the current political crisis was due in part to 
the public statements made by the Carter administration. 
Following the imposition of Martial Law and Garrison Decree, the situation seemed to 
be under control, and many observers felt that the worst of the demonstrations had now 
passed. 88 The last telegram from the US Embassy to the Department of State before the 
assassination of President Park described the mood at 08: 34 EST on October 26: "Pusan 
and Masan remained quiet. "89 The news of the assassination of President Park, 
announced in the early morning on 26 October, therefore came as a great shock to the 
Carter administration. There could be no doubt that this event had brought the 
authoritarian Yushin system to an end. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though both governments wanted to bring the period of their unhappy relations to 
an end, the final outcome was grave failure. The Park regime, with wishful thinking, 
believed that US policy towards South Korea would shift its orientation from human 
rights to security. However, the political strains between the two countries continued to 
accumulate. After Carter's visit, the US intervened in South Korean politics more 
deeply than ever before, and the strain resulted in a series of diplomatic moves and 
counter-moves. Just four months after the US President's visit to Seoul, President Park 
was dead and his regime had collapsed. 
87 Ibid.: pp. 1-2.; 79 Seoul 15849 (19 October 1979). 
88 The embassy diagnosed with caution that: "There remain expectations that demonstrations could recur 
at any time in any location. " 79 Seoul 16063 (23 October 1979) 
89 79 Seoul 16299 (26 October 1979). 
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As explained in the introduction to Part Two, the internal political liberalisation of 
South Korean politics was one of the basic requirements for a sustainable security 
environment in Northeast Asia. Reviewing the whole process of US-South Korea 
interaction, between January and October 1979, it is noteworthy that US alliance 
management of South Korean politics showed a high degree of flexibility despite the 
emphasis on maintaining the status quo. The long-range US goal of political 
development in South Korea as a basis for unification was regarded as complementary 
to the short-range goal of maintaining the security of South Korea. In the process of 
pursuing this dual track policy towards South Korea, certain elements of crisis 
behaviour in intra-alliance politics emerged. These can usefully be analysed in terms of 
Neustadt's framework, which seeks to show how muddled perceptions can lead to 
stifled communications, disappointed expectations and eventually paranoid reactions: 
the spiral of conflict stopped only when one bows low before the other's latest 
grievance. 90 The Park regime did not and could not bow low before the US pressure, 
and misread the degree of American policy shift in its favour and believed that the US 
security commitment was guaranteed even to the extent of the US condoning the 
authoritarian regime in South Korea. On the other hand, Washington, in contrast to the 
judgement of the US embassy, insisted that the Park regime should demonstrate its 
political will by initiating a liberalization process, including the lifting of EM-9. When 
the Park regime refused to accept these US recommendations, the Carter administration 
took the decision to seek more actively to change the political structure of South Korea. 
This process in due course eroded the legitimacy of the Park regime, but it also revealed 
the ineffective management of alliance politics by the Carter administration. Put the 
other way round, the Park regime failed to attract and maintain American support, "a 
90 Neustadt (1970): pp. 56-75. 
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formidable asset" in Wait's terms. At least to the point of the demise of President Park, 
however, the position of "a projected force" and exposed state could not prevent the US 
pressure from the demise of the Park regime, as explained in the Introduction. 
Considering the general issue of the degree of US influence in Korean politics, even 
though the US could not transform the Park regime's authoritarian rule, there can be no 
doubt that the death of President Park was in part attributable to the mounting 
displeasure of the US with the regime. In this respect, whatever the process, the US did 
succeed in removing the authoritarian leader from office. However, the US aim of 
encouraging the gradual transformation of South Korea's political system was not 
realised. In this sense, the US approach to alliance management was at best only a 
partial success. 
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CHAPTER5 
JAPAN'S PERCEPTION ON US-SOUTH KOREA POLICY AND 
POLITICAL INTERACTION WITH THE PARK REGIME, 
JANUARY-OCTOBER 1979 
INTRODUCTION 
As explained in the introduction of Part Two, Japan's operational principle was a rigid 
status quo policy which authorised a defensive intervention in South Korean politics 
through the support of the Park regime when the later was challenged by both US 
offensive intervention and domestic political opposition. Chapter 5 contains five 
sections. Section 5.1 discusses briefly the Japanese perspectives on the link between 
economic growth and political development, and the limits to changes in Japan's policy 
towards the Korean peninsula. Section 5.2 considers the rationale behind Japan's return 
to a rigid status quo policy. Then, in Section 5.3 Japan-South Korea co-operation in the 
political and defence areas is discussed. Section 5.4 examines Japanese perspectives on 
US-South Korean political relations, and this will provide the basis for the later 
consideration (in Chapter 7) of the more direct intervention by Japan than before the 
death of President Park. During the course of this chapter's analysis, issues of alliance 
management, intra-alliance politics, the hierarchical nature of the TASS, the dissimilar- 
integrative character of alliance interactions, and the nature and scope of Japan's 
defensive intervention will be examined. The achievement and the limits of the role of 
mediator that Japan played will be discussed in the conclusion. 
121 
Part 11 5 Japanese Intervention 
5.1 JAPAN'S VIEW ON THE SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS 
OF POLICY SHIFT TOWARDS THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
Japan had a very specific view of the disjunction between economic development and 
political democratisation in South Korea, and at the same time the scope for policy shift 
towards South Korea was limited, especially in terms of the improvement of relations 
with North Korea. 
5.1.1 The Disjunction between Economic Development and Political Dentocratisation 
Japanese apprehension towards US-South Korea policy dates back to the advance of the 
Yushin System in 1972. At that time, Japan viewed the attitude of the US Democratic 
Party towards the Park regime as problematic, since the regime was portrayed by the US 
Democratic Party as a more severe form of dictatorship than Hitler's National-Socialist 
state in Germany. ' In the late 1970s, Japanese images of South Korea differed 
significantly from those endorsed by the Car-ter administration. This is one reason why 
the US and Japan disagreed about the most effective course of action for promoting 
stability in the Korean peninsula. The South Korean path to developmental dictatorship, 
through the co-existence of rapid economic development and an authoritarian political 
system, was not at all problematic for the Japanese government. It was similar in culture 
and polity between Japan and South Korea, and in line with the Japanese path of state 
developmentalism for the past decades. Indeed, Masataka Kosaka argued that, given the 
history of Korean government, the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee in the South was 
2 
very natural. Kamiya Fuji criticised the political pressures exerted by the Carter 
1 Interview with Thmaki. 
2 Kosaka (1977): pp. 20-1; Weinstein and Fuji Kamiya (1980): p. 2. 
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administration on the Park regime in an even stronger tone: 
The United States, which is deeply involved in Korea, has sometimes failed to grasp the 
basic facts concerning that country ... It is inappropriate for Carter to expect the Koreans to 
practice democracy or to respect human rights as defined by the United States. Korean 
and U. S. standards simply are not the same. 3 
According to this view, the strong leadership of President Park was a key factor in 
maintaining the security of South Korea and the Northeast Asian region. By contrast, 
the dissidents' call for unification were highly questionable in that their appeals would 
clearly serve the interests of North Korea, which endorsed the confederation proposal 
drawn up by Kim 11-sung as a means of exploiting the perceived weakness of the 
South. 4 In short, the Japanese leadership had no dispute with the Park regime. 
5.1.2 The Limits of Policy Shift Towards the Korean Peninsula 
The security environment in East Asia in early 1979 was complex. The new Japanese 
cabinet headed by Masayoshi Ohira, whose self-inflicted mandate was "how to pursue 
stability amid instability,,, 5 started its term with a relatively optimistic view. Even 
though destabilising factors like the tangible Soviet threat were increasing in world 
politics, the will of the US as a hegemonic power seemed to be reviving, 6 and the US- 
,, 7 South Korea relations were regarded as passing the "phase of restoration. In his first 
official speech as Prime Minister, Ohira expressed a reserved optimism with respect to 
3 Ibid.: pp. 2-3. 
4 Ibid.: p. 49. With regard to the Japanese view on the role of the US forces in South Korea as: "the US 
military presence in South Korea has been strong deterrence agaisnt the southward advance of North 
Korea... In so doing, the US forces has become the forces defending the Park regime, thereby it has given 
confidence to South Korea in terms of security and stability, and has made it possible South Korea 
remarkable economic growth. " (Heiwa. Anzenhosho Kenkyu-sho, 1979): p. 211. 
5 Sato, Koyama and Kumo (1990): pp. 448. 
6 Tanaka (1999). 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the Carter administration was committed to dialogues 
between North and South Koreas and a diplomatic settlement of the military tension 
around the demarcation line of the Korean peninsula -- a formula similar to the previous 
September's Camp David Peace Accords for the Middle East. Reflecting the policy 
orientation of the Carter administration, Sonoda, Japanese Foreign Minister, believed 
that if Japan could have productive partnership with the US, friendly relations with the 
PRC, strong solidarity with South Korea, and a relaxation of relations with North 
Korea, that would be one of the best ways to meet the emerging threat from the Soviet 
Union, as long as the security of South Korea was not adversely affected. 9 
Inevitably, any attempt by Japan to relax its relations with the North provoked strong 
protests from the Park regime, even though it was President Park himself who proposed 
the unconditional resumption of the North-South dialogue in mid-January 1979. For 
example, the regime was angered by the Japanese MOFXs decision to permit delegates 
of the North Korean Workers Party to enter Japan at the invitation of the Japanese 
Socialist Party in late January 1979. The South Korean mass media criticised the Ohira 
cabinet for attempting to break the "taboo" of North Korea just a month after coming to 
office. 10 Shortly afterwards, Sonoda told the Diet that Japan should not support the 
South one-sidedly. In late February and early March, the Japanese Foreign Minister 
expressed his concern that the large-scale US-South Korea joint military exercise might 
threaten the ongoing North-South Korean dialogues. 
7 Gaimusho, 1%ga Gaikono Kink-yo (Vol. 23,1979): p. 47. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Tanaka (1999): Dai87k-ai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dai6go (6 February 1979): p. 14; Dai7go (7 February 
1979): pp. 11-2. 
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Nonetheless, the provocative remarks made sporadically by the Ohira. cabinet were 
short-lived for two reasons. First, the North-South dialogue did not go smoothly, and 
reached deadlock, without any substantive outcomes, in late March. " Secondly, the 
installation of Soviet military facilities in the claimed northern territory of Japan near 
Hokkaido began to receive wide media coverage from late February and enhanced the 
image of a Soviet threat. Thus, the most striking feature of South Korea-Japan relations 
in early 1979 was the continuation of co-operative mood in the political and defence 
areas. 
5.2 THE JAPANESE DEFENSIVE INTERVENTION: POLITICAL CO- 
OPERATION AND MILITARY EXCHANGES 
When US hegemonic leadership was under test and the Soviet threat increased, Japan 
had to decide how best to cope with the new situation. Gand Yamashita, Director of the 
JDA, told the Diet that Japan should increase its military capability steadily and 
qualitatively to deter unpredictable contingencies. 12 The rapid military build-up of the 
Soviet Union caused heated debate in the Diet, and from February 1979 the situation 
became extremely uncertain. 13 The situation in the Korean peninsula and the Soviet 
military build-up in the Far East were the key issues. For Japan, close co-operation with 
the US to meet the new threat from the Soviet Union, and with the Park regime to 
maintain the status quo in the Korean peninsula were imperative. As a result, the scope 
10 Chosinz Ilbo, 31 January 1979. 
11 Gaimusho, 1117ga Gaik-ono Kink-yo (Vol. 24,1980): p. 5. 
12 DaWkai Sangiin Yosan-iinkai Dai2go (8 March 1979): p. 29; Dai5go (12 March 1979): p. 6. 
13 On 16 February 1979, the Soviet naval destroyer passed through the Tsuruga Strait between South 
Korea and Japan (DaWkai Shugiin Yosan-ffnkai Dail3go (17 February 1979): p. 3). On that day, Foreign 
Minister Sonoda particularly emphasised autonomous information gathering capability from the US; 
Dail6go (21 February 1979): pp. 14-37; Dail7go (22 February 1979): pp. 42-45; Dai20go (6 March 
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of Japan-South Korea political and military co-operation was widened and deepened. 
5.2.1 Political Co-operation 
Prime Minister Ohira, one of the key negotiators in the Japan-South Korea 
non-nalisation process in 1963-1964, was well aware of the importance of having sound 
relations with South Korea. Ohira's personal perception of the Park regime was 
somewhat complex due to President Park's strong friendship with former Prime 
Minister Fukuda, Ohira's political rival. 14 External circumstances, however, forced the 
Ohira cabinet as a whole to co-operate earnestly with the Park regime. In late February, 
Prime Minister Ohira assured South Korean Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, who was 
visiting Tokyo, that his cabinet had no intention of changing its attitude towards the 
Park regime, and he informed Park of the PRC's reluctance to establish contact with 
South Korea. Late April and early May 1979 marked a turning-point when the Ohira 
cabinet decisively recovered its relations with the Park regime. 
Table 5.1 Political Exchanges between Japan and South Korea, April-May 1979 
Dates Details of Political Exchanges and Venues 
13-16 Yasuhiro Nakasone, former JDA Director and the then Secretary General of the ruling LDP 
April conducted the second visit to Seoul since 1973. 
30 April- The I" Plenary Session of the Security Committee of the Japanese-South Korean Parliaments 
2 May was held in Seoul to demonstrate a common position on US withdrawal policy. 
8 May Former Director of the JDA, Shin Kanemaru, visited Seoul; it was reported that a Japan-South 
Korea ruling party consultation body would be organised. 
23 May The 8h General Meeting of the Japan-South Korean Parliamentarian League-which C, delivered a letter to Prime Minister Ohira demanding that the North Korean delegates of the 
Workers Party should not be allowed to enter Japan--was held in Tokyo. I 
Source: Adapted from Nikkan Giin Renmei (1992) and Tanaka (1999). 
1979): pp. 28-30; Dai87k-ai Sangiin Yosan-iink-ai Dai2bunka-kai Dai2go (29 March 1979): p. 28-9. 
14 Masumi (1995): p. 192. 
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From April 1979, a stream of important exchange visits bridged the gap caused by 
Japan's efforts to expand its diplomatic links with the North (see Table 5.1). The central 
issues amidst this flurry of exchanges were twofold: the opposition to the Carter 
administration's withdrawal policy, and Japan-South Korea co-operation in various 
sectors including defence. Resolutions, comments and remarks during the visits focused 
on these two issues, and there was a further reiteration of the Korean Clause of the 
Johnson-Sato communiqu6. All these cooperative political efforts targeted the 
forthcoming Carter-Park summit meeting scheduled for 29 June-I July 1979. 
Since 1974, the Kim Dae-jung issue had been the subject of regular debates in the Diet. 
There were heated discussions in the Diet's Committee on Foreign Affairs in late May 
and early June in 1979. Like its predecessor, the Ohira. cabinet consistently claimed that 
there was no evidence of the direct involvement of the South Korean government. 
Therefore, political settlement of the problem should be unaffected for the sake of 
harmonious relations between Japan and South Korea. 15 It was well known that the 
political influence of Kim Dae-jung was still very strong, as revealed in his role in the 
victory of Kim Young-sam (of the New Democratic Party) in the presidential election 
on 30 May. However, the Ohira cabinet continued to show strong support for the Park 
regime, and managed to prevent the Kim Dae-jung issue from being rekindled and 
aggravating the mood for the Carter-Park summit meetings. 16 
15 DaWkai Shugiin Gainut-iinkai Dail4go (31 May 1979): pp. 17 &21. For more details, Dai 12go ( 28 
May 1979): pp. 2-18 and Dai 13go (30 May 1979): pp. 5-18. 
16 Until late May 1979 there were more than ten times when the Kim Dae-jung issue mattered in both 
Shugiin (the Japanese House of Representatives) and Sangfin (the Japanese House of Councilors). 
DaWkxi Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dai8go (8 February 1979): pp. 7-11. On this occasion in the Diet, the 
Ohira cabinet confirmed its same posture dealing with the Kim Dae-jung issue as the Fukuda cabinet; Dai 
21go (7 March 1979): pp. 19-21. See also DaWkai Sangin Gainut-iink-ai Daillgo (22 May 1979): pp. 
14-16 & 22-30; Dail2go (24 May 1979): pp. 2-10; Dail3go (28 May 1979): pp. 23-31; Dail5go (6 June 
1979): pp. 1-3. 
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From the early spring of 1979, senior officials of the Japanese government raised on 
various occasions unequivocally the question of the Soviet threat and the necessity of an 
increase in Japan's military preparedneSS. 17 Prime Minister Ohira and the Director of the 
JDA, Yamashita, played an important role in reiterating these issues. Yamashita told the 
Diet on 21 February that since 1961 the Soviet Union had retained only border guards in 
the disputed islands, but from the summer of 1978 the Soviet Union had sharply 
increased its military presence, begun to construct military bases, and deployed combat 
forces. 's It was a qualitatively different issue from apprehension about the change in the 
US-Soviet strategic balance. 
After officially commenting on 21 February that the Soviet military build-up in the Far 
East was a "potential threaf' to Japan, Yamashita frequently repeated this statement in 
public. ' 9 In early March, the Japanese Army Chief of Staff, Shigeto Nagano, made a 
speech before Japanese businessmen in which he stated that the Soviet Union, having 
finished its military build-up in the European theatre, was about to turn its attention to 
the Far East. However, the US, Nagano argued, had fixed its attention on the Middle 
East and would continue to do so. On 12 April, Yamashita gave a lecture to another 
group of business leaders to express his concern about Soviet plans to send now air- 
bombers and the aircraft carrier Minsk to the Far East. 20 On 23 April, Ohira and 
Yamashita, at a meeting of senior officers of the Japanese navy, army and air force, 
17 For about Japanese data about the Soviet military capability in the Far East, see Heiwa. Anzen Hosho 
Kcnkyu-sho (1979): pp. 65-9. 
18 DaWkai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dail6go (21 February 1979): p. 11. 
19 DaWkai Shugiin Yosan-ffnkai Dail6go (I March 1979): pp. 4-5. The Ohira government conveyed 
protest notes to the Soviet Union on 5 and 26 February 1979. (Ibid. ) 
0 On 6 March 1979, the JDA revealed that the new Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk had left the Black Sea on 
25 February for the Mediterranean Sea, but did not know exactly when it would be deployed to the Far 
128 
Part 11 5 Japanese Intervention 
strongly reiterated the implications of the Soviet military moves to the security of Japan, 
and the need to strengthen Japanese military capability. 21 Under these circumstances, 
22 Japan tried to increase the defence level of the NDPO , and the adoption of the 
Guidelines on 27 November 1978 at the seventeenth US-Japan Security Consultative 
Meeting, only one day before the Fukuda cabinet resigned, was regarded as timel Y. 23 In 
line with the Guidelines, US navy, marine-corps and air forces in Japan participated in 
the US-South Korea joint military exercise, Team Spirit '79, and various facilities at the 
US bases in Japan were mobilised. 24 
Table 5.2 Exchanges of Military Officers between Japan and South 
Korea, 1974-1978 
From Japan to South Korea From South Korea to Japan 
Year No. of Cases No. of Officers No. of Cases No. of Officers 
1974 0 0 1 1 
1975 4 13 11 37 
1976 5 11 11 38 
1977 6 15 11 39 
1978 8 17 19 76 
Source: Adapted from Shugiin Gainni-iinkai Dai 6go, (25 April 1979) 
The perceived threat from the Soviet Union and US pressure to increase Japan's defence 
burden-sharing resulted in closer co-operation between Japan and South Korea in the 
East. (Dai874ai Shugfin Yasan-fink-ai Dai2Ogo (6 March 1979): p. 29; Dai87A-ai Shugfin Gainut-fink-ai 
Dai6go (25 April 1979): p. 32 
21 Dai87kai Shugiin Gainut-iink-ai Dai6go (25 April 1979): p. 32. 
22 Dai87kai Shugiin Naikaku-iinkai Daillgo (8 May 1979): p. 11. The Director of the JDA, Yamashita, 
stated in the Diet that the situation no longer corresponded to the assumption of the NDPO. 
23 The Fukuda cabinet did not review thoroughly the full contents of the Guideline in the last cabinet 
meeting (Dai87k-ai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dail7go (22 February 1979)): p. 44. 
24 Dai87k-ai Shugiin Gainut-iinkai Dai3go (28 February 1979): pp. 12-3. On this occasion, some of the US 
airforces deployed to Japan for Team Spirit '79 had a separate joint exercise with the Japanese Air Self- 
Defence Forces in Japan (Akahata, 5 December 1979). In fact, in Team Spirit '78, USFJ stationed in the 
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defence sector. The high-level contacts and exchanges of the defence establishments of 
Japan and South Korea attracted wide media attention in 1979. Table 5.2 shows that the 
number visits of military officers from Japan to South Korea gradually increased from 
1974 to 1978, but the number of visits from South Korea to Japan was stable between 
1975 and 1977, having already reached a high level. In 1978, the number of South 
Korean officers visiting Japan nearly doubled, mainly due to the need for information- 
gathering about US intentions concerning the troop withdrawal plan and the desire to 
communicate the South Korean position about the proposed Guidelines. 
In 1979, human exchanges between the two countries reached their most senior level in 
the defence sector. On 5-10 February 1979, three Japanese officers of the Command of 
the JSDAF were invited by their South Korean counterparts to inspect South Korean air 
bases and facilities. The visit was significant in that the US-South Korean joint military 
exercise, Team Spirit '79, was forthcoming in March. The JSDF was involved in the 
25 US-South Korean joint military exercise, at least at the information-sharing level. On 
4 April, the South Korean Chairman of the JCS, Kim Jong-hwan, visited the JDA and 
invited the Japanese Director of Self-Defense Forces, Ganri Yamashita, to Seoul in the 
summer of 1979. On 30 April-4 May, General Shigeto Nagano, Joint Chief of the An-ny, 
visited Seoul at the invitation of his South Korean counterpart. He viewed South Korean 
military facilities and met South Korean generals to exchange views on the East Asian 
security environment. 
The climax of Japanese-South Korean human exchanges in the military sector was the 
visit by Gand Yamashita, Director of the JDA, to Seoul on 25-26 July 1979. The talks 
three regions and US Air Forces and the Seventh Fleets in Okinawa were deployed. (T. Hayashi, 1979: p. 
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between Yamashita and South Korean Defence Minister, Rho Jae-hyun, were of 
particular significance in the history of the security consultations between Japan and 
South Korea. The two men exchanged direct and in-depth ideas and information about 
the security environment in East Asia, including North Korea's military capability and 
Soviet moves in the Far East, each country's defence policy, and the content of the US 
announcement of the suspension of the withdrawal policy. Reportedly, the South Korean 
side had a great interest in the role Japan would hypothetically play within the South 
Korea-US-Japan collective security system. 26 Yamashita explained that Japan had 
constantly called for the US to be cautious about its withdrawal policy from South 
Korea. 27 They agreed to arrange exchange port calls of naval ships in the following year. 
These visits of senior officials from the Japanese defence sector reflected the new 
position of Japan in contributing to the military balance surrounding Japanese territory. 
Yamashita's visit was portrayed by South Korean opposition/dissident forces as 
reactionary move regarding to South Korean democratisation because it was arranged 
just two days after the NDP leader Kim Young-sam launched a full-scale anti-Park 
struggle in the National Assembly. 28 Three former Directors of the JDA and the present 
Director all visited Seoul to discuss mutual interests in the political and security areas. It 
is also likely that uniformed officials from the two countries further expanded these 
contacts. What is more important is that a new generation of South Korean military staff 
was provided with opportunities to become familiar with Japanese politicians and 
military establishments. The unprecedented flurry of political and military co-operation 
213) 
25 DaWkai Sangiin Yosali-iinkai Dai2go (8 March 1979): p. 6. 
26 Chosun Ilbo, 26 July 1979. 
27 Boei Antena (September 1979): p. 41. For a more in-depth analysis for the strategic position of Japan 
and the limits of its military capability, see the article written by Okazaki (1982), who accompanied 
Yamashita's visit to Seoul in 1979. 
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and consultation between Japan and South Korea was clearlY designed to enhance the 
Park regime's political fortunes. At the same time, however, the political effect was 
sceptical about how far the Park regime could actually obtain benefits by using Japanese 
support to enhance its political legitimacy. Thus, both the possibility and limits of the 
Japanese role as facilitator within the TASS were highlighted. 
Japan's self-help efforts to increase its military capability, including the first combined 
military exercises of Japanese navy, army and air forces in late May 1979,29 were 
insufficient to meet the new challenges to Japanese sectifity. Actually, in late May 1979, 
the JDA requested the US to deploy pennanently two aircraft carriers around Japan in 
the same way that there was a rotation of six aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet 30 as a 
necessary measure in response to the information that the new Soviet aircraft carrier 
Minsk would enter the port of Vladivostok .31 The unavoidable time lag between the 
emergence of unpredictable threats and military readiness necessitated enhanced 
Japanese co-operation with the US and South Korea as a matter of urgency. 32 Another 
point to make here is that various exchange visits in the defence sector between South 
Korea and Japan were arranged just before, during and after the bilateral talks between 
the US and Japan. The timing was of significance in that the period of Japanese Army 
Chief of the Self-Defence Forces, Nagano's stay coincided with Ohira's visit to 
Washington. During the Park-Fukuda/Ohira phase, a triangular pattern of interplay was 
established based on a series of bilateral visits rather than a gathering of the three parties 
at the same table. Before going to Washington in order to discuss the military situation 
in the Korean peninsula and Japan's own military build-up plan for coping with the 
28 Interview with Kim Kun-tae. 
29 DaWkai Shugiin Hong-k-aigi Dai27go (22 May 1979): p. 18. 
30 DaWkai Shugint Gahiýg-u . nkai Dai6go (30 May 1979): p. 35. 
31 DaWkai Shugfin Naik$t-iink-ai Daillgo (8 May 1979): p. 17. 
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changing security environment in East Asia, Nagano visited Seoul. Yamashita followed 
the same pattern, as did the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Japan and South Korea, and 
the US Secretaries of Defense and State. The accumulation of bilateral visits and 
consultations, in spite of its disadvantages, continued until the end of the Cold War in 
order to avoid the denunciations from of the Communist bloc. In short, therefore, the 
Ohira cabinet's close co-operation with the Park regime can be explained as an aspect of 
alliance management within the framework of intra-alliance politics. 
5.3 THE CARTER-PARK SUMMIT MEETINGS AND THE OHIRA CABINET: 
A SYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION 
The Carter administration wanted to leave official confirmation of the arrangements for 
the summit meeting until as late as possible. However, on 19 January Tokyo Shinibun, 
quoting a credible diplomatic source in Seoul, reported that President Carter would visit 
South Korea for summit talks with President Park. The Carter-Park summit meeting in 
Seoul became a fait acconipli in Japan from early February, which weakened the US 
bargaining position not only in relation to the contents of the joint communiqu6 but also 
in terms of the US capacity to induce the Park regime to make concessions on the 
human rights issue during the pre-summit consultation between the two countries. 33 In 
fact, the summit was announced simultaneously in Washington and Seoul on 20 April. 
The Japanese government sought to persuade the Carter administration to visit Seoul by 
stressing the importance of seeing the Korean situation at first hand. These efforts by 
32 Ibid.: p. 15. 
33 See also DaWkai Shugiin Yosan-ffnkai Dai6go (6 February 1979): p. 12. 
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the Japanese were greatly appreciated by the Park regime. 34 The Ohira government was 
well aware of the underlying tension between the Carter administration and the Park 
regime, and therefore welcomed the announcement of Carter's plan to visit South Korea 
as a tangible shift of US policy towards South Korea. Japan was also willing to facilitate 
an atmosphere conducive to the restoration of the traditional friendship between the US 
and South Korea. It actively conveyed the on-going changes of US-South Korea policy 
to Seoul, particularly those related to the withdrawal issue. 35 Of particular interest was 
the statement by the Japanese spokesman of the MOFA, Hideo Kagami, on 12 April, 
just a week before the announcement of the Carter visit to Seoul, that the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Sonoda, had been officially informed by the Carter administration that 
further withdrawal would be postponed. 36 This delivery of one of the most critical US 
decisions related to South Korean security through the Japanese channel confirmed the 
great importance of Japan within the TASS. 
Before flying to Washington in late April, Prime Minister Ohira emphasised the 
importance of close Japanese military co-operation with the US, and the need to 
improve Japanese reconnaissance capability in response to the Soviet moves into Asia; 
and he further revealed that he would consult with Carter about the Korean question. 37 
In fact, the joint communiqu6 of the Carter-Ohira summit meetings in Washington in 
early May 1979 stated that: 
The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the maintenance of peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula is important for peace and security in East Asia, 
including Japan. The United States is firinly committed to the security of the Republic of 
34 Interview with the then South Korean diplomat in the South Korean Embassy to Japan. 
35 Interview with Sato. He told the author that the Ohira cabinet conveyed the information in late and 
early 1978 that the withdrawal policy had been substantially changed. 
36 Chostin 11bo, 13 April 1979; DaWkai Sangiin Gainut-iinkai Dai8go (No. 8,24 April 1979): p. 23. 
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Korea. Its policy toward future ground force withdrawals from Korea will be developed 
in a manner consistent with the maintenance of peace and stability on the Peninsula. 38 
The article of the communiqu6 is made it fairly clear that a change of the US withdrawal 
policy was mainly due to considerations of Japanese security rather than the security of 
South Korea itself. The US appreciated the Japanese feeling of insecurity, and gave the 
impression that the issue of troop withdrawal from South Korea had already been 
discussed between the US and Japan, even though Gleysteen had recommended that 
there should first be consultations with the Park regime. There are two probable reasons 
why the US gave the impression that the suspension of the withdrawal policy was 
already being implemented. First, the Carter administration wanted to utilise the 
withdrawal issue to exert pressure on the Ohira cabinet to strengthen defence posture. 
Secondly, the administration viewed the TASS as a hierarchical arrangement and 
believed that the alliance leader had an obligation to notify its middle member first. 
Nevertheless, the US-Japan joint communiqu6 was not t&e-ý-tke. By this time, the 
suspension, or at least a significant adjustment, of the withdrawal policy was already an 
open secret to the Park regime, which was in turn reasonably optimistic about the likely 
outcomes. In fact, President Park's invitation to the former Japanese Prime Minister, 
Fukuda, on 19-23 June was an extension of such efforts to monitor the policy shift. On 
this occasion, President Park asked Fukuda to convey an invitation to Prime Minister 
Ohira and to play the role of mediator in explaining the basis of South Korean 
insecurity. On behalf of President Park, returning to Tokyo, Fukuda met President 
Carter on 28 June 1979. These developments testified to the dissimilar-integrative 
features of the TASS, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
37 Ibid.: p. 24. 
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This process had both positive and negative sides. On the positive side, the Park regime 
benefited from Japanese involvement in the reversal of the withdrawal plan even before 
the US-South Korean pre-summit consultations. In short, the Park regime was able to 
read US intentions through Japanese channels. However, on the negative side, the Park 
regime failed to respect the seriousness of American demands for visible signs of 
improvement in human rights conditions. The infon-nation from Japan was filtered 
through the Japanese prism so that the Park regime tended to be optimistic regardless of 
the real intentions the Carter administration. 
In June, President Carter had a very tight schedule, including summit meetings with the 
General Secretary of the USSR, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the leaders of the G7 countries, and 
President Park of South Korea. Despite domestic political difficulties, Carter was self- 
confident about the US role: "to guarantee... the security of our allies and to protect our 
interest.,, 39 This self-confidence in part stemmed from Carter's own positive evaluation 
of his forthcoming meeting with Brezhnev. In Carter's mind, the US would enhance its 
leadership role among its allies by guaranteeing security while gaining a momentum to 
control the arms race with the Soviet Union. In addition, the achievement of the Middle 
East peace settlement was an undoubted bonus for the US, and the Iranian situation was 
being managed reasonably well. In terms of the South Korean question, therefore, he 
was determined to press the Park regime further on the issue of political development 
while giving confirmation that the US would maintain the stability of the Korean 
peninsula. To that end, he did not hesitate to reveal that he would meet opposition and 
religious leaders in South Korea. On 12 April 1979, National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski encouraged Carter: "In 1980 [in the presidential election campaign] you 
3S pppU, Carter 1979, Book I: p. 764. 
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must be recognized as the President of Peace and Resolve. You should stress your role 
as Commander in Chief and can do so on the Korea trip. '940 On the surface, however, the 
Park regime had enough justification for wishful thinking about the forthcoming Carter- 
Park summit meeting. Just one day before the departure of President Carter for Tokyo, 
an American high official told reporters that: "the US remains an active Pacific Power", 
and on the following day The Washington Post reported that US JCS had formally 
recommended that President Carter suspend the withdrawal plan. 41 It was therefore 
quite natural that the Park regime should pay much more attention to Car-ter's comments 
about the withdrawal issue in the second Ohira-Carter summit meeting in Tokyo. On 28 
June, just one day before Carter visited Seoul, he informed Ohira about the suspension 
of the withdrawal of US combat forces from South Korea. The news from Tokyo came 
as a great relief to the authorities in South Korea. 42 
The contents of the Carter-Park joint communiqu6 were beyond Japanese expectations 
and convinced the Ohira government that the US really intended to return to Asia. 43 The 
government expected that the political relations between the Carter administration and 
the Park regime should and would be relaxed, for the US withdrawal policy was 
implemented substantially by political motivation rather than purely military 
considerations. 44 However, what Carter saw in South Korea was not the same as the 
Park regime and the Ohira cabinet expected. Their desire was that the American 
President should recognise the unique military confrontation between the two Koreas 
and the consequential necessity to sacrifice political freedoms in the South. In fact, 
39 Ibid.: p. 1107. 
40 Brzezinski (1983): p. 565. 
41 The Wmhitzgton Post, 24,25 June 1979. 
42 The Mishington Post, 27 June 1979; Chon (1979): p. 101. 
43 Ibid.: p. 103. 
44 Dai87k-ai Sangiin Gainut-iink-ai DaiS (24 April 1979): p. 28. 
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Carter strengthened his conviction that another war must be avoided through North- 
South dialogue, and that political liberalisation was necessary to that end. Later, the 
unilateral announcement of the suspension of the withdrawal policy on 20 July was 
portrayed by Japan as an expression of the Carter administration's displeasure with the 
Park regime. 45 
5.4 JAPAN'S EVALUATION OF THE US NIANAGEMENT OF SOUTH 
KOREAN POLITICS 
On the surface, the tight schedule of high-level mutual visits between the three countries 
demonstrated that the TASS was operating effectively. In substance, however, strained 
US-South Korean relations meant that the alliance was suffering and that Japanese 
efforts to bring the two countries together had only limited success. 
When JDA Director Yamashita visited Washington in mid-August to meet Brown, 
Brzezinski and others, US policy towards Asia appeared to be reliable. On 16 August, 
Brown assured Yamashita that the US would strengthen its military preparedness around 
Japan, and would maintain its commitment to Asia, especially in relation to the 
increasing Soviet threat. Yamashita described his recent visit to Seoul as an 
achievement, and the Americans evaluated it as positive evidence of improving Japan- 
South Korea relations. Returning to Tokyo, Yamashita, referring to security relations 
with the US, asserted that the situation was very good and that Japan should consider 
the issue of security from a global perspective. 46 In fact, when the Director of the JDA 
visited the USA, the Carter administration was exchanging verbal tit-for-tat with the 
Park regime. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Ohira cabinet, based on its predecessor's 
45 Sek-ai Shitho (17 July 1979), pp. 10-11. 
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efforts, was able to see the suspension of the US troop withdrawal policy towards South 
Korea. However, it did not necessarily mean that the Carter formula itself was changed. 
The Ohira cabinet could not achieve its aim of restraining the Carter administration 
from dismantling the political foothold of the Park regime. 
The US Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, made an important address in Tokyo on 
9 October, when the US Ambassador to South Korea, William Gleysteen, was recalled 
to Washington: "the outmost limits of US defense in this region are Japan and the 
1547 Philippines. On 16 October, US Congressman Paul Findley applauded the 
Ambassador's foresight and statesmanship in relieving "an emerging crisis of 
confidence in Japan and Southeast Asia over the credibility of the US defense 
, 48 guarantee. By contrast, one of the key members of the General Chun group of the 
South Korean military responded to the Mansfield speech as follows: "rhe remark 
reiterated how vuInerable the South Korean position was. South Korean security was 
totally dependent on the US commitment. Therefore, the Park regime should follow US 
advice. Otherwise, the suspension of the withdrawal policy would be reconsidered. 149 In 
Japan the government and commentators also did not see any merit in the speech owing 
to its comment on the Korean position; and the Ohira cabinet condemned Mansfield's 
,, 50 statement as "a serious interference in the domestic politics of South Korea. 
It was widely believed in Japanese conservative circles that the US action was making 
the Korean situation more volatile and unpredictable .51A crucial question was how 
46 Boei Antena (September 1979): pp. 41-9. 
47 Findley (1979): p. 28522. 48 Ibid.: p. 28523. 
49 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung. 
50 Hasegawa (1980a). 
51 Interview with Takesada. 
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Japan should exert its influence to restrain the Carter administration from harassing the 
Park regime. It must be stressed that this did not mean the Ohira cabinet approved of the 
Park regime's expulsion of Kim Young-sam from the National Assembly. But what 
concerned the cabinet even more was the fact that US intervention was fanning the 
political tunnoil in South Korea. 
The main difficulty facing Japan was that there seemed to be no way of interrupting the 
political tit-for-tat between the Carter administration and the Park regime. The options 
open to the Ohira cabinet were very limited. Also, it had to focus on a general election 
campaign during September 1979, countering the criticisms of the political opposition 
in Japan. It therefore found itself severely hampered in seeking to perform the role of a 
mediator in the TASS. 52 The season of summit meetings was over, and the Carter 
administration seemed to be determined to bring about a change in South Korean 
politics. At this juncture, it was evident that President Carter was not likely to listen to 
Japanese advice. The US local representative, Mansfield, was seemingly -reluctant to 
convey Japanese apprehension to Washington. Moreover, it was President Carter 
himself who, after recalling Ambassador Gleysteen to Washington, stated on 12 October 
1979 that: "When I visited South Korea, I told President Park that any prelude of 
infringement of human rights would cause serious damage to US-South Korean 
,, 53 relations. On 18 October President Carter instructed Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown to convey the presidential letter to President Park with further demands that Park 
should change his method of rule. It was well known to Japan that Brown and Park 
exchanged strong words about their respective stances on South Korean politics. 54 
52 Sonoda again made the provocative statement during the election campaign that Japan-South Korea 
relations should be reformulated. 53 Nojoe (1980): p. 16. 54 Ibid.: p. 18. 
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CONCLUSION: THE ACHIEVEM. ENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF JAPAN'S 
ROLE AS MEDIATOR WITHIN THE TASS 
The Ohira cabinet was certainly eager to play an active role in world politics. One of the 
expressions of such eagerness was Ohira's deliberate use of the word "ally, " which 
suggested that Japan would give unstinting support to the United States. This seemed to 
be the only feasible strategy for Japan in the face of declining US hegemony and the 
emergence of the Soviet military threat. Even though two crucial programmes, the 
NDPO and the Outline, had been adopted in the past three years (from 1976 to 1978), 
they did not guarantee the security of Japan when faced with a nuclear threat. At that 
time, the US did not want Japan to increase significantly its practical defence capability. 
When the scope of co-operation narrowed down to the regional level, however, Japan 
did not necessarily have to follow the American way, because Japanese national 
interests were directly affected either positively or negatively according to the contents 
of US foreign policy towards the region. As far as the Korean question was concerned, 
the range of strategic choices open to Japan was much narrower than that open to the 
US. The US had room for experimentation with various policy options, but Japan could 
not do so because of the lack of resources and the serious aftennath an ill-chosen policy 
line might cause. As a result, the Ohira cabinet adhered strictly to its rigid status quo 
orientation, and became involved in mediating to restore the traditional ties between the 
US and South Korea, and in. co-operating with the Park regime in politico-military 
affairs. " 
The problem was that the Japanese involvement was only partially successful. The 
55 See Heiwa. Anzenhosho Kenkyu-sho (1979): p. 15,31-33. 
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Ohira cabinet succeeded in redirecting one branch of US foreign policy (towards the 
Korean peninsula), but failed to achieve a comprehensive reformulation of the Carter 
formula, which was designed to change the basic fabric of the East Asian security 
environment. To the Japanese attempt to change the whole package of America's South 
Korea policy, the Carter administration responded by rekindling the Kim Dae-jung 
issue, which shook the ground of the political settlement between Japan and the Park 
regime, and by the initiative for three-way official talks between the two Koreas under 
the sponsorship of the US. The Carter administration was reluctant to yield on the 
human rights issue and could not explicitly return to the realist approach employed by 
the Nixon and Ford administrations. 
Moreover, the Ohira cabinet itself did not have a strong political foothold within the 
LDP, and the political protest and challenges from the oppositions were stronger than 
ever before. The Ohira cabinet's active co-operation with the US, particularly in the 
military area, was frequently criticised by the opposition parties. Concerned about the 
Carter-Ohira summit meetings in early May, the JSP attacked the cabinet for 
transforming the US-Japan security system and thereby intensifying international 
tension in Asia and the world. It was also argued that the Ohira cabinet's policy had 
further solidified the division between the two Koreas. 56 
Under these circumstances, Japanese co-operation with the Park regime was not so 
politically effective to a degree to which it could decisively recover the declining 
political legitimacy of the Park regime. The US was the guarantor of South Korean 
security through its military presence and nuclear umbrella, and Japan could not replace 
56 Dai87k-ai Shugiin Hong-kaigi Dai27go (22 May 1979): p. S. 
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the status of the US in South Korean politics. That was the limit of the regional power, 
which could not be fully committed to the security of South Korea in terms of military 
capability, regardless of the political will. Japanese overt political support to the Park 
regime was not sufficient to protect the latter from aggressive US political intervention, 
especially when the Japanese policy line was different from the US formula. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART TWO 
In early 1979, it was discovered that the US had shifted its policy priority towards South 
Korea on the grounds of its shifting strategic and military interests. This shift was 
expressed in its export of state-of-the-art air fighters, the large-scale Team Spirit 1979 
military exercise, Carter's visit to Seoul, the co-manufacturing of the F-513, and the 
eventual suspension of the withdrawal policy. All these measures were nothing but sub- 
categories of the Car-ter formula. For the US, the internal change of the South Korean 
political system was the key element of the transformation of the East Asian security 
environment. 
In terms of the interests of the TASS, from the American point of view, Japan under the 
Ohira cabinet showed its willingness to co-operate bilaterally to increase its defence 
burden, and to play an important supportive role in world politics commensurate with its 
economic status. Thus, the other junior ally of the TASS, South Korea, also needed to 
follow the new diplomatic tune of the US, for the Park regime as a projected state could 
not nullify the US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty as Brazilian Geisel regime did 
in 1977. The solution suggested by the Carter administration was the simultaneous 
liberalisation of the ruling style of the Park regime with the enforcement of US security 
commitment to South Korea. On the basis of this framework, President Carter intended 
to engage North Korea in exchange for a more liberalised South Korean political 
structure, which he deemed necessary if North Korea was to be persuaded to abandon 
its hostile posture towards the South. 
In order to survive, the Park regime had to understand the significance of the pre- 
summit pressures from Washington and the implications of Secretary Vance's speech on 
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Latin American policy in mid-September (referred to Chapter 4: 4.3.2). The Carter 
administration believed that it had quite clearly and sufficiently conveyed the message 
that the US security commitment to South Korea was conditional. Therefore, a visible 
measure of South Korean political liberalisation was the absolute precondition for any 
improvement of US-Korean relations. 57 
In any event, the strong pressure exerted by the US on the Park regime, contributing to 
the death of President Park, increased instability in the security of South Korea and of 
the Northeast Asian region. The instability worsened so quickly that the Japanese 
cabinet could not intervene effectively in South Korean politics and had insufficient 
opportunities to persuade the Carter administration to change its approach. Japan had to 
play the role of initiator-not the role of mediator-in the South Korean regime 
transition. 
57 79 State 089493 (10 April 1979). 
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PART THREE 
THE INTERVENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
IN THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TRANSITION, NOVEMBER 
1979-JANUARY 1981 
INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 
Part Three is mainly concerned with the differences between the US and Japanese 
strategies of intervention in the South Korean regime transition between November 
1979 and January 1981. In principle, the general interests of the US and Japan in South 
Korea were parallel. As Harrison puts it, "The governing interest of both Japan and the 
United States in Korea lies in reducing North-South tensions and in preventing a 
renewed large-scale military conflict in which either of the two countries could become 
even indirectly involved. "' However, the common interest of the two countries in the 
emergence of a strong South Korean buffer state was not matched by agreement on how 
to introduce a politically desirable system in South Korea on the front line of an anti- 
Communist alliance system. As discussed in Parts One and Two, the value of South 
Korea to the US national interest tended to fluctuate according to changes of American 
global strategy. In order to ensure that South Korea served the needs of US strategy at a 
time when it was not willing to follow the changing focus of US foreign policy, the US 
imposed external pressure, which occasionally included the effort to force changes in 
the South Korean political system. Thus, the US flexible status quo orientation was 
coupled with a policy of aggressive intervention. 
1 Weinstein and Kamiya (1980): p. 42. 
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On the other hand, the Japanese version of the status quo was both more consistent and 
more restrictive because the Japanese perspective was regional rather than global, 
focusing on East Asia and its military situation. The emphasis was on minimising the 
changes in the Korean peninsula in an effort to avoid any dismantling of the existing 
balance of power in the East Asian region. Put another way, Japan sought to defend the 
East Asian region in general and the Korean peninsula in particular from the negative 
impact of changes in global power parity. This also included a desire to minimise the 
changes in South Korean politics and, if necessary, to respond accordingly to the 
fluctuation of US containment policy against the Soviet Union and its East Asian 
policy. In other words, Japan stuck to a rigid status quo orientation and defensive 
intervention policy. 
The combination of different national strategies and national power configurations led 
the two countries into different approaches towards the South Korean regime transition. 
In terms of intra-alliance politics, the US, as a leading country, and Japan, as a middle 
member of the TASS, saw things differently. In terms of political legitimacy, the 
demise of the Park regime showed the limits of the political benefit obtainable from 
Japan to a state in South Korea, when the US pursued to change the South Korean 
political system serving for the new policy for the Northeast Asian region. The close co- 
operation between Japan and South Korea failed to halt the rapidly declining legitimacy 
of the Park regime. So Japan decided to intervene more directly in the regime transition 
in South Korea after the death of President Park (See the discussion in Part Two). 
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After the demise of the Park regime, circumstances changed. Due to the Iranian hostage 
incident, US intervention in the regime transition in South Korea lost momentum and 
failed to realise the goal of establishing a civilian government to South Korea. (See the 
discussion in Part Two. ) Indeed, the intervention of the middle member (Japan) proved 
to be more effective. The US succeeded in removing the authoritarian Park regime (see 
Chapter 4), but Japan succeeded in replacing the power vacuum with an arguably more 
amenable new military regime, an achievement reflecting Japan's different policy 
orientation from that of the US (This will be discussed in Chapter 7). Of course, this 
change was not due entirely to the Japanese intervention. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan alarmed the US into protecting its self-serving national interest in the 
Northeast Asian region and in the Korean peninsula, which resulted in inconsistent US 
management of the emergence of a new military regime. 
Part Three consists of two chapters (6 and 7) that examine in turn US and Japanese 
rationales, policy priorities, and actions taken towards the South Korean regime 
transition bequeathed by the assassination of President Park from November 1979 to 
January 1981. Chapter 6 deals with the US management strategy, focusing on the 
unsuccessful employment of the "nudging" policy for the establishment of a broadly 
based civilian government. It covers the period from the death of President Park on 26 
October 1979 to the establishment of a new military junta in late May 1980 after the 
suppression of the Kwangju democratisation movement on 27 May 1980, the Kim Dae- 
jung trial in late 1980, and Chun's visit to Washington in January 198 1. 
There were three main factors which hindered the transformation of the South Korean 
political system: (1) the actions of a new, emergent military leadership, risking the 
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security of South Korea; (2) the deep American engagement in the Iran hostage 4D 
incident, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and (3) Japan's intervention in the 
South Korean regime transition, which contradicted American intentions. So, Chapter 7 
deals with the Japanese intervention in South Korean politics during the second term of 
the Ohira Cabinet from November 1979 to June 1980. This chapter also covers the 
initial period of the Suzuki premiership from July 1980 to January 1981. This chapter 
seeks to shed light on the Japanese view of US management of the South Korean 
political situation following the death of President Park, and the resulting decision by 
Japan to implement its own strategy of intervention. It also examines the ways in which 
the Suzuki cabinet intervened to prevent the execution of Kim Dae-jung by the new 
Korean military regime, when the Carter administration had lost its influence in South 
Korean politics. 
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CHAPTER6 
THE US INTERVENTION IN THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME 
TRANSITION, NOVEMBER 1979-JANUARY 1981 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the dynamics of US intervention in the regime 
transition in South Korea against the background of a rapidly changing world politics 
and the emergence of a new military leadership in South Korea. 
At five o'clock in the morning of the 27 October, South Korean radio announced that 
President Park had been dead through an accident, and that Prime Minister Choi Kyu- 
Ha had taken over control of the government. Martial law was immediately imposed 
across the whole country with the exception of Cheju-Do, 2 and Army Chief of Staff 
Chong Sung-hwa became martial law administrator. The announcement stated that 
universities would be closed and assembly prohibited. The nation-wide curfew was 
extended to 2200 to 0400 from the normal 2400 to 0400. In due course, troops were 
deployed throughout Seoul and other major cities. The US State Department issued a 
statement at 4: 30 p. m. on 26 October [EST] stressing that: "[The US] will react strongly 
in accordance with its treaty obligations to the Republic of Korea to any external 
2 The exclusion of Cheju-Do from martial law was of great significance, allowing the civilian government 
to remain in command. 
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attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea. ', 3 The statement was 
immediately delivered to Moscow, Beijing and Tokyo. As indicated by the Vance 
speech before the Foreign Policy Association on 27 September 1979, just one month 
before the death of President Park, South Korea's external security was guaranteed by 
the US, and accordingly the issue of South Korea's internal political development now 
required serious attention. 
In terms of leading South Korean politics towards political liberalisation, thereby 
producing a security environment in the Northeast Asian region that would not 
necessitate an American military presence, the death of President Park was not in itself 
a negative outcome for the US. However, there were various intervening factors 
obstructing the US "nudging" policy from realisation, the policy which aims at: "urging 
the government move ahead with political liberalisation; advising the military to remain 
unified and refrain from crude intervention in politics; and pressing the opposition to be 
patient to reduce the prospects of a military counter lash. 14 Most importantly, this 
policy was obstructed by the zeal for power of the new military leadership loyal to the 
late President Park. Therefore, the main challenge for the Carter administration was how 
to keep the military out of civilian politics. The "nudging" policy was also seriously 
affected by the rapidly changing world political situation due to the Iran Hostage 
incident in early November and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 
1979. Under these circumstances, the US administration did not pay much attention to 
political developments in South Korea. The two new challenges demanded a great deal 
3 79 SeouII6346 (27 October 1979). 
4 79 State 312340 (4 December 1979): 79 Seoul 19044 (18 December 1979); 79 State 325655 (18 
December 1979); 79 Seoid 19135 (20 December 1979); The core of the nudging policy was "the vital 
importance of unity within the Korean armed forces, maintenance of civilian rule, and progress toward 
the political goals enunciated by President Choi" 80 Scoid 00338 (10 January 1980). 
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of attention and considerable resources, and this made American policy increasingly 
unstable. 
The first military coup led by General Chun Doo-hwan broke out on 12 December 
1979: Chun controlled the military, but they still remained in their barracks. For the US, 
if a broadly based civilian government was to be established, the key problem was how 
to deter a final take-over by the Chun group. Even after the 12 December Coup, the US 
did not change the fundamental orientation of the "nudging" policy. The US assessment 
of the political movement within the Korean military was not consistent, and this 
resulted in the oscillation between the military and the opposition/di ssi dent forces. 
There is no doubt that the "nudging" policy turned out to be a grave failure resulting in 
the massacre of many pro-democracy civilians. 
This chapter investigates the main components of US policy towards South Korea in the 
post-Park era and examines how the emergence of a new military regime led to the 
unstable implementation of the "nudging" policy in terms of intra-alliance politics. 
Section 6.1 will briefly summarise the priority of the Carter administration managing 
the South Korean regime transition, the impact of the Iran hostage incident to it, and the 
occurrence of the 12 December military coup led by General Chun Doo-hwan. The US 
self-restraints and intrinsic defficiencies in disciplinining the new South Korean military 
leadership will be examined. The following section (6.2) will discuss the assessments of 
the Carter administration on the South Korean politics after the 12 December coup; 
Section 6.3 and 6.4 will investigate the new military group's advances towards the final 
take-over. Section 6.5 and 6.6. will discuss the US policy towards South Korea after the 
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17 May Coup and the failed Kwangju Dernocratisation Movements. The Kim Dae-jung 
trial issue will also be examined in terms of alliance management. 
6.1 THE US EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
POST-PARK ERA 
The Carter administration had no reason to moum the death of President Park on 26 
October, 5 for his regime was perceived as having posed a serious threat to peace and 
stability in the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. His death presented 
the possibility of a new starting-point for the realisation of the Carter formula for a 
transformation of the East Asian security environment. The abolition of harsh 
restrictions on human rights and the cultivation of a new spirit of liberalisation were 
seen by the US as the first step to "a clear break with the past"6 and the introduction of a 
broadly based civilian government in South Korea. The aim was to move the caretaker 
civilian government and opposition/dissident forces toward a well planned, one-year 
political development timetable while ensuring that the military remained within their 
barracks. The implementation of this policy commenced with the visit of Secretary of 
State Vance to Seoul in early November 1979. 
6.1.1 The Visit of Secretary of State Vance to Seoul, 3 November 1979 
The Carter administration intended to change the South Korean political structure into a 
liberalised one, even though it perceived it difficult due to irreconcilable political forces 
in South Korea. As an extension of the policy orientation signalled by the speech of 
5 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung. 
6 79 State 285736 (1 November 1979): p. 3. 
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Vance on 26 September (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2), and in line with the statement 
the Carter administration issued on the occasion of the death of President Park, South 
Korean political actors were expected to promote internal political change, while the US 
took responsibility for external security. However, the first of these tasks was not at all 
easy. From the very beginning, dissidents and some churchmen suspected that the army 
would assume full control of the interim government. Therefore they wanted the US, 
standing alongside them, to prevent the military's seizure of power with "direct, clear- 
cut US intervention, " because they thought the "ROK military are more open to US 
,, 7 influence than Korean politicians. Under these conditions, the US role was crucial in 
determining the future direction of the political system. 8 In fact, the Carter 
administration recognised that "[T]he new situation clearly is an opportunity, but it also 
begins a period of great danger. ... Any mishandling would have direct and serious 
consequence for the United States. "9 The "nudging" policy demanded a delicate mode 
of delivery, high standards of statecraft, influential policy instruments, and the constant 
involvement of senior decision-makers. 
The assassination of President Park meant that the institutionalised ruling political camp 
had collapsed, and the political confrontation line had now been changed. Two polarised 
non-institutionalised social forces, the dissident forces led by Kim Dae-jung and the 
most loyal faction of the military led by General Chun Doo-hwan, emerged. These two 
forces moved towards a final confrontation in the political vacuum bequeathed by the 
death of President Park. Nonetheless, the Carter administration did not pay as much 
attention as Japan to this dimension (On the Japanese view, see Chapter 7, Section 7.2). 
7 79 Seoul 16874 (5 November 1979); 79 Seoul 16736 (2 November 1979); 79 Scoul 16750 (2 November, 
1979). 
8 79 Seoul 16750 (2 November 1979). 
9 Ibid.: p. 3. 
154 
Part 111 6 US Intervention 11 
In fact, unlike Japan, the US did not know that the Chun Doo-hwan faction intended to 
launch a coup to arrest General Chong immediately after the death of President Park. 10 
The Carter administration believed that the US could monitor and control the South 
Korean military through the ROK[US Combined Forces Command and military liaison 
channels. "At some point, " the ambassador reported to Washington, "we can be sure 
they will also seek our assistance in trying to keep the political opposition from being 
too impatient. "" This judgement revealed that the US thought it could exert proper 
influence on the military group led by An-ny Chief of Staff General Chong Sung-hwa, 
Martial Law Administrator. 
Secretary Vance, visiting Seoul to attend the state funeral of the late President Park on 3 
November, encouraged the caretaker government to move forward to submit "a 
timetable for a more democratic revision of the political structure" and "early human 
rights improvement. " 12 Concerning the caretaker government's difficult position 
between the military and the opposition/di ssi dent forces, the Vance team assured 
President Choi and Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin that no desire on the part of the 
armed forces to assume control was detected, and the US offered political support to 
help the acting government by counselling the opposition towards moderation. 13 Vance 
authoritatively told the Foreign Minister: "You can count on us to give you realistic 
private advice. " 14 In exchange, the possibility of an early liberalisation including a 
constitutional amendment lifting EM-9 was hinted at by the caretaker govemment. 15 
When Vance left Seoul, he was convinced that the South Korean military supported the 
10 Interview with Huh. 
11 79 Seoul 16656 (1 November 1979). 
12 79 State 285736 (1 November 1979). 
13 79 Seoul 17060 (8 November 1979). 
14 Ibid.: p. 3. 
15 79 Seoul 1709](8 November 1979). 
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civilian government. No American delegates to the funeral ceremony could have 
predicted the hostage incident in Iran just two days later: Vance would never be able to 
visit Seoul again to manage the South Korean situation. 
6.1.2 The Impact of the Iranian Hostage Incident on the Management of the South 
Korean Situation 
The political development of South Korea was adversely affected by the occurrence of 
the Iran hostage incident on 4 November 1979. From that point onwards, senior officials 
in Washington were distracted by the Iranian problem. ' 6 The top decision-makers were 
simply not available when the South Korean situation exceeded ambassadorial 
competence. In addition, rapid changes in world politics made the implementation of 
US policy towards political liberalisation in South Korea inconsistent. 
The US was apparently inclined to press the Choi government to demonstrate visibly 
that democratisation was in progress. 17 In order to press the government to move more 
quickly before the dissidents' patience ran out, " on 21 November the Assistant 
Secretary instructed the Ambassador to meet Kim Dae-jung as soon as possible. 9 In 
fact, on 24 November, acting President Choi held a series of meetings with religious 
leaders to explain his desire to promote democratisation in a cautious but steady 
manner. 20 During these meetings, Choi hinted at the possibility of the release of EM-9 
prisoners and even the eventual lifting of the house arrest of Kim Dae-jung. On 26 
November, the National Assembly formed the Constitutional Revision Committee 
16 Brzezinski (1985): pp. 471-2. 
17 79 Seoul 17091 (8 November 1979). 
18 79 Seoul 17311 (14 November 1979). 
19 79 State 302462 (21 November 1979). 
20 79 Seoul 18028 (27 November 1979). 
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(CRC) to draft a new constitution. In general terrns, the achievement of the first month 
of the post-Park era looked promising. 
However, the US "nudging" policy encountered intrinsic difficulties when one of the 
two confronting political forces, the military and the opposi ti on/di ssi dent groups, 
showed that it was not willing to accept the other as a political partner. It was no easy 
task to maintain a proper distance between the competing forces while at the same time 
driving them to work together. American resolve was challenged by a series of 
disturbing events. To begin with, the first indoor political rally since the death of 
President Park was organised by dissident groups at the YWCA hall on 24 November in 
Seoul. Leaflets urged people to rise up and demonstrate in all major cities. In response, 
the Martial Law Command (MLC) arrested 96 organisers and many partiCipants. 21 
The MLC stressed its intolerance towards all activities harmful to "national unity, order, 
and stabi lity. i722 General Chong Sung-hwa appeared in front of the press on three 
consecutive days from 27 November. He stressed that the military were determined to 
prevent five developments: (1) Kim Dae-jung's assumption of the Presidency and his 
direct control of military forces; (2) the NDP's and its leader Kim Young Sam's 
excessive political activities; (3) political interference by religious groups; (4) any 
demonstrations; and (5) the emergence of a strong National Assembly. 23 A veto power 
had thus been proclaimed against democratic political development. General Chong 
denounced almost every political force except for the Choi government, and projected 
21 79 Seoul 17966 (26 November 1979). 
22 79 Seoul 17063 (8 November 1979). 
23 79 Seoul 18145 (29 November 1979). 
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itself as "a veto power. , 24 Ironically, this blinded the US from keeping an eye on the 
moves of the Chun Doo-hwan faction, which was preparing to arrest General Chong. 
Even though the possibility of a military coup was considered to be "very unlikel Y,, 25 by 
the US, suddenly the prospects for the "nudging" policy seemed to have worsened. For 
more than a month the US witnessed a total refusal of the South Korean government to 
remove any political restrictions. Gleysteen and General Wickham, the Commander of 
the US-South Korean Combined Forces, had urgent talks with General Chong on 30 
November to press him further on the issue of political development, but there was still 
no response 26 Thus, for the first time since the death of President Park, the US embassy 
requested Washington to provide a solution. However, as already explained, due to the 
Iran hostage incident, Washington was not able to devote its attention and resources to 
South Korea. Most senior fi, gures-Presi dent Carter, Secretary of State Vance, NSC 
Advisor Brzezinski, and Secretary of Defence Brown-were totally absorbed in what 
was happening in Iran. Only Assistant Secretary Holbrooke was available. 
After receiving the request from the Ambassador, Holbrooke talked privately with some 
Senators and Congressmen, including Nunn, Glenn and Wolff, about US strategy 
towards the Korean situation. The result was the telegram 79 State 312340 NODIS 
Korea Focus -- Nudging ROK Political Leaders dated 4 December [EST]: 
We have their full support at this time. Their attitudes, like everyone else's, are 
dominated by the Iranian crisis and, needless to say, nobody ivants "Another Iran "-by 
24 Ibid.: p. 2. 25 79 Seoul 18150 (29 November 1979). 
26 79 Seoid 18324 (30 November 1979). 
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which they mean American action which would in any way appear to unravel a situation 
and lead to change on [sic] instability in a key American at ly. 27 (Emphasis added) 
This telegram revealed that US Korea policy was not being decided only within the 
scope of the Korean situation itself, but within a broader global context. Following this 
opening remark, Holbrooke denounced "a relative handful of Christian extremist 
dissidents" as the source of trouble. 28 He instructed Gleysteen to alert the Christian 
leaders that they should not automatically count on "the same degree of American 
support now" contrary to "a few months ago": "We do not favor challenges to Martial 
Law at this delicate tiMe.,, 29 By contrast, he asked the Ambassador to convey to the 
generals that: "provided they in turn carry out their commitments to liberalization ... you 
,, 30 are going to have to lean on the Korean leadership on these issues. This instruction 
shook the basis of the "nudging7 policy and lost the momentum in advance to watch the 
military faction loyal to the late President Park to launch a coup at a critical juncture. 
As soon as his house arrest was lifted on 8 December 1979, Kim Dae-jung expressed 
his suspicion that the US might turn its back on South Korean democracy and tilt 
towards an emphasis on stability: "I am not yet sure where the US Will go.,, 31 US 
Ambassador Glyesteen sent an official to Kim on 10 December and met him in person 
on the morning 12 December 1979. "Nudging" means to push activities of splinters into 
a certain direction. However, the delivery of the US position to "lean on the Korean 
leadership and the generals" gave a chance or a momentum to the Chun group to launch 
a coup, while Gleysteen's reluctance of the giving the dissident forces a warning that 
27 79 State 312340 (4 November 1979). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 79 State 312340, (4 December 1979). An immediately following sentence is extremely difficult for the 
author to interpret: '7he purpose of this approach, quite frankly, is to enhance U. S. credibility with the 
leadership on the eve of some tough decisions" (Ibid.: para 9). 
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the US would not automatically defend the political liberalisation did not lessen the 
complacency that the US would go along with the dissident forces. 
6.1.3 The Military Coup of 12 December 1979 and the US Restraints 
The fact that President Park died at the hands of his intelligence chief, Kim Jae-kyu, 
cast a shadow of doubt over higher officials within the Park government. As Chief of 
the Martial Law Combined Investigation Headquarters and Commander of the Defence 
Security Command, General Chun Doo-hwan had exclusive rights to interrogate 
anybody including acting President Choi Kyu-ha. Two of the most senior men close to 
the late President, Choi Kyu-ha and Army Chief of Staff General Chong Sung-hwa, 
gave cause for suspicion in the eyes of the loyalist faction of the military. As for 
General Chong, his appointment with Kim Jae-kyu near to the site of the assassination 
in the evening of 26 October 1979 gave the Chun group strong grounds for concern and 
added weight to the legitimacy of their coup. As for Choi, he had demonstrated 
indecision in not moving to arrest Kim Jae-kyu that night. Moreover, the US, 
represented by its embassy, was not able to quell totally the rumour of American 
32 involvement in the assassination of President Park . Such suspected complicity 
weakened the US embassy's influence over the camp loyal to Park. In addition, the Iran 
hostage incident raised a suspicion about the US power to realise its policy towards an 
ally. 
33 
31 Asahi (8 December 1979). 
32 79 Seoul 17592 (19 November 1979). From the very initial stage of the post-Park era, the foreign press 
suspected the US must have had some involvement in the affair, as evidenced by the quick US 
response. (79 Seoul 1979 (27 October)). 
33 One of weekly status reports drafted by the Korea Desk Officer R. Rich recorded that: "Several times in 
the past two weeks I have called the attention of the ROK political counsellor here to the public criticisms 
of Japan's action [Japanese comprehensive companies' purchasing of Iranian oil in higher price than the 
market price in late November 1979] and cautioned that the ROKG be careful in its dealing with Iran in 
search for needed oil. Meanwhile, our ICA posts in Korea have concluded that the cautious U. S. handling 
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Under the delicate condition that most of the key actors were suspected either 
collaborating in the murder (the Martial Law Administrator, Army Chief of Staff, 
General Chung Sung-hwa), or provoking it (the Carter Adminsitration), or improper 
initial action to arrest the assassin (Prime Minister Choi), the partial implementation of 
Holbrooke's instructions worsened the situation. While Gleysteen was reluctant to turn 
his back on Christian leaders, fearing the possibility of anti-American feeling in their 
circles, 34 he conveyed the changed US approach to the government and the generals. 35 
On 7 December General Wickham met with General Lew Byung-hyon, and a US 
embassy officer met General Chun Doo-hwan. 36 Gleysteen's selective delivery of 
Holbrooke's instruction to the acting government and the military did not function as a 
solution, but served only to exacerbate the problem. 
On 7 December 1979, just one day before the lifting of EM-9 and the house arrest over 
Kim Dae-jung, General Chun, having been infon-ned that the embassy was going to 
"lean on the Korean leadership, " had a meeting with his factional colleague General 
Rho Tae-woo in order to draw up a plan to arrest the Martial Law Commander General 
Chong five days later. By the early morning of 13 December, the military coup was 
completed with the victory of the pro-Park faction led by Chun: 
Without prior approval from [President] Choi, Chung [Chong] was taken into custody 
and replaced as chief of-staff on the ground that he implicated in Park's assassination. In 
the hours immediately after this coup de main, armoured units loyal to each army faction 
of the Iranian crisis has diminished American prestige among other Koreans, who allege they see 
evidence of American impotence which has implications for the ROK reliance on U. S. security ties" (79 
Seoul State 32 7362,20 December 1979). 
34 79 Scou118543 (7 December 1979). 
35 Ibid. 
36 79 Seoul 18689 (11 December 1979). 
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moved threateningly towards each other on the outskirts of Seoul. However, after small- 
arms skirmishes at the army headquarters, Chung's supporters halted their resistance and 
closed ranks with the successful rebels. Chun and his main supporters, many of whom 
were, like Chun himself, graduates of the 1955 or I I'h class of the Korean Military 
Academy, seemed motivated by the wish to hold a reserve of power to make sure the 
political path South Korea followed did not deviate too far from that set by Park. 37 
The South Korean military were now controlled by "the tough cookies .,, 
38 The 
insurgent group sacked more than 30 generals, and their senior members entered the 
Choi government, namely Defence Minister Chu Young-bok and Home Affairs 
Minister Kim Chong-hwan, fon-ner Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The timing of the arrest of Chong was of significance. When Chun Doo-hwan met 
General Rho to plan the coup, the lifting of the house arrest imposed on Kim Dae-jung 
was made public mainly because of American pressure on acting President Choi. At the: 
very moment when Kim came back onto the political scene, the Chun group grasped 
control of the military. The US was surprised by "the speed of this power grab .,, 
39 The 
military coup further weakened the civilian authority and also loosened the traditional 
ties between the Korean military and the United States. 40 The Carter administration 
responded by issuing warnings to the new military leadership and also potential sources 
of external threat, including North Korea and the Soviet Union. Washington 
reconfirmed its security commitment to South Korea and delivered this message to 
Moscow and Beijing. Washington warned the Chun group that "Any forces within the 
Republic of Korea which disrupt this progress [of political development] should bear in 
mind the seriously adverse impact their actions would have on the ROK's relations with 
37 Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd (1981): p. 174. 38 Ibid.: p. I. 
39 79 State 322555 (15 December 1979). 
40 79 Seoul 18811 (13 December 1979). 
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7,41 the United States . The US stressed that three aspects of Chun's possible misconduct 
needed to be highlighted: the damage to the unity of the Korean military and, most 
importantly, to the Combined Forces Command Structure; the serious risk vis-ý-vis 
North Korea by mobilising troops from the near DMZ; the negligence of the US. 
No matter how angry the US administration was, it had no alternative but to exercise 
restraint. In reality, the White House, the Departments of Defense and State, and the 
CIA held several high-level meetings to discuss options to discipline the new military 
leadership soon after the coup. Various responses, including the adjustment, reduction 
or withdrawal of military aid, the suspension or the cancellation of the SCM, and partial 
or total withdrawal of US forces in South Korea were discussed. The State Department 
claimed that this was the best time to reconsider the suspension of the withdrawal plan. 
However, the White House and the Defense Department played a central role in 
rejecting any such strong actions. The basic attitude was that the US must pursue the 
simultaneous progress of democratisation and politico-military stability, and that the 
former consideration should not override the latter. The cancellation or suspension of 
the SCM in the view of the State Department was an attractive option because it would 
emphasise the US non-recognition of the coup without the serious consequences of the 
withdrawal of US forces. However, the Department of Defense was completely opposed 
to the idea of a linkage between US defence policy and South Korean dernocratisation. 
Economic sanctions were considered to be an ineffective option. 42 The remaining 
possibilities were: to distinguish between US-South Korean common interests and 
Chun's action by expressing US displeasure directly to Chun Doo-hwan, and to extract 
a pledge from him not to topple the civilian presidency; and not to obstruct political 
41 79 State 321049 (13 December 19 79); 79 State 322555 (15 December 1979). 
42 Young (1994): pp. 332-3. 
163 
Part 111 6 US Intervention 11 
43 liberalisation . In spite of its bitterness against the military coup led by General Chun, 
the Carter administration declined a counter-coup against the December 12 group when 
this was proposed by an anti-Chun faction. A counter-coup was far beyond the interests 
of alliance management. 
The reasons for self-restraint by the US regarding the military coup need to be 
investigated further in tenns of the general and particular characteristics of US-South 
Korea relations. The generality of the US-Korean relationship needs to be viewed from 
the perspective of alliance management in a bipolar system. In maintaining a bipolar 
system in the Cold War era, there was an essential tension in the asymmetry of power 
dependence between superpower and ally. As discussed in Chapter 2, junior allies can 
not always be controlled by the superpower, but can be adventurous. The degree of 
control of a leader in an alliance depends on the strategic value of an al ly. 44 
With respect to the coup carried out by the Chun group, this proposition explains the 
reasons for US restraint. Gleysteen stressed the fundamental source of US influence by 
stating that: "Ultimately our real influence is going to stem from Korean awareness that 
they are significantly dependent on the US in both the military and economic area. 45 In 
principle, the possibility of American acquiescence in politically motivated insurgence 
in a strategically important state always exists as long as the newly emerging military 
power adheres to the ideology of anti-communism and not anti -Americanism. When 
internal security becomes an overwhelming issue in an ally, the US tends to make a firm 
security commitment, whereas the problem of actually tackling internal security is often 
seen to be beyond US influence. All that the US can do is to strive to transform an 
43 79Seoid 19389 (28 December 1979). 
44 J. Roberts (1988): p. 29-30. 
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unsettled situation into a more stabilised one. In that sense, any contingency plan of the 
US for coping with an ally's political upheaval has to review more complex conditions 
than would be the case with an adversary state. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, US political power effectively demonstrates its competence 
when a junior ally maintains loyalty. Such loyalty to a superpower ultimately relies 
upon the credibility felt by the ally for the political support of the superpower when an 
incumbent leader in that ally state faces not only an external military threat but also 
domestic political difficulty. 46 During the first years of the Carter presidency (1977- 
1978) the US lost credibility because of the US policy of withdrawal of ground forces 
from the Korean peninsula. Beginning in 1979, the situation improved slightly until the 
Carter-Park summit meetings of July 1979. As Gleysteen acknowledged: "The 
announcement [of July] that further withdrawals of US combat troops would be 
suspended until at least 1981 contributed enormously to Korean confidence in the US 
commitment. 7,47 As far as one of the most powerful military factions in South Korea 
loyal to the late President Park was concerned, however, US credibility was eroded 
substantially because of the pressure exerted by the US on the Park regime. On top of 
that, the alleged complicity of the Carter administration in the death of President Park 
made matters worse. Accordingly, diplomatic manoeuvrability proved insufficient. 
Diplomatic influence between allies is always conditioned by the recognition of mutual 
power assessment and credibility. When the elements of respect, credibility and loyalty 
are no longer sufficient to enable a superpower to control the range of an ally's activity, 
the superpower is often left with no choice other than to acquiesce. Once the 
45 79 Seoul 19389 (28 December 1979). 
46 Creclibility refers to j's expectation that i is able and willing to execute the threats and to fulfil the 
V romises that, according toj, seem to be involved in i's behaviour. (Lieshout, 1995): p. 58. 7 80 Seoul 01186 (29 January 1980). 
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fundamental source of US influence towards South Korea-in Gleysteen's term, this 
was "Korean awareness" of their dependence on the US in both the military and 
economic areas -- was eroded, the US lacked the leverage to deal with the South Korean 
situation. This was because, in an alliance game, military sanctions or punitive actions 
can not really be adopted. Consequently, the Carter administration had no choice but to 
acquiesce in the emergence of the Chun group. This was the case when Gleysteen met 
General Chun on 14 December in order to convey the extent of US concern "quickly, 
bluntly, and directl yi). 48 The ambassador reminded Chun of Korean dependence on good 
relations with US military personnel and businessmen, who were deeply disturbed by 
what had happened . 
49 He then stated: 
Our interest was to ensure [the] development of a broadly based constitutional 
government under civilian leadership ... the events of December 12 would jeopardise this 
progress, divide the ROK military, and increase the danger from North Korea. 5t) 
Contrary to his resolve to nurture the relationship with the Korean General, the 
ambassador had to realise at first hand the diminished scope for US pressure. In turn, 
Chun raised a question about his suspicion of US involvement in the death of President 
Park. Gleysteen found himself having to defend his position: "I used this opportunity to 
again bluntly and forcefully deny any involvement on our part in the events of October 
26 or any attempt to soften the justice due to an assassin. "51 In consideration of the 
general US-South Korean alliance relationship, and the security of South Korea, the US 
was forced to refrain from putting further pressure on the Chun group and the Choi 
govemment. 
48 79 Seoul 18885 (15 December 1979). Gleysteen cautioned that the meeting should not be regarded as 
i lying US acceptance of the group's legitimacy. TPI 
49 Ibid.: p. 1. 
50 Ibid.: p. 5. 
51 Ibid.: p. 5. 
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Another key factor influencing the US approach to the Chun group-the hostage 
incident in Iran-prevented the Carter administration from paying sufficient attention to 
what was happening in South Korea. Holbrooke summoned Korean Ambassador Kim 
Yong-shik to convey US concern: 
Despite the pressures of the Iranian crisis, the President [Carter] has been following the 
Korean situation very closely .... The President and the 
Secretary both are concerned that 
there be no overthrow of civilian rule in Korea and that orderly progress toward broadly 
based political development continue. If the integrity of the ROK military command 
structure should become badly breached, this would offer a dangerous opportunity for 
North Korea. 52 
The Iran hostage incident, by directly and immediately challenging the US, threatened 
the implementation of the flexible status quo orientation and strategy of offensive 
intervention in the South Korean regime transition. When the situation in Iran merged 
into a broader political struggle against the Shah, the Carter administration did not 
seriously consider the possibility that strong anti -Americanism would arise in Iran. This 
was a key reason why the US stood firm in adopting a dernocratisation policy towards 
South Korea. US pressure, whether intended or not, resulted in the demise of the Park 
regime. The policy focus of the post-Park era was to nudge every spectrum of the 
political forces into the establishment of a broadly based civilian state. This policy, 
however, became ineffective. When anti -Americanism in Iran became prominent, 
culminating in the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran, a new driving principle was 
adopted. This change was also evident in South Korea policy. Worrying about the 
analogous impact of the Iran hostage incident, the US withdrew its support for the 
52 79 State 326393 (19 December 1979). In this meeting, Holbrooke also informed Kim that the US had 
contacted the Soviet Union and China to express its concern that North Korea should not to try to exploit 
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Christian dissidents in South Korea and reconciled its opposition to the military. When 
a fundamental principle of foreign policy changes, there is inevitably a period of 
instability between abandoning the old principle and the assumption of the new. Taking 
advantage of this short period of instability, the Chun group succeeded in seizing power. 
Then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979 added further problems 
to the American foreign policy agenda. In Brzezinski's terms, "a major watershed had 
been reached in the American-Soviet relationship. "" 
6.2 US ASSESSMENTS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TRANSITION 
After expelling the old hierarchy of the military, the Chun group could not immediately 
topple the Choi Presidency due mainly to continued US pressure. In order for the new 
military group to attain full political power, two conditions were necessary: there must 
be an impending threat from North Korea, and internal politics must be in turmoil. 
Under such circumstances, it was believed that the US would lend support or at least 
acquiesce. For the time being, therefore, the Chun group continued to draw the limits of 
its tolerance, groping for the decisive timing of the final take-over, while fanning 
political tun-noil and insinuating that the North Korean threat was real and even 
impending. At the same time, the basic policy line of the US towards South Korea did 
notchange: 
Neither the assassination of President Park nor the events of the December 12/13 have 
changed our basic interests in Korea, and all of them-security, political and economic- 
will be best served if there is stability and political evolution at a pace acceptable to a 
the situation in South Korea. Moreover, he told Kim of the Defense Secretary Brown's coming visit to 
Chine, with the Korean issue as one of the important pending matters. (Ibid.: p. 3) 
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majority of the Korean people. Our influence is greater than in recent years because most 
Koreans know they cannot make it without us internationally and, to a lesser extent, 
because they need us-at least for a while-to help bridge some domestic gaps. 54 
This wishful prospect however confronted various obstacles, and became one of sources 
to fail to see the establishment of a broadly based civilian government established by 
the popular election in South Korea in 1980. 
6.2.1 Washingtons Assessments On the South Korean Politics 
The emergence of the new military leadership through the 12 December military coup- 
44a serious new element of instability in the Korean situation"-complicated US 
objectives . 
55 Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, refined the "nudging" policy in order to 
prevent the disintegration of army unity, and to preserve the momentum toward a 
broadly based democratic government under orderly civilian leadership. 56 On balance, 
in early 1980, the US policy towards South Korea was twofold, i. e., "the importance of 
stability and the maintenance of a civilian government. " Most crucial was that: 
"Stability, however, should not be used as an excuse by some to override the civil 
govemment. v757 
On 16 January 1980, in Seoul, Holbrooke told President Choi that "We are totally 
committed to the idea of civilian control ... [and] both the embassy and the US military 
53 Ibid.: p. 429. 
54 79 Seoul 19392 (28 December 1979). 
5-5 79 Seoul 19442 (31 December 1979). 
56 79 State 323609 (16 December 1979). 
57 Department of State Airgram A-003 (23 January 1980): p. 5. 
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[in South Korea] would support the President's civilian govemment.,, 58 Then he urged 
President Choi unsuccessfully to outline a timetable of political reform. The period from 
January to early May was one of preparation for a full military take-over by the Chun 
group. 
In early 1980, several important assessments of the South Korean situation were given 
in Congress by Secretary Vance, General Jones (US Chain-nan of the JCS), General 
Wickham (Chief of the UN Command in Korea), and Holbrooke (Assistant Secretary). 
There was a distinct optimism now that the authoritarian rule of Park was over. In 
Holbrooke's view, thanks to the encouragement of the Carter administration, South 
Korea was a successful case of significant progress on the human rights front, without 
damaging other broad foreign policy goals including security concems. 59 This 
optimistic prospect needed to be backed up by economic assistance in order to remove 
"a major element of danger during a period of political transition with so many pitfalls" 
and to enhance the public impression in South Korea that "the US remained a close and 
concerned a] ly.,, 60 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of the State Department, told a 
senior official of the Choi government on 19 February that "political liberalisation is 
essential to the US. If the timetable slips there will be serious repercussions which will 
harm economic as well as political confidence. "61 The optimistic assessment in 
Washington directly affected and reflected the assessment of the US embassy in Seoul. 
58 80 Scoul 000652 (7 January 1980). 
59 USDSB (May 1980): p. 30. 60 80 Seoul 01900 (13 February 1980); 80 Seoul 01807 (11 February, 1980). 
61 80 State 04280 (19 February 1980). 
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6.2.2 The US Embassy's Assessments of the Moves of the Chun Doo-hwan Group 
Washington's wishful thinking was reflected in US local representatives' assessments in 
Seoul. The Carter administration saw the continuing joint military exercises with South 
Korean armed forces as an opportunity to limit General Chun's steps towards a final 
take-over. As a result, the US embassy, losing sight of the steady advance of the Chun 
group, concentrated on the development of party politics, the rallies and campaigns of 
politicians, and the democratisation movement on university campuses. 
In late January 1980, Ambassador Gleysteen had increasing opportunities to meet 
infon-nally with some of Chun's colleagues to "emphasize our continuing concerns 
over their actions, the dangers of insubordination [and violations of the chain of 
command] and factionalism within the ROK army, our disinterest in trying to reverse 
changes in army leadership, our willingness to cooperate so long as the new army 
leadership group really lives up to its verbal assurances, and Korea's dependence on 
cooperation with the U. S. military officers and foreign confidence. " 62 After the 
meetings, he thought that: "a steady drumbeat on these themes is useful. " On these 
occasions, the US Ambassador told South Korean generals that: 
We are not trying to reverse the events of December 12, but unless those who were ousted 
are treated with compassion, the young turks of today will become the elders of tomorrow 
and pay for any blood that is spilled. The U. S. military and civilian leadership is united, 
and even though U. S. military officers were properly angry over the command violations 
of December 12, all of us are prepared to cooperate on the basis I had outlined. 63 
62 80 Seoul 01094 (16 January 1980): p. 1. 
63 Ibid.: p. 2. 
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In short, from late January 1980, after the Afghanistan incident, the Carter 
administration hurried to return to normal relations with the new military leadership led 
by General Chun as long as Chun kept the assurance to stay in the military bulwarks. 
When Gleysteen and Wickham met General Chun's cohorts occasionally to emphasise 
the "continuing US concern about the gross insubordination and violations of the CFC, 
and to deter them from intervening in civilian politics, " they clearly perceived through 
informal meetings with the generals that Chun had pronounced political ambitions. 64 
However, the introduction of a broadly based civilian government was still not 
considered to be an impossible mission. The US confidently anticipated a future "Seoul 
Sping". 
The US embassy acknowledged that it would be difficult to achieve the South Korean 
military's withdrawal from politics. 65 The possibility of a democratic coalition 
government composed of the moderate opposition, the democratic elements of the 
bureaucrats and the army was therefore rejected. 66 The "great potential for mistakes and 
adverse repercussions" undeniably existed in the US management of the regime 
transition in South Korea. 67 In the long run, however, even though another coup could 
not be entirely excluded, a broadly based civilian government was seen to be likely 
because the Chun group had not yet gained complete control of the army, and there was 
a clear division between hard-liners and soft-liners concerning the degree of control, 
timing and conditions of a military take-over. The strong anti-military mood among the 
public was also taken into account: 
64 Ibid.: p. 4. 65 80 Seoul 01807 (11 February 1980). 
66 80 Seoul 01787 (11 February 1980). 
67 Ibid. 
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Virtually everyone agrees ... to scrap the 
Yushin Constitution 
... 
Sentiment against a 
military government is very strong, with people talking of an all-out struggle if elements 
68 of the military try to seize power. 
Consequently, a power seizure by the military was not expected for at least a few 
months. This view reveals American ignorance that the new military hierarchy had 
already been unified under General Chun's control. 
Several liberalisation measures by the Choi government led to a revision of the 
February assessment. Universities and colleges opened, and EM-9 expellees were 
reinstated. Kim Dae-jung was allowed to resume his political career. Reflecting on these 
developments, the assessment of 12 March was distinctly optimistic: 
Granting that tougher tests lie ahead, the prospects for stability and democratic-mind 
through 1980 are not bad. The odds of dangerous disruption, such as a military coup or 
massive student/worker uprising do not seem high. 69 
General Chun's moves were alarmist, but, for the time being, he would remain in the 
military barracks as "a backstage mentor. ', 70 At least, a pre-election coup was unlikely. 
It would perhaps occur in the summer of 1981 at the earliest. From this calculation, a 
new US administration, either under the re-elected Carter presidency or a Republican 
leader, would be able to respond effectively to any such move by the military. 71 
Seemingly there were other significant constraints on Chun: the complexity of the 
Korean economy and the delicacy of the country's foreign relations, reflected especially 
68 80 Seoul 01807 (11 February 1980). 
69 80 Seoul 03039 (12 March 1980). At the end of the telegram, the sender reminded the addressees of 
the fact that: "General Wickham concurs in this assessmenV' and requested the State Department to pass it 
to Tokyo. " 
70 Ibid. 
71 For the nexus of coercive diplomacy including the use of force and the timing of US presidential 
election, see Auerswald (1999). 
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,, 72 in US reluctance to support "an effort to upset the current equilibrium. Basically, the 
situation in South Korea seemed to be manageable. 
The relaxed assessment of the moves of the Chun group in mid-March was partly 
reinforced by the American belief that the various joint military exercises between the 
US and South Korea would facilitate close monitoring of Chun's behaviour. Soon after 
the 12 December coup and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the eve of Christmas, 
US forces in South Korea had independent military exercises. In January, US forces in 
Okinawa came to South Korea for mountain-area training. In early March, Team Spirit 
80, the biggest ever US-South Korean joint military exercise, lasting 50 days, 
73 
commenced . In addition, National Security Advisor Brzezinski expressed full support 
for the on-going process of political change in South Korea and opposition to the 
military's intervention in the political transition (in an interview with South Korean 
major newspaper, Donga Ilbo): 
The essential role for the Army, Navy and Air Force of any country, whether in a state of 
political transition or not, is to defend the country from outside interference. And any 
other activities tend to weaken this primary role, and may cut into civilian support for the 
military establishment. ... the use of the military as an instrument of political change is 
almost always a sign of a situation in which a country is moving away from greater 
political maturity. In Korea, where the problem of defense is so vital, your [South 
Korean] military establishment needs to focus clearly on its primary role. 74 
The DSC censored this remark from the issue of Donga Ilbo on 2 April 1980, and the 
US National Security Advisor was extremely angry: the US embassy distributed the 
72 80 Seoul 03039 (12 March 1980). 
73 "Team Spirit '80" spanned 50 days from I March to 20 April with three stages. The diary of each step 
of the exercise was as follows: The strategic developmental step (1-20 March)-US forces in Hawaii and 
abroad reached the Korean peninsula; the field exercise step (21 March-7 April); the return step (8-20 
April)-expedited US forces returned to its normal loci. "Korea Report, " The Hayashi Collections. 
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original script of the interview to the mass media, although it was still not reported in 
the Korean newspapers. 75 From April, it became obvious that expressions of American 
displeasure had little effect on General Chun's political ambitions, and he proceeded, 
despite legal prohibitions, to assume the post of Director of the KCIA. In response, 
Gleysteen expressed surprise, and in early May he admitted indirectly that his March 
assessment had not been correct. 76 
When South Korean politics became heated from mid April, the Carter administration 
was deeply involved in the Iran hostage crisis. Its diplomatic attempts to resolve the 
crisis had not achieved any breakthrough during the previous five months. The situation 
therefore continued to challenge the resolve of US foreign policy and threatened to 
dominate the forthcoming presidential election. On 7 April, President Carter announced 
retaliatory measures against Iran. 77 In an attempt to maximise the effectiveness of the 
sanctions, it called upon its allies to lend their strong support. 78 On 10,16 and 17 April, 
Carter hinted that military forces might have to be used to resolve the cri SiS. 79 On 11 
April, Brzezinski devoted most of a speech to rebuking America's allies. Warren 
Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, revealed that the administration had delivered 
two specific deadlines to the allies: 12 April 1980 for the start of joint economic 
sanctions; and 17 May for allies' diplomatic severance with Iran. 80 Inevitably, these 
trends had a negative effect on the US "nudging" policy towards South Korea. 
74 Brzezinski (1980): pp. 6-7. 
75 Asian Wall Street Journal (10 April 1980). 
76 80 Seoul 05787 (7 May 1980). 
77 NIT (8 April 1980): Keesing's: p. 30528 
78 NYT(8 April 1980). 
79 NYT (16 and 18 April 1980). 
so NYT (13 April 1980). 
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6 US Intervention II 
Preparing for US-South Korean foreign ministerial talks in Washington in April, the US 
embassy emphasised three policy issues: the American interest in South Korean 
political liberalisation; the empowen-nent of Ambassador Gleysteen and General 
Wickham to deal with the Chun group; and details of South Korean support for 
collective sanctions against Iran .81 At the talks on 14 April, Secretary Vance stated to 
his Korean counterpart, Park Dong-jin, that the Iran hostage incident was the most 
frustrating problem he had ever faced. Thus the US called for allied support in 
economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. Without conceding the difficulty 
caused by South Korean dependence on Iran for oil, Vance nevertheless stressed that 
South Korea should support the US by cutting imports and severing diplomatic relations 
with Iran by mid-May. 82 In this meeting, no empowerment to Gleysteen and Wickham 
was successfully realised by Vance. In fact, it was Foreign Minister Park himself who 
"pointedly" urged Gleysteen to normalise relationships with the ROK military and in 
particular to establish ties with Chun Doo Hwan, just three days before Chun assumed 
the post of KCIA Director. 83 
On 15 April 1980, having consolidated his standing within both the military and 
governmental spheres, General Chun Doo-hwan assumed the office of Chief of the 
KCIA concurrently with that of Commander of the DSC. This unprecedented joint 
appointment gave him complete control over national security, 84 which suddenly 
81 80 Seoul 04357 (14 April 1980) 
82 80 State 100417 (16 April 1980). 
83 After listening to the Foreign Minister and others, Gleysteen emphasised that the Korean side needed to 
make more efforts: "With General Wickham's concurrence, I had spoken to all senior U. S. military 
commanders and urged them to develop and sustain good relations with their ROK counterparts. Having 
done on our side, I asked that the ROKG do the same thing on its side: specifically a high level ROKG 
official. " (80 Seoul 04565 (11 April 1980)) 
84 Keesing's: p. 30605. 
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heightening fears among students and politicians of the unwillingness of the military to 
go along with the people's demands. 
Two days later, Kim Dae-jung took his campaign for accelerated democratic reform to 
the people with a rally attended by tens of thousands of students and workers at a Seoul 
university. Although the meeting was technically in breach of the martial law ban on 
public meetings, no action was taken and Kim's supporters followed up with a similar 
campus rally two days later. Around the same time, the peaceful demonstrations taking 
place in many universities began to focus on political rather than purely campus issues, 
with Chun himself already a key target for protest. 85 
On 23 April the Carter administration suspended indefinitely the SCM as an expression 
of US disapproval of Chun's directorship of the KCIA. At the same time, the US 
Ambassador attempted to meet Chun promptly "to state [the US] position directly" in 
exchange for "our willingness to deal with him as a major leader. ', 86 However, Chun 
delayed his reply until his completion of a detailed scheme to abrogate civilian politics 
by 9 May. 
From late April, the new military group became more vocal and extreme in advancing 
its ambitions. In particular, Chun replied to American dissatisfaction at a press 
conference on 29 April: 
85 Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd (1981): pp. 175-6. 86 80 Seoul 04927 (18 April 1980). 
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There is no reason for our staunch ally, America, to interfere in Korea's domestic affairs 
and destroy trustworthy relations by expressing dissatisfaction over our presidential right 
to give a new assignment to any person concerned. 87 
Chun insisted that the US must respect the bottom line not to interfere the domsetic 
politics in South Korea. Gleysteen described the press conference as "a very political 
act" and stated that the US had been "barbed. "88 The next day, Chun summoned a 
meeting of the senior commanders of the entire armed forces. The resulting statement 
expressed the military's intolerance of the use of university campuses by politicians for 
political purposes (this was a warning to Kim Dae-jung), and labour disputes that 
violated stability and order and would ultimately send misleading signals to North 
Korea. 89 
At the same time, going over the heads of US local representatives, Chun sought to 
open direct channels with high-officials of the defence establishment in Washington, 
while the American ambassador sought a meeting with Chun in person. The Chun group 
attempted to exploit internal dissent within the Carter administration. It wanted to 
identify any significant disagreements in the Carter Administration related to political 
development in South Korea and the postponement of the SCM. 90 The response from 
the administration was not warm. Actually, on 29 April, Holbrooke informed Korean 
Ambassador Kim of the continuity of US foreign policy. He also expressed his 
87 80 Seoul 047205 (29 April 1979). 
88 80 Seoul 05433 (30 April 1980). 
69 Ibid. 
90 In fact, another article of NYT, 20 April, entitled "Boiling Point: Military Risk Divides the Iran Experts 
In Washington, " unveiled the differences about the military actions between agencies of the 
administration. 
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displeasure at the difficulties Ambassador Gleysteen had encountered in trying to see 
General Chun. 91 
However, two days later, the Assistant Secretary infonned Gleysteen that Chun's two 
messengers, retired Generals Johnny Sohn and Choi Kyung-nok, reported to Chun that 
the two US local representatives in Seoul were not likely to represent "real" US policy. 
92 There were unsettled loopholes in the coherence of US foreign policy after the 
abortive rescue mission. Even though the Chun group did not succeed in attaining a 
definite promise of support from the Carter administration, it was a situation that the 
Chun group was determined to exploit. 
6.2.4 The US Approval of the Contingency Platt for the Combat Force Movements 
From late April, it appeared that the willingness to compromise among the mutually 
distrustful protagonists-those seeking rapid dismantling of the Yushin System and 
those seeking restoring and counselling caution-was exhausted. 93 When the political 
confrontation reached a critical phase in early May, the US could not manage it 
effectively. Despite various expressions of displeasure with General Chun, including 
Brzezinski's interview, the postponement of the SCM, the rejection of the request to 
South Korean General Lew to call on the Secretaries of State and Defence in late April, 
the Carter administration could not one-sidedly defend the dissident forces led by Kim 
Dae-jung. Before the meeting with Chun, Gleysteen telegramed to Holbrooke about 
this impression to the situation as follows: 
91 80 State 113399 (30 April 1980). 
92 80 State 117573 Q May 1980). 
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Like you, I am more anxious than I was before Chun's latest move and worrisome 
student/labour unrest. Yet, while more pessimistic than I was six weeks ago, I am no 
more pessimistic than I was on October 27. Nor would I be inclined to describe the 
present situation as the beginning of a "disintegrative proceSS.,, 94 
Once again, the "nudging" policy hung in the balance. The urgent problem in early May 
was how to achieve the degree of political relaxation necessary to ensure political 
stability. To that end, the US urged every major political element to calm down and 
called for the Choi government to resolve the crisis. 
More specifically, with regard to the military, the US wanted a deal: the approval of a 
contingency plan for the South Korean military and the conveyance of a US message 
expressing 64 authoritatively and without distortion" its opposition to the military take- 
over. On 7 May, two days before the Gleysteen-Chun meeting, the US embassy and the 
UNC approved the MLC's request for the movement of special troops on 8 and 10 May 
to Seoul and other major cities "for temporary duty. ', 95 There was no doubt that both the 
UNC and the US embassy in Seoul were aware that the "temporary duty" of the Special 
Forces might be expanded to "extinguish student rallies. " In fact, these special forces 
were put into a military exercise called "Olympic Game" in central Seoul and other 
cities on 10-13 May 1980. 
After his long-awaited meeting with Chun on 9 May, Gleysteen evaluated it as 
successful: 
I got my points across without souring the atmosphere or engaging in any argument with 
him ... I feel the authorities [both of Korean military and government] have adopted a 
93 Far Eastern Econon-ft Review Ltd (198 1): p. 176. 
94 80 Seoul 05787 (7 May 1980) 
95 80 Seoul 05781 (7 May 1980). 
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sensible, prudent approach to the student problem. They have given it a good deal of 
thought and they are very aware of the danger of over reaction and use of military force. 
96 
In fact, however, his explanation of the US position was managed to deliver with his 
sympathetic attitude with Chun's elucidation of the security situation. 97 
After the meeting with Chun, the US Ambassador met the chief of the Presidential aides 
in the belief that: "President Choi is also very at fault for adding to the general sense of 
suspicion rather than setting forth clearly what needs to be done. " It was now time for 
President Choi to stop the situation from turning into a rebellious mood. Gleysteen 
emphasised the importance of not using excessive force against the students and "the 
man in the street" (implying Kim Dae-jung). Instead, Gleysteen recommended that 
President Choi should issue a statement on political stability, setting out the various 
elements of the proposed political schedule "with greater clarity" and warning that this 
schedule could not be maintained if students or others took the law into their own 
hands. 98 However, President Choi did not make public any significant proposal 
reflecting American recommendations, but he departed for the Middle East on 10 May, 
the day when fully-fledged student demonstrations were set in motion. In addition, the 
US embassy unsuccessfully attempted to persuade other political leaders, including Kim 
Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil, to be moderate towards the government 
and the military. 
96 80Seoul 05907 (9 May 1980). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
181 
Part 111 6 US Intervention 11 
6.3 THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, THE 17 MAY MILITARY COUP AND 
THE KWANGJU MASSACRE 
When political leaders and students forced the Choi government to sack General Chun 
and to lift martial law, the Chun group utilised the North Korean card in order to justify 
its direct intervention in politics by the expansion of the jurisdiction of martial law to 
the entire nation. It became known as the 17 May Coup. The Carter administration 
opposed it strongly until the demonstration in Kwangju, the political hometown of Kim 
Dae-jung, developed to the level of civil war, thus making it clear that US forces would 
have to protect South Korean territory and support the Chun group in extinguish the 
upnsing. 
6.3.1 The North Korean Card and the 17 May Coup WE tat 
From early May 1980, the Chun group fon-nulated a strategy for Chun's assumption of 
absolute power by assigning special combat forces to appropriate locations with the 
approval of the US. In order to launch immediate actions, however, the cause of social 
unrest alone was considered insufficient. The perception of a tangible threat from North 
Korea had to be manipulated to justify direct military intervention in civilian politics. 
Therefore, on 12 May, Chun suddenly played his "North Korean card" by proclaiming, 
in an emergency cabinet meeting from which President Choi was absent, that a North 
Korean invasion was imminent. On that day, he completed plans for another coup: the 
expansion of martial law to encompass the entire country; the dissolution of the 
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National Assembly, to include the arrest of targeted politicians and the prohibitions on 
all political activity; and the establishment of a military junta. 99 
After completing his plans for the coup, Chun visited US General John Wickham on 13 
May to reiterate his position that Pyongyang was the "hidden hand" behind the student 
demonstrations, and to inform him that a North Korean attack on the South was 
imminent. Wickham reported to the Pentagon that Chun's stress on danger from the 
North appeared to be a pretext for a move into the Blue House. 100 It was therefore 
urgent that the State Department should issue a statement refuting the idea of an 
imminent North Korean invasion. US embassy officials in Seoul also stated that "we 
have no confirming evidence of a North Korean military threat". 101 The North Korean 
card meant that the Chun group was neither prudent nor sensible in its approach to the 
student problem. Gleysteen's belief that the Chun group was "very aware of the danger 
of over reaction and use of military force"-was groundless. 
In a broadcast on the evening of 15 May, Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwack, in the 
absence of President Choi, appealed for order and promised that the government would 
"meet the people's aspirations by shortening to the maximum extent what possibly can 
be shortened in the political schedule. " 102 The student leaders called off the 
demonstrations until 22 May, when the National Assembly planned to convene to lift 
martial law. The Chun group had no time to wait. Hurriedly returning to Seoul late at 
night on 16 May from his visits to the Middle East, President Choi was coerced by 
Chun and his cohorts to take stronger measures without reporting the aforementioned 
99 Seoul Jibang Goinchalchong (June 1996): p. 683. 
100 Oberdorfer (1996): p. 125. 101 Keesing's: p. 30606. 
102 Ibid. 
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meeting of senior military commanders scheduled for the following morning of 17 
May. ' 03 
In the morning on 17 May, Gleysteen, armed with th'c knowledge that the senior 
military commanders were meeting to discuss the martial law issue, again met President 
Choi's chief of aides. On this occasion, he suggested more specifically that the 
government should announce a 15 June target date for the lifting of martial law. ' 04 At 
the end of the meeting, he asked the chief aide to convey a stem warning against the 
military's interference in the process of political development, including the arrest of 
Kim Dae-jung. 105 Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Chun threatened the President by 
saying that the entire military command had resolved that the President should take 
emergency measures to counter the present national crisis: the expansion of martial law, 
the dissolution of the National Assembly, the closure of universities and colleges, and 
so on. 106 At midnight, the government spokesman announced that martial law was being 
extended to cover the entire nation as of 24: 00 hours, 17 May 1980 because of. "current 
North Korean movements and the likelihood of the occurrence of incidents of unrest 
across the ROK. " 107 President Choi, in a printed statement handed to reporters in the 
afternoon of the following day, also cited "unspecified North Korean and Soviet 
military moves and international tensions in such places as Afghanistan and Iran" as 
justifications for stricter martial law. 108 
103 The Agency of the Seoul Local Prosecution, The Record of Interrogation of Chun Doo Hwan, 10 
December, 1995, cited in Shindonga (June 1996): p. 643. 104 80 Seoid 06262 (17 May 1980). 
105 Ibid. 
106 The Record of Interrogation of Chun Doo Hivan, Seoul Local Prosecution Off ice, 10 December 1995, 
cited in Shindonga (June 1996): p. 644. 
107 80 Seoul 06273 (18 May 1980). 
108 NYT (20 May 1980). 
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Later that same night, Gleysteen found himself reporting the commencement of the 17 
May Military Coup: "An all but formal military take-over ... in process. "109 He drafted 
a diplomatic note in strong tones to be read in front of President Choi and the martial 
law commander. 110 The State Department, on 19 May, stated that it was "deeply 
disturbed by the extension of martial law throughout the Republic of Korea, the closing 
of universities, and the arrests of a number of political and student leaders. "111 The 
Department instructed Gleysteen to apply pressure on the military to return to normalcy, 
indicating a quasi-deadline: "Our judgement will be significantly influenced by whether 
the three Kims are freed from detention and whether the National Assembly is permitted 
to convene as scheduled on May 20. "' 12 Thus, at the very start of the coup, the US acted 
as if it could reverse the military take-over. 
6.3.2 The Clashes in Kwangju and US Actions: the Policy Review Committee at the 
White House, 22 May 1980 
On 19 May, the US embassy, observing the people's reactions in Seoul, concluded that 
the opposition had lost the necessary momentum to organise an anti-coup campaign. 113 
However, the situation in Kwangju, Kim Dae-jung's political homeland, was quite 
different: the anti-Chun struggle had begun in earnest. In the total absence of 
demonstrations elsewhere, one report from Kwangju to the US embassy in Seoul 
symbolically described the scale of atrocities: "Troops are being more ruthless than 
North Koreans ever were. " 114 
109 80 Seoul 06264 (17 May 1980). 
110 Ibid. 
ill NYT (20 May 1980). 
112 80 State 130472 (18 May 1980). 
113 80 Seoul 06336 (19 May 1980). 
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Having observed that the bloody resistance in Kwangju had pushed the special combat 
troops out of the city, the US embassy appraised that "the December 12 generals 
obviously feel threatened by the whole affair. " 115 Confronted with the determined 
resistance in Kwangju, and pressured by the warnings from the US, the Korean military 
authorities instituted a cease-fire on 21 May. 116 The pendulum of power was in the 
balance. Anticipating the emergence of anti-Americanism in Korea because of the US 
approval of the military movement in early May, 117 Gleysteen urged the Carter 
administration to take decisive action to moderate the situation just a few hours before a 
crucial decision-making meeting on the Korean situation in Washington (on 22 May): 
The situation remains extremely serious; more and more people want to know the U. S. 
attitude; the Korean government wants us to make a statement; and most important, 
General Wickham and I have been assured by the military hierarchy that they will 
encourage distribution of the uncensored text and will not undercut its by takingforcefill 
action in Kivangizi for at least nvo days unless the situation goes conipletely sour. 
(emphasis added)"s 
Nonetheless, the decisions of the Policy Review Committee (PRC) were quite different 
from those expected by the American local representatives. Its meeting was held at 3: 00 
p. m. on 22 May in the White House Situation Room. Most senior decision-makers, 
except for President Carter, attended. ' 19 The overriding concern of the meeting was to 
114 Ibid. 
115 80 Scout 06463 (21 May 1980). 
116 Ibid. 
11" Ibid. 
118 80 Seoul 06525 (22 May 1980). 
119 Vice President W. Mondale, Secretary of State E. Muskie, Secretary of Defense H. Brown, and JCS 
Chairman Gen. Jones, CIA Director Admiral. S. Turner, and other working level officials took part in the 
committee meeting. Representing the White House, Z. Brzezinski and David Aaron attended the meeting, 
separately from NSC's Asia Bureau Chief, D. Gregg. 
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prevent "a pattern of violence in Kwangju" from spreading to other cities, an eventuality 
that could endanger the "counter-North Korean mission of the joint command" 120 : 
The first priority is the restoration of order in Kwangju by the Korean authorities with the 
minimum use of force necessary without laying the seeds for wide disorders later. Once 
order is restored, it was agreed that we must press the Korean Government, and the 
military in particular, to allow a greater degree of political freedom to evolve. 121 
The dominant figure in the PRC, Brzezinski, who had previously claimed that the 
Korean military's primary role should be to defend the territory, summarised his own 
view: "In the short term, support, in the longer term, pressure for political evolution. " 122 
On the qu. estion of what should follow short-term support, what the Committee 
concluded: 
What we do depends in large part on how the situation in Kwangju is resolved. If the 
situation there is handled well, with little lose of life, we can move quietly to apply 
pressure for more political evolution. If the situation in Kwangju involves large loss of 
life, the PRC will meet again to discuss measures to be taken. 123 
This conclusion was the core theme of US alliance management when negotiations 
between the Choi government and the leaders of the Kwangju Dernocratisation 
movement were underway. 124 US aircraft carrier, Midway, having anchored in 
Yokosuka Naval base of Japan, departed towards unspecified location. Reportedly, the 
aircraft carrier headed for the East Sea (Sea of Japan), with another aircraft carrier, 
Corral Sea, stationed in Philippine. 125 
120 Ibid.: p 2; 80 Seoul 06525 (22 May 1980). 
121 National Security Council (22 May 1980): p. 1. 
122 Ibid.: p. 1. 
123 Ibid.: p. 2. 
124 Akahata (24 May 1980). 
125 Ak-ahata (25 May 1980); Sankei (25 May 1980). 
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Before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Asian and Pacific Affairs 
of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on 6 February 1980, 
Holbrooke stated that: "Over the past 3 years in East Asia, we have made significant 
progress on the human rights front ... without damaging or subordinating our other 
objectives. 99126 This rhetoric implied that the status of the human rights policy among 
broad foreign policy goals could or should be adjusted if it collided with other foreign 
policy goals. This was what happened in May 1980. The security concern had been the 
most crucial factor among various US interests in its relationship with Korea. With the 
rapidly changing international security environment and challenges from the Soviet 
Union and Iran, security relations with South Korea overrode other interests. The Chun 
group had exploited the national security issue for its own interests. 
When General Chun played the North Korea card, Wickham was certain that Chun had 
his sights set on the Blue House under the pretext of maintaining national security. As a 
matter of fact, key units of the Korean army, the most powerful special combat forces, 
were moved from the front line near the DMZ to the south Seoul metropolitan area, and 
some forces were moved out of the Combined Field Area. Leaving the front line empty 
was an unimaginable action. However, the US did not push Chun or the MLC to return 
the moved troops to the demarcation line, but Wickham agreed to "release four South 
Korean regiments in the command for use in "crowd control and security work, " even 
though US Defense Department spokesman confirmed that there was "no evidence that 
North Korea may try to take advantage of the situation. " 127 Between the 17 May Coup 
and the suppression of the Kwangju clemocratisation movement, the US repeatedly 
reconfirmed its security commitment to South Korea: "As we affirmed on October 26, 
126 USDSB (May 1980): p. 30. 127 Keesing's: p. 30607. 
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1979, the US government will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to 
any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of Korea. " 128 
On 23 May, Gleysteen, at a luncheon meeting with Korean National Assemblymen, 
changed his position, and took a very direct line: "we were convinced that the 
immediate task at hand was the restoration of public order. " 129 Calling on new Prime 
Minister Park Choong-hoon, on the same day, he reiterated that "We are doing all we 
can to contribute to the restoration of order. " 130 Then the US embassy began to evacuate 
American citizens from Kwangju. 131 Supported by the Carter administration, the new 
military power group retook the city on 27 May 1980. The "nudging" policy was now 
doomed. 
6.4 THE LONG-TERM PRESSURE ON THE NEW MILITARY AUTHORITIES 
IN JUNE 1980 
After the suppression of the Kwangju democratisation movement, the question of 
longer-term pressure" was set in motion. The US had no intention of attempting to 
nullify the military take-over. Nevertheless it was imperative to maintain an appropriate 
distance from the new military regime. 132 The longer-term pressure would not result in 
desired outcomes. The new military regime was resolved to wage a war of nerves 
against American pressure. In addition, the Presidential election campaign in the US 
tilted the Korean situation in favour of the new military regime. The popularity of 
President Carter, the Democratic candidate, had fallen sharply since the failure of the 
128 80 State 130472](28 May 1980). 
129 80 Seoisl 06607 (23 May 1980). 
130 80 Seoul 06610 (23 May 1980). 
13 180 State 135741 (23 May 1980). 
132 80 Seoul 06869 (29 May 1980). 
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Iran rescue mission in late April, and the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, 
pledged to restore the strategic value of South Korea. All of these factors substantially 
weakened the effects of the longer-term pressures from the Carter administration. 
6.4.1 The Initial Measuresfor Longer-tenn Pressure 
As soon as Kwangju was re-taken, US longer-term pressure was imposed. On 30 May, 
the officials in the US Embassy in Seoul visited almost every newspaper companies in 
person-which was unprecedented-in order to make it clear that the US was not 
informed the 12 December Coup in 1979, the appointment of Chun's KCIA 
directorship, and the 17 May coup in advance: in shorth, the Carter administration had, 
and would not support the military take-over. ' 33 
President Carter confirmed the longer-term pressure policy by saying in an interview 
with the CNN on 31 1980 that "Democratization has been given a setback. " 134 As far as 
the question of recognition for the new military junta was concerned, it was difficult for 
the Carter administration to move in this direction because the Chun regime did not 
heed the pressures emanating from Washington. When Holbrooke asked Gleysteen for 
his opinion about his planned visit to South Korea, the Ambassador opposed it because 
it might be seen as a sign of "recognition. " 135 Moreover, The New York- Times reported 
on 13 June that "US Ambassador William Gleysteen had told General Chun and other 
leaders that the US believed the direction they were taking was fundamentally wrong 
and would cause political instability and weaken the country internally and 
133 Sankei (31 May 1980). 
134 80 State 152850 (10 June 1980). 
135 80 Seoul 07558 (12June 1980); 80 Seoid 07559(12 June 1980); 80 Seoid 07707 (16 June 1980). 
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externally. " 136 The report cited two quasi -sanctions: the control of visits by high- 
ranking Americans to South Korea and the suspension of economic assistance 
programmes. On 21 June 1980, at a time when the new military regime desperately 
needed US recognition, an instruction co-ordinated by the State Department, the 
Defense Department and the NSC, arrived at the US embassy in Seoul: "we seek to 
avoid over-identification with the present Korean regime. "137 
Apart from the impact of the Iran hostage incident upon US efforts to deal with the 
South Korean situation, it is also necessary to consider the general issue of alliance 
management in an hierarchical alliance system to explain the failure of US "nudging" 
policy. In a bipolar system, Snyder and Diesing argue, there is an essential "tension" in 
the asymmetry of power dependence between the two superpowers. J. M. Roberts 
develops Snyder and Diesing's argument as follows: "The allies can be controlled, but 
also ... they can be adventurous if they want... The more the superpower needs a 
particular state, the less the super power's control over that state. " 138 This was exactly 
the case in the relationship between the Carter administration and the Chun regime. The 
Carter administration resented Chun and his group's "abusing [the firrn security] 
commitment in ways that will undermine Korea's long-terrn stability. "139 On 25 June, 
however, acting Assistant Secretary Mike An-nacost testified before the House of 
Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that: 
The nature of the local military balance and the persistent risk of renewed conflict in 
Korea has required a continued US troop presence, a build-up of ROK n-fflitary 
capabilities, and the development of an integrated command structure. Failure to maintain 
136 80 State 156703 (13 June 1980). 
137 80 State 163085 (21 June 1980). The possibility of the reconsideration of the suspension of the troop 
withdrawal was also raised as a card when "a more broadly based support is not visible. 
138 Cited in J. Roberts (1988): pp. 29-30. 
131) 80 State 175146 (2 July 1980). 
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these elements of deterrence could heighten the dangers of hostilities involving not only 
the two Koreas but also the PRC, the USSR, Japan and the US, with unpredictable but 
profound consequences for the East Asia power balance. 140 
In that sense, the possibility that the US, as a superpower, might acquiesce in any 
military actions taking place in South Korea always existed as long as the newly 
emerging military power in practice guaranteed American strategic interest in South 
Korea. Otherwise, mature democratic social forces in the junior member state might 
have to be relied upon to establish a broadly based civilian government. The Carter 
administration's nurturing of the new military regime towards political development 
also failed mainly because of Chun's refusal to make any concessions in regard to the 
Kim Dae-jung issue. 
6.4.2 The War of Nerves between the Carter Administration and the Chun Regime 
The relations between the Carter administration and the new military regime remained 
poor, 
141 
and the administration never publicly recognised the Chun regime. 
142 The 
suspension of the SCM remained intact. At the same time, it should be stressed that the 
Carter administration did not openly exert any pressure to commute Kim Dae-jung's 
death sentence. 
The new military leadership desired recognition from the US, but at the same time was 
not frightened to wage a war of nerves with the Carter administration. At the same time, 
it started to approach the Republican Party, whose Presidential Candidate, Ronald 
Reagan, recognised the strategic value of South Korea as a vital US national interest,. 
During the last days of the Carter Administration, the new military authorities refused to 
140 80 State 167847 (25 June 1980). 
141 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung. 
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receive the protest letters of US congressmen, sent soldiers armed with guns and 
bayonets to the US information centres in Kwangju, Taegu and Pusan, and organised a 
large number of South Korean soldiers to write letters to the US embassy protesting 
against US interference in South Korea's internal affairs. 143 Under these circumstances, 
the Carter administration was not able to apply pressures on the Chun regime explicitly, 
and instead asked Japan to help prevent the Chun regime from executing Kim Dae-jung, 
144 in the belief that people in Kwangju and other adjacent cities would not take to the 
streets, even if the execution were carried out. 145 Wickham implied the inevitability of 
recognition by saying that "If General Chun is going to be Korea's new leader, as 
expected, the US will support him. " 146 The State Department found it necessary to 
respond on 13 August that "Wickham's comment did not reflect U. S. policy. " 147 
One of most important things to make here is the Carter administration's dealing with 
the regime transition issue with Japan. As soon as the US Embassy in Seoul reported to 
Washington that General Chun would assume presidency after pushing out President 
Choi from the office, 148 Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher telegramed to 
the US Embassy in Japan as follows: 
There have been a number of indications during the past several weeks that Gen. Chun 
Doo Hwan is moving swiftly to assume the presidency of the ROK... Yesterday we 
received information indicating that President Choi plans to resign on August 16 and that 
the National Conference for Unification (the presidential electoral college) was being 
assembled in Seoul on August 18 to elect a new president, presumably Chun Doo Hwan. 
1,12 80 State 215404 (15 August); 80 Seoid 10504 (13 August 1980). 
143 80 State 168725 (26 June 1980); 80 Seoid 082303 (28 June 1980); 80 State 173290 (1 July 1980); 
80SeouI 08506 (2 July1980); 80 Scoid 08080 (24 June 1980): 80 Seoul 09527 (25 July 1980); 80 Seoul 
09553 (25 July 1980); 80 Seoid 09547 (25 July 1980); 80 State 196255 (25 July 1980). 
"" 80 State 163106 (21 June 1980); 80 Seoid 08027 (23 June 1980); 80State 215254 (14 August 1980). 
"5 80 Scoul 09829 (31 July 1980). 
146 80 Scout 10210 (8 August 1980). 
147 Keesing's: p. 30607. 
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We have informed Japanese Embassy here [Washington] of the foregoing and will 
provide you [Mike Mansfield] with further information as available. We are actively 
reviewing the appropriate U. S. response to these imminent developments. For Seoul, 
please info CINCPAC and CINCPAC POLAD on messages reporting and analyzing 
political development. 149 
This telegram proves the validity of the systemic approach regarding the US, Japan and 
South Korea as one of relatively autonomous and separate sub-systems of the American 
system set out in Chapter 2. The channels between the US and Japan were working, 
especially after the Carter's participation in the Japanese state funeral for the late Prime 
Minister Ohira in early July 1980, in Washington and Tokyo. At the same time, with 
respect to the policy co-ordination between the Department of Defense and the 
Department of State was seemingly well maintained as assumed in the last paragraph of 
the telegram. 
The result of the "actively reviewing the appropriate U. S. response to the imminent 
developments" was Carter's presidential letter to President-elect Chun Doo Hwan in 
late August: 
Recent events in Korea have troubled us greatly ... We regard free political institutions as 
essential to sustaining a sound relationship between our two countries... Mr. Kim's [Kim 
Dae-jung] execution, or even a sentence of death, could have serious repercussions 
Nevertheless, I urge you take the earliest possible action to ensure the stability of the 
government through the development of popularly supported political institutions and 
150 
greater personal freedom for your citizens. 
On 17 September, Kim Dae-jung was sentenced to death. In response, the US 
administration did not give any premature sign of intent to resume the annual Security 
148 80 Seoul 10504 (03: 32 14 August 1980). 
149 80 State 215254 (22: 02 14 August 1980). 
150 80 State 230028 (29 August 1980). 
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Consultative Meeting, which might have symbolised de facto US recognition of the 
incumbent regime in South Korea. Consequently, the relationship between the Chun 
regime and the Carter administration became increasingly aggravated, and the US 
clearly failed to establish the declared objective of "a broadly based civilian 
government. " The visit of US Defence Secretary Brown on 13 December did not change 
the firm attitude of the Chun regime on the Kim Dae-jung issue. 151 
As the quiet diplomacy to save Kim proceeded, in the United Nations there was a North 
Korean diplomatic effort to draft a resolution denouncing the Kwangju massacre and the 
Kim Dae-jung trial. 152 If the Carter administration were to embark on strong and open 
criticism, it could not effectively block the North Korea regime from initiating the 
adoption of a resolution at the UN, which would consequently officially make the new 
military regime in South Korea illegitimate in international society. The Carter 
Administration had to consider the side effect of US public pressure on the Kim Dae- 
jung issue when North Korea attempted to exploit it in the international diplomatic 
arena. This is typical of the kind of alliance management dilemma posed by an 
illegitimate regime in a member state. Put differently, however, because of the North 
Korean exploitation of the Kim trial as a source of anti-South Korean propaganda, the 
issue had to be resolved in order to reduce the damage to alliance relations with South 
Korea. 153 
151 Sunobe (1981): p. 12. 
152 80 State 237970 (16 September 1980) 
153 On the legitimacy in international politics, see Hurd (1999). 
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6.4.3 The Chun Regime and the New Republican Administration of President-elect 
Ronald Reagan 
The 32 nd National Convention of the Republican Party held in Detroit on 14-17 July 
1980 approved the party's policy platform for the forthcoming Presidential and 
Congressional elections, and chose Ronald Reagan as the party's Presidential candidate 
and George Bush as vice-presidential candidate. 154 The Republican Party's policy 
platform-which criticised the Carter administration's "lack of a coherent strategic 
concept to guide foreign policy"-was good news for the new military regime in South 
Korea. For the sake of restoring the American leadership, the Republicans proclaimed 
their slogan "peace through strength. " 155 The platform targeted the Soviet Union as a 
main adversary: "The premier challenge facing the United States, and the entire globe is 
to check the Soviet Union's global ambitions. ' 56 The Republican Party deliberately 
shifted the direct and immediate challenge from the Iranian hostage crisis to the Soviet 
Union. To that end, the platforin. revealed a significant shift of the foreign policy towards the Asia- 
Pacific region: 
A new Republican Administration will restore a strong American role in Asia and the 
Pacific... Japan will continue to be a pillar of American policy in Asia. Republicans 
recognize the unique danger presented to our ally, South Korea. We will ... recognize the 
special problems brought on by subversion and potential aggression from the North. We 
will maintain American ground and air forces in South Korea, and will not reduce our 
presence further. Our treaty commitments to South Korea will be restated in unequivocal 
terms and we will re-establish the process of close consultations between our 
Governments. 157 
154 Keesing's: p. 30477. 155 
1 
156 
Ibid.: p. 30477. See also KeVy Jr and Witkopf (1982). 
Ibid.: p. 30477. 157 Ibid.: p. 30478. 
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As soon as the Republican Presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan came to office, the 
cohesion of the TASS was quickly revived. As soon as Reagan had gained his landslide 
victory over President Carter on 4 November 1980, the Chun regime actively 
approached the President-elect to make a deal-Chun's state visit to Washington as a 
first national guest to Reagan in exchange for the life of Kim Dae-jung. The Chun 
regime sought to enhance its legitimacy by demonstrating the degree of external 
support, escaping from economic crisis, and stabilising its political foothold. Even in the 
last days of the Carter administration, the Chun regime did not give any indication that 
the execution of Kim could be avoided. It wanted a direct deal with President-elect 
Reagan. On 16 December, General Chong Ho-yong flew to Washington via Tokyo 
Narita Airport as a messenger of Chun to hold talks with Richard Allen, National 
Security Advisor-appointee to President-elect Reagan, about a possible agreement. It 
was only a few days after the visit of Brown of the incumbent Carter administration 
which had failed to secure a certain confirmation of Kim's future from the Chun 
regime. 158 When Chong Ho-yong stopped over at Narita Airport, one of the high 
officials of the JDA had talks with Chong for two hours. 159 The Chun regime, utilising 
the fact that the Kim Dae-jung trial was regarded with "serious interest" by the US and 
Japan, strengthened its position. After the state visit to Washington and the restoration 
of relations with Japan, President Chun lifted martial law and proceeded with a 
presidential election in March 1981. 
158 The Washington Post (14 December 1980). 
159 "Korea Report, " The Hayashi Collection. 
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In summary, from early 1979, the Carter administration attempted to build a broadly 
based civilian government for long-term political stability. It succeeded in toppling the 
authoritarian leader, President Park, but this made the political landscape in South 
Korea more volatile. In order to facilitate political stability, the US employed a 
"nudging" policy towards the establishment of "a broadly based civilian government" 
for a political environment that could best serve US national interests. The Carter 
formula was not just a matter of principle, but asserted that US short- and long-term 
goals were complementary. However, if the Carter administration was forced to choose 
only one policy option between South Korea's political development and support for the 
authoritarian regime, not only in the context of the human rights policy but also in terms 
of alliance, it would choose the latter. Therefore, the failure of the Carter administration 
to establish a broadly based civilian government in South Korea can best be illuminated 
by the analytical framework of intra-alliance politics and alliance management. 
The Carter administration certainly wanted liberalisation, but at the same time it 
preferred political stability, so the operational principle was the flexible status quo 
policy behind offensive intervention. The Carter administration did at least succeed in 
witnessing the demise of the authoritarian Park regime. In this context, US power was 
not really limited. South Korea was heavily dependent on the US security commitment, 
and whether a regime in South Korea has good relationship with the US or not directly 
affected its legitimacy. In the case of a projected force and exposed state, in particular 
one sharing a border with a hostile country as a forward base of US global strategy, the 
removal of security commitment means the abandonment of the regime in power. That 
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is the difference between the situation that the South Korean regime faced and that 
confronting Latin American regimes. 160 
The Chun group risked not only the opposition of the US, but also national security by 
removing special troops and other key forces from the demarcation line between the two 
Koreas. In dealing with the emerging military power, the Carter administration faced 
major constraints in the implementation of its "nudging" policy: the impact of the Iran 
hostage incident, the absence of reliable leverage to prevent the Chun group from 
trespassing into politics, the lack of communication channels with the Korean military, 
and the loss of credibility. What made matters worse was the suspicion about the 
correlation between the sudden death of President Park and the influence of the US. On 
top of that, the US self-serving strategic interest in maintaining stability in South Korea 
overrode the declared goal of political development. The rationale of US support for the 
17 May coup was the security imperative. When the balance between change and 
political stability was threatened, the Carter administration chose the latter. The 
repercussion of this shift gravely weakened US influence on the new military regime 
during the remaining part of the Carter presidency. More importantly, the US had to 
confront the emergence of widespread anti-Americanism in South Korea. Thus, the 
Carter administration's alliance management must be regarded as a grave failure in 
terms of America's relationship with both the Korean civilian population and the 
Korean military. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the core imperative of US international interventionism was 
to foster "a world environment in which the American system can survive and 
160 For a critical analysis about the human rights policy towards Latin America, see Kirkpatrick (1992). 
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flourish. " 161 This US post-war strategy limited the range and scope of its offensive 
intervention and flexible status quo policy to change South Korean politics in two 
respects: to promote democracy and to protect the civilian government from a military 
coup.. With respect to the first limit, as Robinson puts, the US has never intended to 
implant socio-economic democracy-which guarantees mass participation-to its junior 
allies in the Third World, but has promoted "polyarchy" or "low-intensity 
democracy. " 162 Concerning the second limit, as Andrew Hurell argues, the US has never 
acted to restore an overthrown government by military intervention in the Cold War era 
or even in the post-Cold War period (except in less strategically valued nations). 163 
These limits are evidently discovered in the US "nudging" policy towards South Korea. 
The Carter administration approved the movements of special forces in early May 1980, 
decided to support the Chun group to quell the uprising in Kwangju in late May, and did 
not exert pressure on the Chun group to return to the barracks. 
In terms of external constraints, Brzezinski recalled that "The attention of the top 
decision makers, myself included, was riveted on the issues [of the Iranian Hostage 
Incident and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan] ... Our decision-making circuits were 
heavily overloaded. " 164 The formal rise to power of General Chun took place during 
April and early May 1980, the very time at which the attention of all participants in the 
US diplomatic and military decision-making structure was fixed on the Iranian issue. 
Because of these extraordinary circumstances, no secretarial visit to South Korea in the 
first half of 1980 was made and the contemporaneous US-Korea policy was 
161 FRUS, 1950, VoLI. - pp. 252. 
162 Polyarchy refers to "a system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision- 
making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites. " Robert Dahl 
used the term first. (Robinson, 1996): p. 49. 
163 Hurell (1999): p. 284. 
164 Andrew (1995): p: 43 8. 
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implemented mainly at the assistant secretarial level in the home country and at the 
ambassadorial level in the local state. 
After the aborted Iranian hostage-rescue mission on 24 April, US foreign policy 
underwent a shift of principle. On 9 May 1980, Carter made a speech before the World 
Affairs Council in Philadelphia emphasising that foreign policy "must be based 
simultaneously on the primacy of ... human rights and on the preservation of an 
American military strength that is second to none. " 165 Brzezinski praised the speech as 
"the best statement of [a] balanced approach" for "a long-term objective of shaping 
world order" and the "application on the level of practical policy" as a new framework 
for foreign policy. 166 It became obvious that US strategy was now shifting from human 
rights to security. As discussed already, it was Brzezinski who decided to approve the 
suppression of the Kwangju democratisation movement on 22 May 1980, even though 
he apparently opposed the military's political intervention in an interview in early April. 
During this short period, the strategic change of US foreign policy and the persistent 
deadlock of the Iran hostage incident inevitably affected the integration of the Carter 
administration in policy and decision-making. The relationships between the State 
Department and other agencies such as the Defense Department, the NSC and the CIA 
deteriorated, and the State Department began to lose its influence from late 1979, 
effectively being isolated after mid-April 1980. This disintegrative feature extended to 
coordination among US local representatives from different parts of the administration, 
which in turn weakened the authority of US foreign policies and made them 
ineffective. 167 These factors had a negative effect on the implementation of US Korean 
165 Brzezinski (1985): p. 460. 
166 Ibid.: p. 459. 
167 "Fendency for fragmentation or independent action between ministries or agencies necessarily places 
constraints on the central political control of foreign policy" (Barston, 1997): p. 9. 
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policy and resulted in "a series of habitual responses to events occurring in the 
international environment" rather than "a structured reaction to external StirnUli. iA68 All 
these developments in the US between early April and May 1980 contributed to Chun's 
successful and overt assumption of political power. 
Moreover, the hostage incident forced the Carter administration to press "pretty much 
the same" requests: no trading with Iran and the breaking of diplomatic relations by 
recalling the ambassador by 17 May. The administration promised to guarantee the 
supply of American oil to Japan in early May 1980. Without a similar guarantee to 
South Korea, President Choi left for the Middle East at the height of political tension in 
mid-May. Before his departure, the State Department pressed the Korean President to 
prevent the forthcoming turmoil with a balanced but firm political statement. At that 
critical juncture, however, there was no American attempt to call for the reconsideration 
of the Middle East Trip. It placed a higher priority on the mobilisation of a junior ally's 
co-operation in punishing Iran than on the imperatives of political stability by 
encouraging Choi on duty. 
In terms of the levers the US could utilise to manage Korean politics, it is necessary to 
read the last sentence in Gleysteen's cable about the outbreak of the 17 May coup: "I 
regret to say at this point our influence appears disturbingly limited. " 169 The suspension 
of American economic assistance was not in itself sufficient to influence the Korean 
military's actions. The difficulties of employing proper punitive measures had already 
been exposed when the Chun group violated the CFC system in the coup of 12 
December 1979. The Carter administration evaluated the coup as "a serious new 
168 White (1989): pp. 6-7. 
169 80 Scoul 06262 (17 May 1980). 
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element of instability", but nevertheless the US merely gave "stem warnings" and 
expressed its dissatisfaction. The administration paid more attention to the impact on the 
existing US-South Korean Combined Forces Command System than on the direct 
repercussions on the timetable of political development. Probably any disciplinary 
action might encourage a splinter group within the Korean military to try to overthrow 
the Chun group. If this happened, the Carter administration would have to suffer the 
consequences of a devastating power struggle within an ally's military establishment. 
For the military, the only available leverage was the annual security consultative 
meeting (SCM). After receiving the assessment of Korean political stability, on 13 
March Holbrooke reminded Gleysteen of the possibility that the Ambassador could use 
the SCM. 170 In fact, the US suspended the schedule of the SCM as a lever, but this 
move was ineffcctive. Rather, Chun forcefully reminded Washington that it must 
observe the bottom line not to interfere the domestic politics on 30 April. 
In addition to the lack of leverage, the US faced another problem related to the 
weakness of the communication channel with the Korean military. When the new 
military hierarchy refrained from contacting their American counterparts between early 
February and late April, the US had difficulties not only in gathering information about 
the intended and actual moves of the military, but also in conveying US concerns to the 
new military leadership directly and authoritatively. This was partly due to the alleged 
complicity of the US, particularly the embassy, behind the death of President Park. 
General Chun suspected the involvement of Gleysteen in the 26 October assassination. 
170 80 State66840 (13 March 1980). 
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By the same token, Gleysteen came to distrust Chun and eventually considered him 
"almost the definition of unreliability... unscrupulous... ruthless ... a liar. " 
171 
However, it is still very questionable that only the mismanagement of the Carter 
Administration itself was attributed to the failure. In relation to this question, another 
factor-the intervention of Japan-will be discussed in Chapter 7 because undoubtedly 
Japan has played a critical role in facilitating the stability of the East Asian security 
environment. 
171 Gleysteen's successor as U. S. ambassador, Richard Walker, evaluated Chun as "One of the 
shrewdest, most calculating, politically smart people I've known. " (Oberdorfer, 1998): p. 121. 
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CHAPTER7 
THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION IN THE SOUTH KOREAN 
REGIME TRANSITION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to analyse the nature and scope of Japanese intervention in the South 
Korean regime transition during the emergence of a new military regime from late 1979 
to January 1981. In so doing, it seeks to open up a new chapter in underdeveloped area 
of Japanese studies, particularly on the political dimension of the Japanese foreign 
policy. 
The Blue Paper on Diplomacy 1980 refers to the significance of developments in South 
Korea in the introduction to its survey of events in 1979: 
The assassination of President Park, who had ruled South Korea for the last eighteen 
years, took place in the neighbouring country, South Korea. With the advent of this major 
variable factor within South Korean domestic politics, the trends in the political situation 
in the Korean peninsula once again drew attention. ' 
By the same token, from the ruling LDP side, the 37 th LDP annual convention of 23 
January 1980 adopted that: "Japan should further develop the co-operative relations 
,, 2 with South Korea in the new domestic political situation . However, these bald 
statements allow no room in the officially published materials so far any reading of 
1 Gaimusho, Waga Gaik-ono King)'o (Vol. 24,1980): p. 1. 
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Japanese actions in response to the regime transition. Indeed, the period from late 1979 
to mid-1980 has been virtually ignored in research on South Korean-Japanese 
relations-a gap which the present research seeks to fill. 
The primary objectives of Japanese intervention in South Korea were not in themselves 
different from those of the US: the enhanced security of South Korea and the stability of 
the Northeast Asian region. However, Japan's chosen means of achieving these 
objectives -a "selecting" policy 
3_ was quite different from the "nudging" policy of the 
US. Japan intervened in three ways to support the Chun group: (1) through the supply of 
intelligence about hypothetical North Korean invasions of the South in December 1979, 
January 1980 and May 1980; (2) through the processing and exporting of an anti-Kim 
Dae-jung campaign to South Korea in March, April, May and June 1980; (3) by offering 
political side-support to the Chun group in late April and early May 1980; (4) by 
recognising Chun's final takeover in the 17 May coup and further supporting the Chun 
group through a stream of visits of influential politicians, officials and emissaries to 
Seoul. 
This chapter first briefly introduces US-Japan relations in the second term of the Ohira 
incumbency, from November 1979 to March 1980 (Section 7.1). The way in which 
Japan, as the middle member of the alliance, was able to exert a stronger influence than 
the US on the regime transition in a weaker member state (South Korea) is underlined. 
Then, consideration is given to the different and relatively independent role the Ohira 
cabinet played in the emergence of a new military regime in South Korea. In so doing, 
the means and postures of Japanese intervention are extracted (Section 7.2-7.6). Then 
2 jiyU Minshuto, Kekkan Jiyu Minshit (March 1980): p. 273. 
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the various efforts of the Suzuki Cabinet to commute Kim Dae-jung's death sentence 
are examined (Section 7.7). The entire period is analysed in terms of Japan's "defensive 
intervention" strategy within the context of intra-alliance politics. 
7.1 US-JAPAN RELATIONS, NOVEMBER 1979-MARCH 1980: POLITICAL 
DIPLONUCY 
From the late 1970s, Japan was extremely concerned about the decline of US leadership 
and American unwillingness to commit itself to the East Asian theatre at a time when 
the Soviet Union was rapidly increasing its military capability, particularly in the Far 
East. 4 The late 1970s and the early 1980s saw a growing tension between Japan's 
extended global sphere of interest and the limits of Japan's military capability to protect 
it. As a result, the Ohira government sought to expand Japan's role in world politics. 
The optimistic approach to world politics of Ohira's first terrn did not prevail in the 
second term. Even before the Iranian hostage incident in November and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, the strategic and political power 
parities between the US and the Soviet Union were increasingly unpredictable. 
In the Japanese view, had the Iranian Revolution not happened, the Soviets would have 
refrained from invading Afghanistan. 5 In conjunction with the massive buildup of 
conventional forces in the four northern territories (namely, Kunashiri, Etorofu, 
Shikotan and Habomai) close to Hokkaido, these two incidents put the Japanese military 
3 Compared with US "nudging" policy, the study uses Japanese "selecting" policy, the policy which 
Vicked up the most amenable political force and supported it to assume the power. 
With regard to the Soviet threat, Brzezinski told Yamashita on 28 June 1979: "In military terms, East 
Asian security has been exacerbated due to the military build up of the Soviet Union in the Far East. " 
(Nojoe, 1980): p. 15. As far as Japanese anxiety about US leadership, Kosaka's article, "A Proposal for 
Encouraging America"(1980), is representatively recommendable to read. 
5 Yoshitsu (1981): p. 506. 
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and diplomatic establishments on full alert. At the same time, the Carter administration 
sought to use Japan to bring its Western European allies, which were not enthusiastic 
about supporting the US, into line. 6 The Ohira cabinet faithfully echoed this call from 
the US. As a member of the Western camp, Japan fully supported the US in dealing with 
the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
However, the Japanese government was far from satisfied with the Carter 
administration's world leadership role. In particular, it was worried about US resolve to 
maintain an appropriate level of military capability to deter instability in the East Asian 
theatre. Japanese trust in the US announcement of the suspension of its withdrawal 
policy, and its promise to enhance the Seventh Fleet and the tactical US air force 
presence in the Far East (in late July and early August) was seriously undermined when, 
in mid-October 1979, The Washington Post revealed that the US assumed that it would 
be able simultaneously to cope with one major war in the European theatre and one 
local war in the East Asian theatre. The so-called swing strategy revived the Japanese 
conviction that the US intended to depart from Asia. 7 
The Iranian hostage incident and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further reinforced 
this apprehension. On 23 January 1980, at the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo, 
Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, made a speech emphasising "active diplomacy with a 
global perspective. "8 Prime Minister Ohira underlined the contents of active 
diplomacy-"taking responsibility to remove the sources of instability in international 
6 Ibid.: p. 504-7; interview with Hisahiko Okazaki; Informed the news of the abduction of the US 
ambassador in Iran, Obira said himself that: "Something really worrisome has happened. Disorder is 
hardly the word for it. "(Sato, Koyama, and Kumon, 1990): p. 503. 
7 Hisasumi (1979): pp. 4-5. 
8 Asahi Shimbun (24 January 1980). 
208 
Part 111 7 Japanese Intervention II 
society7-in the 91st Diet session on 28 January 1980.9 At that time, a new source of 
insecurity arose. US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown testified in the Congress in 
late January 1980 that the US marine corps, and air and naval forces in Okinawa could 
be deployed as the situations in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean required. 10 A 
couple of days later, the Japanese Prime Minister expressed his willingness to 
collaborate with the US if the redeployment was really necessary. " However, the 
episode caused grave concern to the Ohira cabinet which believed that the USFJ in 
Okinawa might drag Japan into unwanted American war efforts in the Middle East' 2 
when the Soviet Union drastically increased its military presence in the Far East. ' 3 
US strategy has not been operated from the East Asian regional scope, 14 but there was 
no military alternative available for Japan if the redeployment of the USFJ in Okinawa 
were to take place. 15 Therefore, economic and political strategies for securing the 
balance of power in the world and in the Northeast Asian region, had to be developed 
immediately. As a method of achieving a "steady and significant increase" of Japan's 
military capability, the Ohira cabinet promised financial support to the USFJ 
expenditures. 16 Ohira announced on 18 April 1980 that Japan had committed $125 
million aid to Pakistan and had offered $100 million in assistance to Turkey. 17 He did 
9 Dai9lkai Shugiin Hon-Kaigi Dai3go (28 January 1980): p. 14. 
Asahi Shimbun (29 January 1980). 
Asahi Shimbun (31 January 1980). 
12 Dai9lkai Sangiin Yosan-ffnkai Dail4go (24 March 1980): pp. 8-11; Dai9lkai Sangiin Gainni-iinkai 
Dail0go (18 April 1980): p. 8. 
13 Dai9lkai Sangiin Yosan-iinka Dail5go (25 March 1980): p. 25. 
14 Akahata (6 March 1980); Sekai Seiji (25 June 1980): p. 30. 
15 Dai9lkai Shugiin Hong-Kaigi DaNgo (29 January 1980): p. 15-6: Dai9lkai Shugiin Naik-aku-iink-ai 
Dai5go (25 March 1980): p. 16; Dai6go (26 March 1980): pp. 6-7. 
16 Dai9lkai Sangiin Yosan-ffnkai Dail4go (24 March 1980): p. 8. 
17 The Political-strategic dimension that appeared in Asian and Middle Eastern aid gained momentum 
throughout the 1980s (DaiVkai Shugiin Shokou-iink-ai Dai8go (10 April 1979): pp. 2-3,14,24-26; 
Dafto(l I April 1979): pp. 26-30. In 1979, the Ohira cabinet instituted ODA for "countries bordering 
conflict, " a term used to describe Japanese aid to three "front-line" states important to Western allies: 
Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey (Yasutomo, 1995: p. 9). South Korea, as another 'Tront-lineý' state in the 
Far East, was an object of the political and strategic aid as will be discussed in the later part of the 
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not conceal the obvious strategic and political purpose of these programmes, namely to 
support insecure regimes in vulnerable nations bordering on Iran and Afghanistan: "Our 
basic approach to these trials must be premised upon preserving the fundamental values 
of freedom, democracy and the open economic system. " 18 Coupled with the measures, 
Y57 billion assistance programme to Thailand were seen as the first examples of Japan's 
cc strategic assistance" approach. 19 In fact, Okita told the Diet that: "Japan would never 
intervene in military terms because of the Peace Constitution and the Defensive Defence 
Policy. However, Japan should play a role in defending the free society with economic 
assistanCe.,, 20 Looking at the Korean peninsula, the vacuum left by the demise of the 
Park regime in South Korea was so big that it could seriously threaten the security of 
Japan. The Japanese intervention in South Korean politics represented a shift from 
economic diplomacy to political diplomacy. 21 
7.2 THE INITIAL ACTIONS OF THE OHIRA CABINET IN RESPONSE TO 
THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT PARK 
The Japanese alliance management put continuity and stability as the highest priorities, 
while the US oscillated from change and democratisation to stability and security. It is 
well proved by the initial reactions of the Japanese government. 
chapter. See also DaiVkai Shugiin Shokou-iinkai Gaikiroku Dai 9go (I I April 1979): p. 26. 
18 NYT (18 April 1980). According to "Report to Communist Party Politburo on Afghanistan, " dated on 
27 
January 1980, the Soviet Union viewed responses from the US, the PRC, and Japan as "a convenient 
pretext for a further rapprochement on anti-Soviet basis, to plan long-term measures to complicate 
relations between Washington and Beijing in the context of the development of relations within the 
bounds of the so-called triple alliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan" (Westad, 1997): p. 324. 
19 Sato, Koyama, Kumon (1990): p. 532; Yasutomo (1995). 
20 Dai9lkai Shugiin Gaintu-iink-ai Dail8go (25 Apri 1 1980): p. 19. 
21 Ji yu Minshuto (1988): p. 855. 
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7.2.1 Japan's Alliance Management of South Korean Politics: Continuity and 
Stability 
From the Japanese perspective, as discussed in Chapter 5, the priorities of the Park 
regime should have been to reinforce the country's economic position and emphasise 
military preparedness against a North Korean invasion as long as the peninsula 
remained divided into two adversarial camps. A strong state was essential. Even if this 
was not in accordance with the American concept of liberal democracy, alliance 
management should operate on the basis of this realitY, and should not seek to dismantle 
the existing South Korean regime. From the earliest stage of the post-Park era, the 
Japanese approach towards the South Korean regime transition was noticeably different 
from that of the US. From the outset, the Carter administration's management of the 
regime transition in South Korea was questionable in the eyes of the Japanese ruling 
camp. According to this view, South Korean political instability should be settled as 
soon as possible through the establishment of another strong state similar to the Yushin 
system so that the Northeast Asian security environment could be maintained. The 
combination of declining US leadership and the emerging threat from the Soviet Union 
pushed the existing Japanese realistic approach to the Korean question in an even more 
conservative direction. The policy orientation of Japan was to select one of the political 
forces that seemed to guarantee the existing Japanese national interest. Continuity and 
stability were thus the key concerns of Japanese policy. More specifically, Japan's initial 
actions - in its relationship with General Chun and the 12 December Coup, and its 
attitude towards North Korean military moves - were not in any way identical to those 
of the US. 
The Ohira cabinet's policy of selecting one of the most amenable political forces 
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(including the military) in South Korea for support contradicted the US "nudging" 
policy, which excluded the military as an acceptable political authority. Thus, the Ohira. 
cabinet took clandestine actions and even mobilised the PRC to legitimise the 
"selecting" policy. In terms of alliance management, fearing a US response and lacking 
the means to actualise its own scheme for a South Korean regime transition, Japan, as a 
middle member of the TASS, occasionally sought to utilise external sources to enhance 
its position. 
7.2.2 The Initial Actions 
Just before the death of President Park, the Ohira cabinet perceived that South Korean 
opinion leaders supporting the President were trying to distance themselves from the 
regime and were anxious about the dangerous level of political friction between the 
regime and the Carter administration. The Japanese MOFA and the Japanese Embassy 
in Seoul shared a feeling of crisis before the 26 October incident, judging that the Park 
regime might not be able to survive the coming winter and spring seasons because of 
the increasingly widespread apathy of almost every social element. 22 A wholesale 
reshuffle of the Park regime seemed to be urgent in order to escape from the political 
crisis. Japan certainly did not anticipate the demise of the regime by the assassination of 
President Park. 23 Soon after the assassination, the Japanese embassy felt that the 
atmosphere among South Korean opinion leaders had shifted from a concern about US 
displeasure with the regime to an interest in where South Korean politics should go 
next. 
24 
22 Kuroda (1980): p. 11. 
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To Japan, South Korea was not merely a neighbouring country, but was a stabilising 
influence in East Asia. Political instability in South Korea should be avoided because it 
might dismantle the balance of power in Asia and engender regional conflict. The South 
Korean regime needed to be stabilised. as soon as possible, whatever its specific 
leadership, so that no serious consequences for Japanese security would result. Above 
all, an Iranian-style revolution should be avoided. 25 Therefore Japan hoped that the 
policy changes by the next President in South Korea would be limited and moderate. A 
new President, even though he was bound to be aware of people's expectations of the 
government, should not compromise with the tendency of democratisation, because 
once a government made one concession, the people would demand two concessions, 
and political turbulence would follow: "Even if the next President takes most of 
President Park's policy, the South Korean people would absolutely not turn their backs 
on the new government. iiM 
After the death of President Park, Japan's MOFA found no reason to change its policy 
line. On the morning of 27 October 1979, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the 
Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Section Chief of the Asia Bureau of the MOFA, and others 
gathered to review the situation in South Korea, and issued a statement which 
emphasised the need for stability in the Korean peninsula after the incident: 
Despite the incident, we hope that peace and stability will be maintained, with the 
settlement of the situation in South Korea as soon as possible. We also believe that 
Japanese-South Korean relations will be developed without change afterwards. 27 
23 Dai98kai Sangiin Gainni-ifitkai Dailgo (13 November 1979): pp. 2-3. 
24 Sunobe (198 1): p. 15. 
25 Sekai Henshubu (January 1980): p. 162-3. There are almost identically apprehensive voices from the 
Japanese business world about the political repercussions of the death of Park. 
26 Gotani: p. 37-8. 
27 Yonjiuri Shimbun (28 October 1979); Dai98kai Sangiin Gainni-iinkai Dailgo (13 November 1979): p. 
2. In this Diet session, the autonomy of information for the autonomous actions towards the South Korean 
politics was raised. (Ibid.: p. 5). According to Akahata (28 October 1979), Prime Minister Ohira, even 
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Prime Minister Ohira and Foreign Minister Sonoda confirmed that the policy line was 
agreed among senior officials of the Ohira cabinet. Contrary to the US view, their 
official statement and press conference did not mention any hope for political 
liberalisation and development. In other words, the Ohira government chose to 
emphasise order and continuity of the existing South Korean political system rather than 
change. 
7.2.3 The Lack of High-level Policy Co-ordination between the US and Japan 
The Choi caretaker government wanted the US and Japan to show their continued 
commitment to South Korea by dispatching high-level delegations to President Park's 
funeral. On this issue, there was a conspicuous lack of policy co-ordination between the 
US and Japan. On the night of 27 October 1979, Prime Minster Ohira decided to 
participate in the funeral with Foreign Minister Sonoda and notified the South Korean 
side of the decision. However, at the last moment, the Japanese Prime Minister suddenly 
changed his mind because of the domestic political situation in Japan: his political rival, 
Fukuda, had launched a full-scale campaign for the party presidency. Just one day 
before the funeral, on the evening of 2 November, the MOFA announced that Prime 
Minister Ohira would not be able to attend. It implied that the planned Ohira-Vance 
talks in Seoul could not be taken place. Only Ambassador Sunobe, from the Japanese 
side, attended the funeral. The Ohira cabinet was thus able not to engage in consultation 
with the US. 
though he re-confirmed that Japan's policy towards South Korea would not be changed, was apprehensive 
to the repercussion of the demise of the Park regime to the existing Japan-South Korea relations. As far as 
the new political counterparts in South Korea was concerned, see the following section, 7.4. 
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7.3 JAPAN AND THE 12 DECEMBER COUP 1979 
The Japanese intervention sought to remove external and internal sources of insecurity 
in South Korea: the North Korean threat and the domestic political challenges to a 
strong state. In effect, these were the same imperatives as those of the Park regime. It 
was no wonder, therefore, that the Japanese government gave its support to the most 
similar political force to the Park regime, the new military leadership led by General 
Chun Doo-hwan. 28 
7.3.1 Japan's Focus on General Chun 
One Japanese newspaper account of President Park's assassination described it as "a 
miniature of the 26 February Incident [Niniroku Jiken]", quoting from a source of the 
MOFA. This analogy implied that behind Kim Jae-kyu's assassination of President Park 
was his expectation some of the military leaders would support his action. 29 In fact, 
General Chun's subordinates suggested that Chun should arrest the Army Chief of Staff, 
General Chong, on suspicion of complicity in the death of President Park, in the 
evening of 27 October 1980. However, the timing of such an action had to be 
considered very carefully because Chong had his followers within the military. 30 By 
comparison, the US administration stated on 27 October that "[A]ny evidence to prove 
,, 31 the involvement of the South Korean military with the assassination is not seen. 
Rather, even though no evidence was provided, it was widespread in Japan that the 
28 President Park Chung-hee was extremely obsessed with removing all anti-Park military factions, 
therefore, assigned one of the most faithful generals to the post of the DSC to control the unity of the 
military. On the other hand, he sponsored a kind of palace guard group called "Hanahoe [Association 
One]" with loyal members to him. Chun was the key man of the association. See Kakuda (1980): pp. 18- 
24. 
29 Yonduri Shimbun (29 October 1979) 
30 Chun Doo-hwan (1980): pp. 24-25. 
215 
Part 111 7 Japanese Intervention Il 
Carter administration in any sense affected the action of Kim Jae-kyu to assassinate 
President Park. 32 
Before the death of President Park, the Ohira cabinet paid careful attention to the moves 
within the South Korean military, and concluded that the military wanted to do 
something in order to resolve the political crisis that confronted the President. In fact, 
Major General Chun Doo-hwan, Commander of the Defence Security Command, had 
an appointment with President Park to report a proposal to deal with the crisis on 27 
October 1979, just one day after the President's assassination. 33 
From the beginning of the post-Park era, the Ohira cabinet knew that real power was in 
the hands of General Chun, who led a military faction, Hanahoe [Group One], 
sponsored by the late President Park. On 30 October 1979, Yonduri Shimbim reported 
that the Defence Security Command led by General Chun was emerging as a new centre 
of power, replacing Kim Jae-kyu's KCIA. 34 Furthermore, on 31 October 1979 Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun reported that the MOFA was paying careful attention to the moves of 
General Chun Doo-hwan, who seemed to have real power as Chief of the Headquarters 
of the Combined Investigation of the Martial Law Command. In fact, on 28 October 
1979, Japanese Ambassador Sunobe was at Chun's press conference when the first 
announcement was made of the result of the interrogation of Kim Jae-kyu. On that 
occasion, Chun's private secretary, Huh Mun-do, a former correspondent of a 
conservative South Korean newspaper, Chostin Ilbo, and the then chief of press and 
public relations within the South Korean embassy to Japan, told the Japanese 
31 Nojoe (1980): p. 15. 
32 Ibid. p. 17. 
33 Huh Hwa-pyung, lliolgan Chostin (February 1991). 
34 Yonduri Shimbim (30 October 1979). 
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ambassador that "a new system will be opened by the leadership of General Chun. "35 
Sunobe reported this to Tokyo. From then on, Huh Mun-do played a key role as a 
messenger of General Chun to the Japanese government. The Japanese Ambassador was 
infon-ned that a powerful military faction led by General Chun was determined to 
assume political leadership. It was only a few days after the assassination, when the US 
was eager to stress the need for the establishment of a broadly based civilian 
government. American newspapers such as The New York- Times did not fail to report on 
31 October that General Chun was one of the key military leaders. However, the focus 
of attention in The New York- Wines was on the decision made in the secret meeting of 
South Korean military leaders on 29-30 October 1979. It was known to the US and 
Japan that an absolute majority of the participants of the meeting supported the view 
that the Yushin Constitution should be terminated. However, General Chun was known 
to the US and Japan as one of the minority who opposed such a termination. 36 Because 
of this opposition, it was impossible for the military leaders to fix a date for the 
termination of the Constitution. 
7.3.2 The 12 December Coup and the Ohira Cabinet 
On 9-20 November 1979, just in a couple of weeks after the death of President Park, 
Muramatsu, Chief of the Defence Department of the JDA, visited CINCPAC in Hawaii 
to participate in developing a contingency plan countering military contingencies in the 
Korean Peninsula. 37 In the meantime, On 13 November 1979, the new Japanese Foreign 
Minister, Saburo Okita, underscored the guidelines of his foreign policy: 
35 Interview with Sunobe. One of the leading Japanese commentators on international politics, Keitaro 
Hasegawa, too, from early November 1979, was well aware of the fact that the Chun group was "the 
centre of the Military. " (Hasegawa 1980a): .. 13. 36 K. Hayashi (198 1): p. 44. 
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The economic prosperity of Japan, which has no military forces and lacks natural 
resources, depends greatly on the peace and stability of the world.... On the political and 
diplomatic sides, too, it is essential that Japan should play a positive and constructive role 
commensurate with its international status. Regionally and globally there are non- 
divisible co-relations between economic prosperity and political stability. Therefore our 
country has to make efforts for the peace and stability not only of Asia, but also of the 
world. 38 
With regard to the possibility of popular presidential election, on the same day, Chief of 
the Asian section of the MOFA, Yanagiya, told at the Committee on the Foreign Affairs 
in Shugiin (House of representatives) that it would take some time to take shape: the 
situation was extremely fluid. 39 
The Japanese Ambassador's agreement to meet General Chun near the Defence Security 
Command in central Seoul in late November 1979 was in line with the new Foreign 
Minister's policy outline. 40 At this meeting, which has not previously been known to the 
public, Huh Mun-do, who accompanied General Chun, repeated that Chun would 
generate a new system. Chun informed the Japanese Ambassador of his plan to arrest 
General Chong Sung-hwa. He also asked for Japanese understanding of his planned 
coup, " whereas the US Ambassador and the Commander of the US-South Korean 
Combined Forces Command met General Chong Sung-hwa in late November 1979 to 
convey US concern about possible military intervention in the coming political process 
to build a civilian government. Sunobe later stated to the author that Japan, unlike the 
US, had no military presence in South Korea and thus had no lever to control the South 
37 Dai9lkai Shugin Kessan-Unkai Dail5go (17 April 1980): p. 29. 
38 Dai89kai Sangiin Gainw-Unkai Dailgo (13 November 1979). 
39 Ibid.: pp. 8-9. 
40 Interview with Sunobe. He did not exactly indicate what date he had met General Chun. The meeting 
place was near the Japanese embassy complex is located closely to the building of the Defence Security 
Command very near the Blue House. 
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Korean military. Japan should therefore adopt a wait-and-see strategy. In fact, however, 
this was not what Japan actually did. 
The role of the JDA in the Japanese intervention in the South Korean regime transition 
was extremely important. Even though there was no actual military clash between the 
two Koreas, the JDA kept a vigilant watch on every delicate move between the North 
and the South in military terms. It undertook sensitive operations such as the rapid 
delivery of new military intelligence to South Korea . 
42At this juncture, the spokesman 
of the Command of the US-South Korea Combined Forces announced on 28 November 
that the joint military exercise "Eight Bells 79", designed to counter the North Korean 
threat after the death of Park by directly linking Washington and Seoul, and scheduled 
to commence in early December 1979, would be cancelled indefinitel Y. 43 It was no 
accident that soon after the Chun-Sunobe meeting, the JDA leaked the information that 
North Korea was making military moves to invade the South on I December. The 
Japanese government conveyed the intelligence to the KCIA under the control of 
General Chun. He reported it to President Choi, who soon afterwards chaired a national 
security committee within the government. ' The US cancellation of "Eight Bells 79" 
resulted in a lost opportunity to keep close vigilance not only on North Korea, but also 
on the prelude to Chun's first coup, while the intelligence from Japan enhanced the role 
of the South Korean military within the caretaker civilian Choi government. 
Visiting Beijing on 5 December 1979, Prime Minister Ohira. discussed the Korean 
41 Interview with Sunobe. 
42 Hasegawa (1980a): p. 30; interview with Sato. In the economic side, Japanese experts on South Korean 
economy like Shinichi Nojoe viewed that South Korean economic leaders whose businesses had grown 
based upon political stability by the Park Chung-hee system were "extremely nervous" to the 
disappearance of the similar political shield. (Koria Hyoron, January 1980): p. 24. 
43 Yonditri Shimbun (30 November 1979). 
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question with PRC Premier Hua Guo-feng. While flying to Beijing from Tokyo, Ohira 
deliberately passed directly through the flight infonnation region (FIR) of South Korea, 
not through the Japanese FIR, which was the normal route from Tokyo to Beijing via 
Shanghai. In so doing, Asahi Shinibun interpreted, Japan wanted to demonstrate the 
significance of its role in lessening military tension in the Korean peninsula . 
45 In his 
first summit talks with Hua, Ohira advocated that the PRC should exert its influence to 
restrain North Korean exploitation of the unsettled situation in the South. 46 In response, 
Hua, rejecting the possibility of a North Korean invasion of the South, stressed that 
South Korea should be democratised, and "the real factor threatening peace in the 
Korean peninsular is the domestic political and social situation itself. "" Ohira did not 
echo the necessity of dernocratisation in the South, but insisted that "the future direction 
of a country should be decided by its people independently. ""s The Ohira-Hua talks on 
5-6 December 1979 produced a joint communiqu6 in which the first article stipulated: 
"The two leaders confirrn that the two states will make efforts to maintain and secure 
stability and peace in Asia and in the world . "49 The article, together with their statement 
to build an international environment conducive to the unification of divided Korea, was 
in accordance with the Carter formula on the East Asian security environment-the 
fonnula which establishing an alignment relations with the PRC against the Soviet 
Union, expanding the Japanese role and military capability, and inviting North Korea to 
three-way talks while instituting a South Korean political system based on broad 
support of its people. Even though Japanese intervention to select a new military regime 
in the South was in direct contrast to the US "nudging" policy, Japan could camouflage 
44 Chun Doo-hwan (1995): p. 558. 45 Asahi Shimbun (4 December 1979). 
46 jiyU Minshuto (1988): p. 854. 47 Ibid.: p. 854. 
48 Sek-ai Shitho (18 December 1979): p. 7. 
49 Asahi Shimbun (8 December 1979). 
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its policy as a partial complement to correct some problems with the Carter formula 
rather than a formal submission of a Japanese formula of their own dealing with the 
South Korean regime transition within the TASS. In effect, Japanese bi-polycentrism 
indicated in Chapter 2 was working. 
Japan was informed of Chun's planned coup, delivered information about a hypothetical 
North Korean invasion, and then asked the PRC to control North Korean adventurism 
without any suggestion of the necessity for democracy in the South. Just two days after 
coup, on 14 December, Yanagiya stated in the Diet that the situation was still fluid, and 
he paid close attention to who would be a new defence minister in South Korea. 50 After 
witnessing the assignment of Airforce Chief of Staff Chu Young-bok to the defence 
minister, from the Japanese point of view, the unsettled situation was resolved by the 
coup. The Ohira cabinet never expressed any concern about the 12 December coup by 
the Chun group. As the former Japanese Ambassador Sunobe recollected: 
At that time it was true that the US expected democratisation [in South Korea] and 
worked hard in that direction. Therefore US resistance was extremely strong when 
General Chong Sung-hwa was arrested. The incident was on the surface a coup to cleanse 
the military within. In the end, after the death of Park, the military believed that the 
military should be the new centre, but there was a remaining question about who or which 
group within the military should finally grasp the political power. The event on 12 
December made it clear that ... the Chun Doo-hwan group of the military decisively 
grasped power. To this event, the US response was very strong. I thought that the strong 
reaction from the State Department of the US reached a point that was not necessary. 51 
The Chief of the Intemal Bureau (Naikyoku) of the JDA, Hisahiko Okazaki, who 
accompanied JDA Director Yamashita on his visit to Seoul in late July 1979, confirmed 
50 Dai9Ok-ai Shugiin Gainut-iink-ai Dai3go (14 December 1979): p. 20-1. 
51 Stmobe (1981): p. 17. 
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that: "We had a business-as-usual relationship with Chun Doo-hwan" after the arrest of 
General Chong. 52 The Japanese government believed that the Chun Doo-hwan group 
had already achieved de facto control of the military and the Choi government. 
James Young, Defence Attach6 in the US Embassy in Seoul, recollected that: 
In my impression, Japanese people in South Korea knew much more than I knew and 
excelled the Americans in terms of the capability of grasping the situation... I have seen a 
Japanese Defence Attach6, Colonel Hagino walk away from the barricades around the 
headquarters of the DSC to the Japanese embassy in the very early morning of 13 
December 1980 ... I could have confirmed again that the Japanese secured really good 
providers of information, and they might know much more about the situation than uS. 53 
Chun's then secretary, Huh Hwa-pyung, told the author that Japan understood South 
Korean politics with heart and feeling, while the understanding of the US was much 
more mechanical. 
However, Chun Doo-hwan had several crises after the 12 December Coup 1979, most of 
them resulting from pressure applied by the Carter administration, particularly between 
13 December 1979 and in January 1980.54 So it was necessary for Japan to protect the 
new military leadership under Chun from both domestic challenges and US pressures. 
Put differently, the Ohira cabinet recognised and supported Chun as a de facto leader 
from mid-December 1979 when Chun managed to resist US pressure to resign with 
great difficulty. Japan's direct and indirect support of the Chun group came from various 
groups of Japanese society: within the government, the Cabinet Investigation Office, the 
MOFA and the JDA collaborated; within the Diet, the Japan-South Korea 
52 Interview with Okazaki. See also Okazaki (1998): pp. 154-160. 
53 Young (1994): pp. 333-4. 
54 Interview with Hayashi. 
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Parliamentarian League helped; and Japanese business leaders also gave their support. 55 
7.4 ANTI-KIM DAE-JUNG CAMPAIGN AND JAPAN 
Neither Kim Dae-jung nor Kim Young-sarn seemed to suit Japan's existing South 
Korean policy. 56 Kim Young-sam of the NDP was discarded because he was supported 
by the US and struggled against Park. He was believed to want to weaken the Japanese 
vested interests, which were secured by a close relationship between major figures of 
the ruling LDP and the Japanese government, and the Park regime. Kim Dae-jung was a 
more complicated partner. The South Korean military believed that he was always 
behind Kim Young-sam's excessive struggle against President Park. Four days before 
the 12 December Coup, Kim Dae-jung returned to public life with the lifting of his 
house arrest by civilian President Choi. The Japanese ruling camp knew how nervously 
the military, and the Chun group in particular, watched the moves of Kim Dae-jung, the 
most difficult political rival of President Park Chung-hee. 
If he came to power, Kim Dae-jung might investigate the collaboration between the 
Park regime and the Japanese government on the kidnapping issue, which would 
damage the vested interests of Japan. Former Prime Ministers, like Kishi, Fukuda and 
Tanaka, were in some way involved with the political settlement of the kidnapping 
incident. Prime Minister Ohira himself was also involved, and, from the beginning of 
his incumbency, he rejected any possibility of reconsidering the political settlement and 
found it impossible to cultivate a good relationship with Kim Dae-jung. 57 Kim also 
seemed to be supported by the US. Japanese Ambassador Sunobe did not regard such 
55 See Fujishima (1980 and 198 1). 
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US support positiveIy: "[On the evening of the 12 December Coup], the American 
Ambassador even went to Kim's house. I felt this went too far, He did not have to go to 
,, 59 that extreme at all. In short, the Japanese ruling camp shared virtually the same 
thoughts about Kim Dea-jung and therefore collaborated willingly with the Chun 
group's anti-Kim Dae-jung campaign. 
7.4.1 The Japanese Response to Kint's Request to Reconsider the Political Settlement, 
December 1979 
As soon as his house arrest was lifted on 8 December 1979, Kim Dae-jung expressed 
his suspicion that the US might turn its back on South Korean democracy and tilt 
towards an emphasis on stability: "I am not yet sure where the US Will go.,, 59 US 
Ambassador Gleysteen sent an official to meet Kim on the morning of 12 December. 
One of Japan's leading political commentators, Keitaro Hasegawa, recorded his 
impression of this matter: 
On the eve of the 12 December coup, US Ambassador Gleysteen invited Kim to his off ice 
and had talks. From the beginning, the Defence Security Command of Chun had files on 
Kim's career and had a deep suspicion of Kim's ideological orientation, leaking its veto 
against Kim's presidency. Therefore, the Command would resist strenuously Kim's 
appearance on the political stage backed by American support. 60 
In the afternoon of 12 December, the Japanese Political Counsellor to Ambassador 
Sunobe visited Kim and made an arrangement for Sunobe to invite Kim to his office on 
17 December. Meeting with Sunobe, Kim Dae-jung conveyed a letter to Prime Minister 
56 Interview with Sunobe. 
57 Dai9lkai Sangiin Gainni-iinkai Dai2go (4 March 1980): p. 24. 
58 Sunobe (1981): p. 14-15. His negative view made him confuse the reality: Kim was invited to 
Gleysteen's office in the morning. 
59 Asahi Shimbun (8 December 1979). 
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Ohira which called for the re-investigation of his kidnapping from a hotel in Tokyo, the 
reconsideration of the political settlement about his kidnapping incident in 1973 
(referred to Ch. 3), and moral assistance for South Korean democratisation. As was 
customary, the Kim Dae-jung issue was debated in the Japanese Diet on 18 December. 
The new Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita, reconfirmed the existing policy: the 
kidnapping did not represent a South Korean interference in Japanese sovereignty, and 
therefore there was no need to reconsider it. With respect to Japanese foreign policy 
towards South Korea in the regime transition, Okita stated in the Diet: 
Democracy in a very poor country is different from democracy in a rich country. In this 
context, we may expect changes in South Korea to some degree ... However the country 
has various social and historical backgrounds. Moreover, it is in a state of semi-war with 
the North. Conditions in South Korea are not the same as in Japan. We should judge each 
country's situation on a given basis ... I recognise that South Korean politics are at a 
delicate juncture. Our South Korean policy, however, should be considered in terms of the 
continuation of the existing policy. 61 
On 20 December, the reply from the Ohira cabinet reached Kim: the political settlement 
would only be reconsidered if any new facts about the direct involvement of the South 
Korean government in the kidnapping were revealed. The decision was conveyed not 
only in a letter written by Sunobe but also by a telephone, 62 which was tapped by the 
DSC of Chun. The Japanese government reaffirmed its veto on Kim Dae-jung, as the 
Chun group intended. 
On 22 December, Yonduri Shimbun released information sent by an unidentified official 
of the US that the KCIA had planned to kill Kim Dae-jung in the East Sea (Sea of 
60 Hasegawa (1980 b): p. 29. 
61 Dai90kai Sangiin Gainni-iinkai Dai2go (18 December 1979): pp. 14-20. 
62 Sekai Henshubu (1980b): p. 269. 
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Japan) without SUCCCSS. 63 On the same day, the Ohira cabinet recalled Ambassador 
Sunobe to Tokyo to listen to his views on the state of South Korean politics. On 25 
December, taking into account the Kim Dae-jung issue and the 12 December coup, 
Sunobe reported to Ohira that the imperative of Japanese policy on the regime transition 
was to encourage South Korea "to maintain stability.,, 
64 With regard to the new military 
leadership in South Korea, Sunobe reported that "the event of the 12 December [led by 
Chun] is different from the previous coup [of 16 May 1961 led by Park Chung-hee]. 
Despite the event, the South Korean military will not intervene into PolitiCS.,, 65 Then he 
supported the Chun group, so no change was necessary on the Kim Dae-jung issue 
despite the American leak of new information a few days previously. 
This raises the general question of the Japanese attitude to the Choi caretaker 
government. The US recommended the Ohira. cabinet have summit talks with caretaker 
President Choi in order to have better relations with South Korea. However, the Ohira 
cabinet rejected this idea, which indicated that it did not really want to strengthen the 
status of the Choi government. Put differently, Japan had no other option but to work 
closely with Chun Doo-hwan. 
7.4.2 Japanese Co-operation with Chun's Anti-Kint Campaign, March-june 1980 
The Chun group had made strenuous efforts to win Japanese support after the 
assassination of President Park. 66 One of the messengers was Chun's private secretary, 
Huh Mun-do, who visited Japan very frequently. In order to avoid being spotted by the 
63 Yonduri Shimbun (22 December 1979). 
64 Asahi Shinibun (26 December 1979). 
65 Yonzittri Shimbun (26 December 1979). 
66 Interview with a South Korean diplomat who requested anonymity. 
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mass media, he traveled to Tokyo via Fukuoka, Osaka and other indirect routes. 67 As a 
result, Japan's conservative news media emphasised the inevitability of the 12 
December coup and the need for a strong state: 
Those who negate the Yushin System totally and defend premature democratisation were 
followers of the NDP and Kim Dae-jung. They would not admit the inevitability of "the 
12 December Event", and argue that Chun Doo-hwan and military leaders have no 
support from the people. On the contrary, those who evaluate Park's achievement 
positively and admit the Yushin System would not approve rapid democratisation. 
Naturally, they don't defend the NDP and Kim Dae-jung. They believe the 12 December 
coup was a necessity, and claim that the military leadership is receiving the support of the 
absolute majority of the people. The standpoints of them both are completely parallel, and 
no meeting point is seen. However, it cannot be denied that the reality is moving in favour 
of the latter. 68 
This viewpoint was widespread within the ruling camp of the Ohira cabinet. 69 It was no 
longer a secret that the Chun group would not accept Kim Dae-jung as a Commander in 
Chief. Chun controlled the government and the military, and Kim enjoyed widespread 
popularity among the people. Chun knew that he must wage an image war against Kim. 
Chun's DSC had already finished planning an anti-Kim campaign to manipulate Kim's 
image as ideologically untrustworthy from early February 1980. To that end, Japanese 
co-operation was essential because the Chun group wanted to exploit Kim's activities at 
the forthcoming National Congress for the Restoration of Democracy of South Korea 
and the Promotion of Korean Unification (NCDU) while he was in Japan during 1972- 
3. 
Some Japanese conservative newspapers, including Sankei Shimbun, spread suspicion 
67 Interview with Shigemura. 
68 H. Shibata (1980): pp. 16-7. For a theoretical notion to the power parity and violent political transition, 
see Benson and Kugler (1998). 
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about Kim Dae-jung based on the materials provided by Chun's DSC, and the Chun 
group imported these Japanese reports as if they were written according to Japanese 
sources and disseminated them to the South Korean mass media. 70 The reports stressed 
that there was suspicion and caution among the military leaders and the South Korean 
intellectuals concerning Kim's political activities during the post-liberation period and 
the US occupation period, 1945-1948; therefore, there was much anxiety about Kim's 
intentions. 71 Even before the 17 May Coup, the Japanese government was aware of the 
fact that Chun was plotting to destroy Kim Dae-jung. Nine days before the 17 May 
Coup, a former Korean expert of the JDA, Shigeo Matsumoto, returned to Tokyo from 
Seoul with materials provided by the Chun group which portrayed Kim as a communist. 
The materials consisted of two main parts: "The Moves of Kim Dae-jung" and "Kim 
Dae-jung and the NCDU (Haninintong). " The former materials indicated Kim's 
involvement in planning the Kwangju uprising, and the latter alluded to Kim's 
ideological problem. This reveals that Japan did not merely remain at a distance from 
Kim Dae-jung, but was partly engaged in the removal of Kim from the political stage. 72 
7.5 JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR CHUN DOO-HWAN THROUGH THE SUPPLY 
OF INTELLIGENCE 
By joining in the anti-Kim Dae-jung campaign, the Japanese government was 
effectively contributing to the establishment of a new military regime in South Korea by 
69 Interview with Sato. They had the similar perspective about Kim's ideological inclination. 
70 Interview with NVada. 
71 Sankei Shimbitiz (28 March 1980). 
72 Sek-ai Seiji (25 July 1980): pp. 4-5; Fujishima (1981): pp. 41-3; Asahi (17 July 1980). Unlike Japan, the 
US Embassy in Seoul sent a long telegram, entitled "Kim Tae-Chung's Past Policy Positions" when it 
perceived Kim would be restored his civil right to come back to the political arena. The conclusion of the 
telegram was that: "If Kim sticks to his less-than-radical views, he may attract moderate voters but not the 
conservative military establishment ... [because] he was "weaker" on security matters than Park Chung- hee. - (80 Seoul 2056 (19 February 1989)). 
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protecting General Chun from US pressures and directly assisting the Chun group to 
launch the second coup. While the US launched a strategy of offensive and aggressive 
intervention, the Ohira Cabinet conducted its own defensive intervention. 
7.5.1 Japanese Intelligence after the 12 December Coup 1979 
As well as offering assistance on the Kim Dae-jung issue, the Ohira cabinet supported 
Chun coming to power. Above all, Japan wanted the US to recognise the external source 
of military threat, and to stop harassing a faithful comrade seeking to enhance South 
Korean security and Northeast Asian stability. 
Table 7.1 The Japanese Provision of Intelligence Concerning North Korean Military 
Moves to the Chun Group 
The Timing I The Contents I The Alleged Original The Route of Conveyance 
Sources 
December 1979 North Korea would invade the A Defence Attach6 in the Director of the Department of 
South between Christmas 1979 PRC embassy in Tokyo Northeast Asia of the MOFA 
and January 1980 
January 1980 The Soviet Union was enticing PRC Embassy in Tokyo Chief of Managing Bureau at the 
the North to invade the South Japanese Federation of Asian 
Exchange and Friendship 
January 1980 North Korea would invade in PRC Embassy in Tokyo The Cabinet Investigation 
February-March 1980 Agency (Naikaku Chosa shilsit) 
January 1980 North Korea would invade in Correspondent of Xinhua The Public Security Investigation 
May 1980 Neivs Agency in Tok Y673 Agency (Koan Chosa cho) 
January 1980 North Korea would invade in PRC journalist in Tokyo Japanese Agency of Security 
I- autumn 1980 Investigation (Koan Chosa cho) 
Source: Adapted from Ryukkun Jongbo Chamobu (1980): pp. 27787-27788. 
As it had done in early December 1979, the Ohira cabinet provided military intelligence 
of an impending North Korean invasion more than five times in January 1980, when the 
US was still asking Chun to promise not to violate the CFC. 74 The intelligence helped 
the Chun group to gain some respite from the political strain with the US. In fact, later, 
73 Later, on 16 April 1980, JDA Director Hosoda had an interview with President of PRC Xinhua News 
Agency, in which he told that Japan might to block the Tsuruga Strait if the US demanded in order to 
prevent the Soviet naval ships' traffic from the Far East to the Indian Ocean (Dai9lkai Kessan-iink-ai 
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in an interview with a correspondent of AP, General Wickham revealed that he had 
dissuaded some South Korean generals from attempting to remove Chun. The American 
pressure, even though it was implemented in a self-restrained manner, was strong 
enough to compel the Chun group to announce that the military had no intention to 
intervene directly in civilian politics. The Ohira cabinet was well aware of the fact that 
the Chun group was under pressure from the US and provided a rationale to help reduce 
that pressure. 75 The stream of intelligence provision in January ended when US Navy 
Chief of Staff Admiral Long visited Seoul on 23-24 January. Admiral Long had talks 
with President Choi, Prime Minister Shin and Defence Minister Chu. Of particular 
interest are the talks between Long, accompanied by General Wickham and Gelysteen, 
and Choi. When Long reviewed briefly "why the US had been so disturbed by the 
events of December 12 which violated the chain of command and threatened the unity 
of the ROK armed forces", Choi assured Long that "all was now in order following the 
"regrettable incident. "76 
It is not known precisely how helpful Japanese intelligence delivery was to the decision- 
making process in Washington in dealing with the Chun group. However, the 
continuous reiteration by the Chun group of the threat posed by North Korea certainly 
reduced the probability of US pressure becoming excessive. Going one step further, the 
Chun group could reinforce its bargaining position with the US externally, remove any 
possibility of a counter-coup by the anti-Chun faction with or without assistance from 
the US, and could also strengthen its position within the government. 77 
Dail5go (17 April 1980): p. 7). 
74 Sekai Slutho (2 September 1980): p. 19. 
75 The then Mainich Shimbint Correspondent in Seoul, Shigemura viewed that it was "the most dangerous 
V eriod" in Chun's political life for about 90 days, from the 12 December Coup to early March (1980). 
ý6 80 Seoul 1114 (28 January 1980). 
77 Huh Hwa-pyung admitted that he heard about the intelligence from Japan in January 1980. 
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7.5.2 Japan's Supply of Intelligence before the 17 May Coup 
Various Japanese governmental agencies dealt constantly with information and 
intelligence concerning North Korean moves and the political situation in the South. 
These included Naik-yokit (the Internal Section) of the JDA, many other intelligence 
sections and departments of the JSDF, Koan Chosacho (The Public Security 
Investigation Agency) of the Ministry of Justice, the Cabinet Investigation Agency of 
the Prime Minister's Office, and other channels of the MOFA. Other research affiliates 
of the Japanese government, such as the Cabinet Investigation Agency's Institute for 
World Politics, the National Institute for Defence Studies of the JDA, also monitored the 
Korean situation at that time. Due to the information barriers between governmental 
agencies, it was necessary for Japanese intelligence-related agencies to organise 
informal study groups with the participation of civilian specialists. 78 
From early 1979, the two study groups monitoring the military and political situation in 
the Korean peninsula were Josei Kentok-ai (The Situation Review Group) and NK-k-ai 
(The Study Group in North Korea). Josei Kentokai was composed of non-career 
researchers of the MOFA'79 the MITI, the MOF, 80 Kban Choshacho of the Ministry of 
jUStiCe, 8 1 and the Cabinet Investigation Agency (JCIA) '82 and other Japanese experts on 
South Korean politics, including Toshimitsu Shigemura of Mainichi Shimbun, Katsuo 
Kuroda of Kyodo News Services, and Masao Okonogi of Keio University. In terms of 
policy orientation, the influence of non-career researchers working in governmental 
institutes as public servants was extremely important in formulating Japan's foreign 
78 Interview with Tamaki. 
79 Former Korea Desk Officer and the then Advisor of Radio Press monitoring North Korean broadcasts, 
Shizuo Mitani 
so Shinichi Nojoe of Ajia Keizai Kenkyu-sho [Institute of Developing Economies of the MITI] 
81 Kunisama Saito 
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policy. 83 From late April/early May 1980, these study groups and other governmental 
organisations believed that a North Korean invasion was certainly possible. 
In addition to the US opposition in late April and in very early May 1980, there was a 
delicate friction between the Chun group and the Choi civilian government. On 2 May, 
South Korean Prime Minister Shin Hyun-hwak, who had ruled out "clemocratisation 
without Yushin" in early March, 84 agreed to accelerate the drafting of a new 
constitution, 85 and students began to attack Chun directly. 86 At this juncture, Japanese 
Ambassador Sunobe met Kim Dae-jung on 6 May, and he left for Tokyo some time after 
the meeting with Kim and before the 17 May COUP. 87 The timing of his stay in Tokyo for 
about a month raises suspicions about the purpose and role of Japanese intervention in 
the rise of the new military regime. The day after Sunobe met Kim, US Ambassador 
assessed the situation as "anxious" and "worrisome" but did not wish "to describe the 
present situation as the beginning of a "disintegrative process. "88 The Ohira cabinet, 
however, judged that the most critical watershed was coming, and it needed to tip the 
balance in favour of the Chun group. 
In the meantime, the Chun group dispatched two South Korean journalists from the 
extremely conservative newspaper, Chosim Ilbo, where Huh Mun-do had worked, to 
Tokyo on 6 May. 89 They met officials in the Cabinet Investigation Office dufing the 
82 Uchiyama, Chief of the Korea Section of the Cabinet Investigation Agency. 
83 Interview with Okonogi. 
84 80 Scoul 03075 (12 March 1980). 
85 80 Scoul 05657 (3 May 1980). 
86 80 Seoul 05661 (5 May 1980); Nakagawa (1980): pp. 10-12. 
87 Interview with Sunobe. Despite its great significance, he would not tell the author the exact date of his 
departure from Seoul. At any rate he did not use the word "recall" referring to his stay in Tokyo for about 
a month. He came back to Seoul in II June 1980 with Kiuchi, Chief of Asian Section of the MOFA. 
88 80 Seoul 05787 (7 May 1980) 
89 On the political atmosphere within Chosinz 11bo, see Shigemura (1980). 
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next two days. 90 On 9 May, KCIA and the JCIA agreed that there was no way to justify 
the second coup without the North Korean card; and so they discussed how to 
disseminate information about the impending North Korean invasion of the South. The 
result was conveyed in the name of Kenji Yebisu, a working level officer of the JCIA, to 
Kim Young-sun, Second Deputy Director of the KCIA, in Seoul on 10 May: 
North Korea has decided to invade the South between 15-20 May 1980, judging that it is 
the decisive momentum, considering the South Korean political situation. Kim II-sung, 
accompanied by General Oh Jin-woo in his visit to the Yugoslavian state funeral of 
Secretary-General Tito, met Brezhnev and planned the invasion. 91 
In order to enhance the quality of the intelligence, the Japanese side emphasised the fact 
that a Japanese high official (koi kanri) had recentlY visited Beijing and had received 
intelligence from the government of the PRC. 92 In fact, Yasuhiro Nakasone, former JDA 
Director and then Secretary General of the LDP, later the first Japanese Prime Minister 
to visit Seoul (in 1983), was in Beijing between 28 April and 7 May 1980. During the 
visit, Nakasone met Deputy Chief of the Anny of the PRC, Oh Shui-chen, and 
discussed the proper level of Japanese military expenditure and other mutually 
significant issues, the suggestion from Oh was regarded by Japan as PRC initiative to 
break the taboo between Japan and the PRC. 93 However, this study dismissed the idea 
90 Interview with a senior journalist of Kyodo News Services, 3 July 1999. From early May in Japan, 
another rumour that the Chun group would make Kim Dae-jung as a scapegoat for the final take-over 
was spread. (Asahi Shimbiat Janaru (30 May 980): p. 98. 
91 Ryukkun Jongbo Chammobu (1980). 
92 Later, Chun argued it was not fake given that the PRC conveyed the intelligence not only to the 
Japanese high official and the JDA but also to the USA (Chun, 1995): p. 558-9. 
93 lbiniuri Shimbun (4 May 1980); With regard to the significance of the Nakasone visit to Beijing, see 
Sankei Shinibun (2 May 1980). Interview with Sato, Tamaki, Shigemura, and Uchiyama; Nakasone 
(1996): pp. 325-31. There was one piece of speculation that the real source was not the PRC, but Japan. 
Motoi Tamaki argues that Japan made a plot and exported it to an unidentified Japanese intelligence 
group, after being slightly revised, reverse- imported from China, disguising that the real source was the 
PRC government. (Tamaki, 1980: pp. 23-4. ) He did not reject the involvement of Nakasone by saying that 
Kunisama Saito, a Korean expert in Koan Choshacho (The Public Security Investigation Agency) was 
very close to Nakasone, and Saito might be a channel between the intelligence organisation of the PRC 
and Yebisu of the JCIA. A Japanese journalist admitted this hypothesis, and told the author that it was true 
that some people in Tokyo tried to manipulate the North Korean threat. However, Sato emphasised 
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that the PRC had handed over intelligence gathered through its own channel. On this 
question, Okazaki defined the intelligence as "bogus", and Sato argued that the 
intelligence was collected through Japanese intelligent agents working in mainland 
China following the diplomatic normalisation with the PRC in 1978, and through the 
circle of Korean-Japanese who had pro-North Korean sentiments. One South Korean 
diplomat who requested anonymity also judged that the intelligence was basically the 
94 
reflection of Japan's own evaluation and needs. In terms of the timing, the Soviet 
Ambassador to Japan, Boriyanski, admitted in an address before the Foreign 
Correspondents' Club in Tokyo on 7 May 1980 that the Soviet Union has maintained the 
unit level ground forces in four northern islands close to Hokkaido in order to counter 
the anti-Soviet military moves between Japan, the US and the PRC. 95 
The Intelligence Headquarters of the South Korean Army concluded that the date of the 
invasion was not entirely believable because there were no preparations near the 
demarcation line between the North and the South, and Kim 11-sung was attending a 
state funeral in a foreign country. 96 Nevertheless, on 10 May Kim Young-son, Second 
Deputy Director of the KCIA, reported to General Chun. Lacking any justifying cause 
for military action to implement his assumption of political power, Chun immediately 
summoned his lieutenants to an urgent meeting to discuss how best to utilise the 
intelligence. 97 In the emergency cabinet meeting on the evening of 12 May, Chun 
Japanese independent information gathering through defence attaches and other intelligence agents who 
were deployed to the PRC and other intelligence agents attentive to moves of Korean-Japanese joined 
Chosoren, a pro-North Korean residential organisation in Japan. Thereby Sato denied Nakasone's 
involvement in any way, even though he accepted that such intelligence provision was one of the 
important devices to prevent Korean invasion in May 1980. Uchiyama, even though he denied 
emphatically his own involvement, admitted that Tokyo was in a mood that it would be not a surprise that 
anybody in the Ohira cabinet conveyed such intelligence to the KCIA. 
94 Interviews with Okazaki, Sato, and a South Korean diplomat 
95 Sankei Shimbun (8 May 1980). 
96 Ryukkun Jongbo Chammobu (1980): pp. 27781-93. 
97 Seoul Jibang Gomchalchong (December 1995). Cited in Shinclonga (June, 1996): p. 642. 
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reported the urgency of North Korean military actions, and strongly called for an 
agreement to allow the military deployment. 98 He then justified the immediate 
implementation of his contingency plan at a meeting with John Wickarn on 13 May. The 
intelligence provided by Japan gave momentum to the Chun group to enhance the level 
of military movement. Between 10 and 12 May, the MLC performed a preliminary 
military exercise, Olympic Game, to seize key institutions and buildings in Seoul. 99 
During these days, unifonned soldiers were to be seen on the streets of cities. On 13 
May 1980, the MLC extended Olympic Game by the directive, The Enforcement Order 
of the Anti-Spy Operation State (The Department of Defence, No. 49). This directive, 
covering the week 14-20 May, complemented the existing order imposed on 10 May 
1980.100 The intelligence provided by Japan thus offered the most convincing rationale 
for Chun Doo-hwan to seize power. The full significance of the provision of 
information by Japan became clear when the Carter administration had doubts about the 
likelihood of a North Korean invasion of South Korea and concluded that it was simply 
an excuse to seize power. 
On 18 May 1980, Chun Doo-hwan justified his second coup by referring to the 
information from the JCIA. 101 The Korea Desk Officer of the JCIA, Uchiyama, denied 
all complicity informally, but did not make any formal protest to the KCIA. Rather, 
during the deadlock of the Kwangju democratisation movement in late May, the JCIA 
98 Ibid.: p. 642; Asahi Shinibun 13 (May 1980). On 23 April 1996, former President Chun Doo-hwan 
stated in the Seoul Local Court that after having provided the intelligence about the alleged North Korean 
invasion, he ordered his subordinates, Col. Lee Hak-bong and Col. Kwon Jong-dal to make a draft to 
counter the political situation. (Yonduri Shimbien Shinibun Database, 19960423TYM0501 0). 
99 5.18Sakon Susakirok (Vol. 19): pp. 27788; Sankei Shimbun (13 May 1980). 
1('0 5.18Sakon Susakirok: p. 27794. 
101 Interview with Uchiyama; Dai9lk-ai Shugiin Yosan-iinkai Dai3go (6 March 1980). Okazaki testified 
that "the objective of the US is to secure the safety of the free world. In that sense, Japanese co-operation 
serves for that interest. However, more specifically, the [Japan-US] co-operation in military terms is For 
the US to use Japanese military bases with the pre-consultation for the maintenance of Peace and security 
in the Far East. " (Ibid.: p. 34) 
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sent two officials, Yebisu and one of Uchiyama's two superintendents, to Seoul in order 
to watch and facilitate the second coup. At the same time, the JCIA dispatched one 
prominent Japanese scholar to Pyongyang in order to monitor the North Korean 
moves. 
102 
7.5.3 The Ohira Cabinet and the Carter Administration in Late April and Early May 
1980 
Behind the relatively autonomous intervention of Japan lay the Japanese perception of 
crisis in the South Korean political system and increasing concern about US leadership. 
Assessing the threat caused by the Middle East conflict to safety and peace in the Far 
East, Foreign Minister Okita. stressed that the threat was not just military but economic, 
and that the Middle East was geographically distant from the Northeast Asia, - so that 
conflicts in the Middle East should not necessadly be included in the concept of the 
range of the Far East. ' 03 
According to one country risk report on South Korea by a Japanese consulting company, 
the country was seen to be experiencing a major crisis (see Figure 7.1). The level of risk 
has four categories-, i. e., low risk (70-100); moderate risk (55-69); high risk (40-54); and 
the highest risk (0-39). Figure 7.1 indicates that the South Korean political risk index 
for 1980 was 49-the lowest index ever between 1972 and 1983, while the ten-year 
102 Okazaki testified that "the objective of the US is to secure the safety of the free world. In that sense, 
Japanese co-operation serves for that interest. However, more specifically, the [Japan-US] co-operation in 
military terms is for the US to use Japanese military bases with the pre-consultation for the maintenance 
of Peace and security in the Far East. " (Ibid.: p. 34) 
103 Dai9lkai Shugiin Gainut-iinkai Dai2go (14 February): p. 6. The opposition parties were concerned 
that Japan might be linked to US global strategy and become involved in some overseas conflict. They 
continued to ask the government what it would do when US forces sailed to the Persian Gulf from bases 
in Japan (Okita, 1992): p. 57. 
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Figure 7.1 The Political Risk Index of South Korea, 1973-83 
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The figure also reveals that the political risk index had begun to fall down drastically 
after the Carter-Park summit talks in mid-1979, and hit the bottom in May 1980, which 
implies the crisis feeling the Japanese government might have with regard to the South 
Korean regime transition. The sharply unden-nining Japanese confidence in the US- 
even though the Japanese Ohira government was the most fervent supporter of the US 
104 The BERI Report (1983): pp. 3,54. The averages of Political Risk Index (PRI) of South Korea 
between 1978 and 1982 are as follows: 1978: 61,1979: 59; 1980: 49,1981: 55,1982: 56, and 1983: 55. 
According to DaWkai Shugiin Sioukou-iinkai Dai9go (10 April 1979), the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry of Japan allotted budget to Ajia Keizai Kenkyu-sho to study the county risk of foreign 
countries from 1979. The author failed to discover the country risk reports of Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo, so 
the BERI Report is instead cited here. ORI means Operations Risk Index indicating business environment. 
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in imposing sanctions against Iran and a boycott of the Soviet Union 105 -accelerated the 
crisis feeling around in May 1980. 
After the failure of the Carter administration's rescue mission to liberate US diplomats 
captured by Iranian students, the Ohira. cabinet did not hide its displeasure with the 
unilateral military action. 106 With regard to the South Korean question, the Ohira 
cabinet expressed its serious concerns. In the Security Committee of the 91" Diet, 
Okita advocated that Japan should utilise both political and military deterrence to 
resolve international conflict. With the US-Japan Security Treaty and Japan's self- 
defence capability, diplomatic efforts for the sake of world and Asian peace needed to 
be co-ordinated. Such efforts should include removing the possibility of large-scale 
military clashes in the Korean peninsula, and co-operating with the US and the PRC. 107 
General Director of the JDA, Hosoda stated in the Special Committee on Security on 
26 April: 
The military confrontation between the North and South is still continuing. In particular, 
North Korea has continued its military build-up considerably, more than 20 per cent 
during the 1970s ... The situation in the peninsula is unpredictable, so I plan to keep an 
eye on the situation from now on. 103 
On the same day, the Special Committee on Security debated the possibility of an American war in 
the Middle East. According to an interview with Okazaki, the JDA was under full alert in late and 
early May 1980 because no US aircraft carriers had been seen in the Western Pacific for more than 
several days, and the Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk had left Europe for the Far East. 
105NYT(16 April 1980); Dai9fkai Sangiin Gainut-iinkai Dai5go (8 April 1980): pp. 2-16; Dai6go (10 
A ril 1980): pp. 2-11; Dai7go (24 April 1980): p. 4-6; Dai9lkai Kessan-iink-ai Dail4go (15 April 1980): 
'T Okita perceived that after the abortive rescue mission, the Carter Administration became more patient, 
VOU7 tting its hope in the joint measures adopted by Japan and the EC (Okita 1992): p. 92. 
Dai9lkai Shugiin Atizeiihosho-toki(betsttiiitk-ai Dai2go (26 April 1980): pp. 1-2. 
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Under these conditions, it seemed natural for the Ohira cabinet to be apprehensive about 
the political turmoil in South Korea. Within three days, members of the Security 
Committee of the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarians had arrived in Seoul. On 30 
April, members of the committee called on President Choi. By the same token, eight 
members of the LDP and JDSP, led by Matsuhei Mori, visited Seoul between 2 and 6 
May. It was encouraging to Chun that pro-Park Chung-hee and conservative Japanese 
politicians were in Seoul to emphasise the necessity of stability. In fact, at his first press 
conference as acting Director of the KCIA on 29 April, Chun rebuked the Carter 
administration by saying that the US should not interfere in the internal affairs of an 
ally, having criticised Chun's concurrence of acting KCIA directorship. It is not yet 
known whether or not these Japanese politicians met General Chun. However, it is 
conceivable that the visits of Japanese conservative politicians were arranged for the 
political benefit of those who proclaimed stability as the first priority. In this 
atmosphere, the Carter-Ohira talks in Washington on 1 May 1980 were of great 
significance. At this meeting, President Carter raised the problem of Chun Doo-hwan's 
scornful rejection of US criticism as interference, stating that it was a cause for great 
concern that one man [Chun] controlled the military, intelligence and security. 109 Ohira 
refrained from expressing any agreement with the US President. Soon afterwards, 
Brzezinski indirectly criticised Japanese Foreign Minister Sabuto Okita of Japan's 
pattern of diplomatic behaviour towards the authoritarian regime in South Korea. ' 10 
On 8 May in the Diet, Chairwoman of the JSP, Takako Doi, criticised Prime Minister 
Ohira for not denouncing Chun in the summit meeting, as President Carter did. Foreign 
108 Ibid.: p. 3. 
109 With regard to a Japanese view on the relations of the Carter administration and the Chun group, see 
Sankei Shimbun (10 May 1980). 
110 Yontittri Shimbun (30 May 1980). 
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It is not right to make public the contents of talks with the US President on international 
relations. It is true that the US and Japan have deep concerns about the South Korean 
political situation. There was an expression from the US side that they pay particular 
attention to the moves of the military. I want to avoid making any comment on this 
point. "' 
Okita refused to answer a further question about his opinion on the South Korean 
situation: "I am very much interested in the political moves in South Korea. I had better 
not cladfy the Japanese government's opinion because it concerns a question of the 
internal affairs of another country. " 112 The Japanese Foreign Minister, who told the Diet 
that "Japan must co-operate with the US 100 per cent to maintain reliable strength for 
security in the Far East, " 113 did not follow the American line because the US was no . 
longer omnipotent. He reiterated this policy orientation in the Diet on 13 May: 
The United States may still be dominant, but its relative status has decreased. The USSR 
has steadily increased its military power, notably in the Far East, where one-third of its 
forces is deployed. Especially significant is the reinforcement of Soviet naval power in 
the region. Under such conditions, in what light should we consider the task of ensuring 
Japan's national security? ' 14 
As far as the cancellation of the US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting was 
concerned, Okita said on 15 May in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Diet that: 
I don't know whether or not it was an expression of American displeasure with Chun's 
appointment of the KCIA directorship ... The present political situation in South Korea is 
very fluid. ... There are many unstable elements, but no big change is taking place 
[towards democratisation]. In the case of South Korea, basically it is in a semi-war state, 
111 Dai9lkai Sluigiin Gainut-iink-ai Dai22go (8 May 1980): p. 22. 
112 Ibid.: p. 22. 
113 Dai9lkai Shugiin Gaimit-iinkai Dai2go (14 February 1980): p. 5. 
114 Okita (1992): pp. 105-6; Dai9lk-ai Sangiin Gaimu-iinkai Dai8go (13 May 1980): pp. 6-7. 
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confronting the North. Therefore, I wonder if the realistic route is something like a 
zigzag course. ' 15 
Two days after the 17 May Coup, Prime Minister Ohira summarised his standpoint on 
the South Korean problem: (1) Japan had great interest in the stability of the Korean 
peninsula; (2) only South Korean people could decide the country's political future; (3) 
Japan expected that political development would proceed after the incident [the 17 May 
coup]. 116 
7.6 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY JUNTA 
LED BY CHUN 
In early May 1980, Chun faced a major crisis as the labour sector, student movements, 
journalists, and even civilians in the Choi government began to turn their backs on the 
military regime. He and Prime Minister Shin were the main targets of political protests 
in Seoul and other major cities. Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam were re-united in a 
struggle against Chun and Shin. Intelligence from Japan in early December 1979 and 
January 1980 sought to strengthen the military position within the Choi government and 
to protect Chun from US pressure. Further intelligence in May signaled that Chun could 
go ahead. After the 18 May coup, confronting bloody resistance in Kwangju, Chun's 
second coup hung on the balance. Now it was critical to consolidate the military junta's 
position. To that end, just after the 18 May coup, a stream of visits from and to Japan 
began. 
115 Dai9lk-ai Shugiin Gainut-iinkai Dai22go (15 May 1980): pp. 1-3. 
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7.6.1 The Visits of Special Ambassador Maeda and Chief of Asian Section Kiuchi 
Before the Carter administration's Policy Review Committee meeting of the NSC on 22 
May 1980 in Washington, the Ohira cabinet decided to dispatch Special Ambassador 
Toshikazu Maeda' 17 to Seoul (on 20 May), where he stayed for more than two weeks 
(21 May-5 June). His visit was exceptional in that other countries were very critical of 
the 18 May Coup and the subsequent massacre in Kwangju, and wanted to keep their 
distance from the Choi government and the military. For example, on 22 May the Policy 
Review Committee of the NSC decided that "No emissaries from Washington are 
needed at the moment. "118 Maeda met high officials of the Choi government, except for 
President Choi himself. The main message he conveyed was a concern that stability 
should be quickly restored in South Korea and order re-established in Kwangju. 
Meeting with Prime Minister Park Choong-hoon, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, and 
Deputy Prime Minister Kim Ki-chon, he was told that these goals would soon be 
achieved. ' 19 After Kwangju was retaken, Maeda met General Chun on 28 May 1980. On 
the occasion, Chun placed emphasis on "consolidation of stability, " which was 
understood by the Japanese MOFA that the political development was conditioned by 
the degree of consolidated stability according to Chun's judgement. 120 By the meeting, 
Maeda became the first foreign diplomatic mission who met Chun after the 17 May 
Coup. 121 
In Tokyo, on 25 May, Prime Minister Ohira interpreted the 17 May coup as a 
116 Mainich Shimbun (24 May 1980). 
117 Maeda was born in South Korea and graduated from Kyungson g Teikoku University (later, Seoul 
National University) and had a number of alumni acquaintances in South Korea. He was a political 
counsellor to Japanese Ambassador in 1973 and was involved with the political settlement of the Kim 
Dae-jung kidnapping incident. 
118 The NSC (22 May 1980): p. 3. 
119 Mainich Shimbun (29 May 1980). 
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legitimated measure by saying that: "Even though it is true that the military is moving, 
it is also the case that President Choi deals with the events within the legal framework. 
[I hope] the political reform the government bears in mind will be proceeded in a 
moderate manner. " 122 When Haruki Wada and others visited the MOFA and met 
Administrative Foreign Vice Minister Masuo Takashima on the evening on 26 May to 
demand that diplomatic pressure should be exerted on the Chun group. Takashima 
explained that Japan and the US were not in the same position, and Japan could not 
offer strong CritiCiSM. 123 The actual actions Japan had taken, as already discussed, 
sought to encourage and solidify the political basis of the new military junta. As soon as 
citizens and students struggling for democracy were suppressed, the Japanese special 
Ambassador had talks with Chun on 28 May 1980, without meeting President Choi. 
This fact was viewed as the first formal recognition of Chun's takeover of power, 124 
while on the same day the US State Department issued a statement that due to the 
reverse course of democratisation in South Korea, a review was underway by the Carter 
administration to exert more pressure, including the reduction of military assistance. 125 
Ultimately, the combination of US approval of the action of the South Korean army to 
quell the Kwangju democratisation movement, and Japan's support for the Chun group 
resulted in the consolidation of another military regime after the demise of the Yushin 
System. Given the US shift from short-term support to long-tenn. pressure, which 
replaced the "nudging" policy for the establishment of a civilian government, the 
Japanese selecting policy, from the beginning to the emergence of the military junta, 
was fully implemented. Maeda witnessed the establishment of the Special Committee of 
120 Sankei Shimbun, Evening edition (28 May 1980). 
121 Mainich Shinibun (29 May 1989). 
122 Sankei Shimbun (26 May 1989). 
123 Interview with NVada. 
124 Interview with Kim Tae-ji; Sekai Seiji (10 July 1980): p. 23; Sekai Seiji (25 July 1980): p. 4 
125 Nikkei Shimbinz (29 May 1980). 
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the National Security Measure (SCNSM) on 30 May and Chun's inauguration to the 
permanent chairmanship of the committee the following day. 
Returning to Tokyo, Maeda reported to Ohira. that according to Chun: the political life 
of Kim Dae-jung had ended; Chun had grasped the power; and Commander of the 
UNC, Wickham had a flexible view of the Chun group. 126 After the establishment of the 
Special Committee of the National Security Measures (SCNSM) on 30 May, the 
Japanese government knew that there would be no other military faction to challenge 
the leadership of General Chun. 127 However, due to US pressure, the intrinsic lack of 
political legitimacy, and the on-going economic stagflation, the prospect of a new 
military regime was not so promising that the Japanese government could not stop 
supporting to the Chun group even after the Kwangju massacre. In reality, Maeda, after 
his visit to Seoul as Special Ambassador, reported to Tokyo that: "Now the situation in 
South Korea is in chaos. We need to watch what is going on during June and August 
1 98o. "128 
Soon after Maeda's visit to Seoul, Asian Affairs Bureau Director General of the MOFA, 
Akitane Kiuchi, visited Seoul on 9-11 June 1980 in order to analyse the state of the 
South Korean political system and review the emergence of a new military regime. 129 
He met General Rho The-woo, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, and US Ambassador 
GleYsteen. After Kiuchi's talks with Park Dong-jin, it was reported that: "[From the 
Japanese point of view], the present situation in South Korea has nothing to affect the 
friendly relationship between Japan and South Korea. There will be no changes in 
126 Fujishima (1980): p. 182. 
127 Sekai Shitho (17 June 1980): p. 24. Fujishima argues that the Japanese government had already 
Fle rceived the plan to establish the SCNSM from early 1980 (Fujishima, 1980): p. 181. 
Sckai Shitho (17 June 1980): p. 24. 
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Japan's South Korean policy. ""' The visits of Maeda and Kiuchi were regarded by the 
Chun group as confirmation of Japan's formal recognition of his actions. 131 
7.6.2 Ryuzo Sejitnas Meetings with Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo 
The formal Japanese recognition of the military junta was backed up by various types of 
informal assistance to consolidate the political power base of the new military regime. 
As already discussed, the Carter administration avoided identifying with Chun and 
Japan could read the intrinsic weakness of the South Korean military leadership: from 
the Japanese point of view, the Chun regime needed to consolidate its power base as - 
early as possible for the sake of security. To that end, a stream of visits between the two 
countries Japan and South Korea significantly outnumbered the traffic between Seoul 
and Washington. 
Of particular importance was the role of Ryuzo Sejima as one of the most reliable 
channels of communication between Japan and South Korea. He had visited South 
Korea numerous times during the Park period and had known Chun Doo-hwan for a 
long time. In November 1979, he gave a special lecture to high officials in the JDA on 
"Japan's Security in the 1980s". In the lecture, he emphasised situations in which, due 
to the instability of domestic politics, a system or regime in a certain country 
collapsed. 132 He was therefore concerned that after the death of President Park, politics 
in South Korea had become more unstable and the tension around the demarcation line 
129 Y. Maeda (1980): p. 107. Prime Minister Ohira dies on 12 June 1980. 
130 Asahi Shimbun (12 June 1980). 
131 Interview with Kim Tae-ji; Kamakura (1980): p. 40. For more details about the Chun-Ohira cabinet 
connection, see Tokyo Shimbim (30 May 1980) and Tokyo Times (30 May 1980). 
132 Tajawa (1980): p. 180. 
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In March 1980, South Korean economic tycoon Lee Byung-chul, the founder of the 
Samsung Group, met Scjima to suggest that Scjima should visit South Korea, as a 
senior (sempai) of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, to encourage and offer advice to 
them. 134 Sejima then prepared proposals concerning the Korean issue, Japan-South 
Korea relations, and the broader question of East Asian stability. After the suppression 
of the nation-wide democratisation movement, culminating with the Kwangju Massacre, 
the Chun Doo-hwan military regime suffered from a lack of legitimacy, so it struggled 
to be recognised by foreign countries. 
Sejima, "representing the political and economic world of Japan", 135 accompanied by 
Noboru Kodo, visited to meet Chun in June 1980. He suggested that Chun should do 
three things after becoming president: "First, you ask Japan to share the defence burden 
with South Korea; second, you host the Seoul Olympics in 1988; third, you bid for 
EXPO. " 136 The explanation was that "Japan could not assist Korean defence 
expenditure directly due to the restrictions of the Japanese Constitution. However, if 
Japan supported South Korea's socio-infrastructure costs, the South Korean government 
would be able to divert that support to the defence budget. Japanese economic 
assistance could help defend South Korean security and revive the economy. That was 
the backbone of the East Asian peace. " 137 Goto added that "I am a committee member 
133 Sejima (1995): p. 420. 
134 Ibid.: p. 420. There is discrepancy between Sejima and his South Korean counterpart Kwon Ik-hyon. 
Considering the fact that Sejima's autobiography was followed by Kwon's interviews in 1995 and 1999, C, 
the study took Kwon's detailed revelation as a more reliable source. 
135 Sejima's South Korean counterpart, Kwon Ik-hyon, in an interview with NHK in the spring of 1999. 
136 Kim Dong-hyon (1995): p. 450. Kwon reconfirmed it in his interview with NHK, 1999 and the Park 
regime attempted to bid Seoul Olympic, but cancelled the plan in early 1979. 137 Ibid.: p. 450. 
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of the Nagoya Olympics Campaign in 1988. In my view, however, hosting the Olympics 
in Seoul will contribute to peace in East Asia. " 138 Kwon later evaluated as Sejima 
prepared the logic of the security-linkcd economic assistance "perfectly. " 139 Two 
months later, just before General Chun became President (in August 1980), the Japanese 
emissaries revisited South Korea at Chun's invitation. Sejima asked Chun to explain the 
outline of the new constitution, and he himself provided ideas: to unite the Korean 
people; to revitalise the economy; to improve Chun's image in Japan by extending an 
invitation to influential mass media leaders of Japanese opinion. 140 By this time, the 
Chun regime had succeeded in solidifying its power basis. As a matter of fact, the Chun 
regime successfully won the bids for the Seoul Olympics and the EXPO in Taejon 
in1981. The security-linked loan negotiation started from early 1981 with the visit of 
Sejima, and Japanese mass media leaders visited Chun on 15 August 1981. In July, 
messengers from South Korea frequently traveled to Tokyo, and in August Japanese 
conservative leaders visited Seoul. 
In late June two teams, one from the MOFA and another from KCIA, representing the 
new military authority visited Tokyo. South Korean MOFA Headquarters Ambassador, 
Mun Duck-ju, and Chief of the Asian Section, Kim Tae-ji, visited Tokyo from 21 to 27 
June and had talks with former Prime Minister Fukuda, former Foreign Minister Okita 
and Administrative Foreign Vice Minister Takashima. On his return to Seoul, Kim Tae- 
ji commented that: 
Due to the landslide victory of the ruling LDP in the general election, South Korea-Japan 
138 Ibid.: p. 450; Sejima (1995): p. 422. 
139 Kim Dong-hyon (1995): p. 450. Sunobe admitted that he heard of the security-linked loan project 
from Sejima in the evening of the day the latter met Chun (Interview with Sunobe, and also see Sunobe 
(1981)). This fact nullifies many studies about the security-linked loan negotiation. 
140 Sejima (1995): p. 422. 
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relations will go smoothly. I could sense that the basic relations between Japan and South 
Korea will not be changed whoever is the Prime Minister in the post-Ohira era because 
they recognise that smooth South Korean-Japanese relations are the ground for the 
stability of Northeast Asia. 141 
In late June, Deputy Chief of the KCIA Kim Young-son and Huh visited Tokyo and met 
the Director and other high officials of the JCIA. Kim stayed in Tokyo for about ten 
days and Huh stayed for about a month. Shortly, on 9-19 July, the biggest scale of the 
Japanese importation promotion mission under the auspices of the MITI visited Seoul to 
facilitate the staggering South Korean economy when the US would not assist until the 
new administration came to OffiCe. 142 
Even when a delicate friction between the Suzuki cabinet and South Korea began to be 
seen from the mid-July, with the Kim Dae-jung issue attracting widespread interest in 
Japan, Japanese conservative political leaders visited Seoul to encourage and solidify 
Chun's power assumption before and after the inauguration to the Presidency on 1 
September. On 5-6 August, Susumu Mutsuka and Michio Tazawa had talks with Chun 
and Defence Minister Chu; on 13 August, there were visits by Shin Kanernaru and his 
colleagues; on 19 August, the DSP's Kasuka and the LDP's Nakamura were in Seoul; 
and former Prime Ministers, Kishi (I September) and Fukuda (24 September) also made 
contributions. 
141 Chosun-ilbo, I July 1980; The Hayashi Colleciion. 
142 Fujishima (1980): p. 183; Fujishima (1981): p. 45. Interviews with Sunobe and Sato. About $Ibn 
import contract was signed. See Kamakura (1980): p. 4 1. 
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7.7 THE SUZUKI CABINET AND THE KIM DAE-JUNG TRIAL, JULY 1980- 
JANUARY 1981 
The South Korean regime transition did not simply end with Chun's coup on 17 May 
1980. On 4 July, the MLC announced that Kim Dae-jung and 36 of his followers would 
be tried by a military court on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government and 
seize power. The statement accused Kim on four grounds: (1) he was an "ardent 
Communist"; (2) he had collaborated with North Korean sympathisers to found the 
National Congress for the Restoration of Democracy and the Promotion of the 
Unification of Korea (NCDU, Hamnintong) in Japan in 1973; (3) he had stirred up 
student disturbances in Seoul and in Kwangju on 18 May. 143 The MLC Administrator, 
General Lee Hee-sung, justified the arrest of Kim as the removal of the major source of 
political instability. However, in the eyes of the Japanese public, the Kim Dae-jung trial 
tarnished the image of the new military leadership. The trial opened before a military 
court in Seoul 14 August. Kim was sentenced to death on 17 September. The heating of 
appeals against the sentence opened on 24 October before a military appeal court. The 
death sentence had not been commuted at the appeal court on 3 November, and so the 
case went automatically to the civilian Supreme Court. If this court confirmed the death 
sentence, then President Chun would be required to approve the execution order. 144 
In order to preserve South Korean national interests, the new military regime, which had 
already been widely projected as brutal and objectionable to the publics of the three 
countries, needed to improve its credentials. To that end, the US and Japan sought to 
apply pressure to commute the death sentence on Kim Dae-jung. This was undoubtedly 
the single most important obstacle preventing the Chun regime from gaining the 
143 Keesing ý: p. 3 0608. 
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recognition of other countries. However, the approaches of the Carter administration 
and the Suzuki cabinet were different: the "quiet diplomacy" of the US contrasted with 
the "public pressure" of Japan. While the US, especially after Ronald Reagan was 
elected President on 4 November, continued to have behind-the-scenes negotiations 
with the Chun regime, the Suzuki cabinet did not hesitate to raise its concerns publicly. 
The key issue in the context of the present study is to explain how Japan's influence can 
be explained in terms of alliance management set out in Chapter 2. 
7.7.1 The Pressurefrom the Suzuki Cabinet to Commute the Death Sentence 
From mid-July to August, the Suzuki Cabinet, which succeeded the Ohira Cabinet in 
early July, emphasised the need to support the establishment of a new military regime, 
even though it also adopted a critical posture towards the Kim Dae-jung iSSUC. 
145 On 7 
August 1980, General Chun, in an exclusive interview with a Japanese conservative 
magazine, Shokun, stressed the importance of South Korea-Japan security 
interdependence and demanded close Japanese support and co-operation to deter the 
Soviet threat in Northeast Asia, given that the US did not possess sufficiently military 
capability over the Soviet Union: 
Particularly regarding the peace in Northeast Asia in 1980s, the stability of Japan and 
South Korea is a very critical condition. The two countries have alliance-like relations 
that can never be separated. Therefore we have to co-operate closely from the economic 
area to the military sector ... Both countries -- South Korea as a forward base and Japan as 
a rear base -- have to take responsibility to deter the advance of communist countries. To 
that end, Japan should not just pursue economic interests, but should grant military 
assistance to South Korea. Japan should co-operate in the true sense. 146 
144 Keesing ý: p. 30609. 
145 Sekai Shitho (19 August 1980): p. 7: The JCP, Sekai Sciji (1980), No. 578: p. 12. 
146 Chun Doo-hwan (1980). 
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However, the Kim Dae-jung trial was regarded by Japan as a breach of an assurance 
given by President Park's regime in 1973, after Kim's abduction from Tokyo, that he 
should not be prosecuted for his political activities abroad, more particularly in Japan. 147 
However, the Chun regime accused Kim of being a "confirmed communist", and Kim's 
alleged involvement with the NCDU (Haninintong) in Japan 148 was the real basis of 
demanding the death sentence. 
Furthermore, progressive intellectuals and opinion leaders, and the JSP and the JCP 
harshly attacked the Japanese government for conspiring to eliminate Kim Dae-jung and 
the emergence of a new military regime from early June. 149 The opposition took the 
case to the Diet debates. At the meeting of the Committee on the Cabinet in the Upper 
House (Sangiin) on 12 August, two days before the opening of the Kim trial before a 
military court in Seoul, opposition members asked for an explanation of the visits by 
Maeda and Kiuchi to Seoul in June, and large-scale economic mission to promote 
imports of South Korean goods on 9 July. There were further specific criticisms of the 
Suzuki government, as illustrated by the remarks of Takako Doi of the JSP and Hiro 
Tatsuki of the JCP: 
Contrary to Western European countries, which expressed serious concerns and regrets, 
recently, the Japanese government enforced its co-operation [with the Chun regime] by 
encouraging the dictatorial military regime, assisting the denunciation of Kim Dae-jung, 
and expediting a large-scale economic mission. The attitude of the Suzuki government in 
147 See Lee and Sato (1983). 
148 It was formed on 13 August, and Kim was kidnapped on 8 August 1973. 
149 The JCP, Sek-ai Seiji No. 575: p. 2; No. 576, p. 23; No. 577, pp. 2-4; Sek-ai (December 1980): p. 112. 
Shin Aochi, Ryo Shibata and Haruki Wada were leading figures in the campaign to rescue Kim. Takao 
Kamakura, the then Saitama University professor, denounced the Japanese involvement to assist the Chun 
group to come to power "the criminal role" of the Japanese government and business world. (Kamakura, 
1980): p. 39. 
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emphasising "the development of friendly relations" with the Chun Doo-hwan fascist 
regime is even a challenge to the common sense of the world. It should not be allowed for 
it is connected with the reactionisation and militarisation of Japan. 150 
The new Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ito, stated at the meeting of the Committee of the 
Governmental Budget of Sangiin (Japanese House of Counci rs) on 12 August that he 
hoped the South Korean government would be cautious in dealing with the issue 
because it would inevitably cause friction in Japan-South Korean relations, and there 
were increasing voices within Japan calling for a reconsideration of the political 
settlement if the death sentence was imposed upon Kim. 151 Affected by this 
overwhelming mood in Japan, some LDP Dietmen, including Yohei Kono, claimed that 
the continuation of the present state of South Korean politics was not compatible with 
the basic goal of Japanese diplomacy, i. e. overall stability in Asia. ' 52 Now, demands 
within the ruling camp for avoidance of over-identification with the Chun regime came 
to fore. 
From mid-September, the Suzuki cabinet moved to press the Chun regime to commute 
the death sentence on Kim. Suzuki, appearing on the NHK (the Japanese public 
broadcasting company) TV programme on 22 September, commented that the South 
Korean government had been informed that if the death sentence were carried out, it 
would "adversely affect the economic relations between South Korea and Japan", and 
that the Japanese Government would be "forced to impose restrictions on our economic 
, 453 assistance efforts. When a JDA source revealed the visit of a South Korean naval 
ship to Yokotsuka on 2 September, the Suzuki cabinet cancelled it as an expression of 
150 Sekai (September 1980): p. 74. 
151 DaiMai Sangiin Naikaku-iffnkai Dailgo (12 August 1980): p. 19. 
152 Sek-ai (September 1980): p. 73. Similarly, Kekkan Jiyu Minshu, the monthly LDP policy paper, raised 
the necessity of the keeping distance from the Chun regime from August 1980. (Kotani, 1980): p. 83 
153 Keesing ý: p. 30609. 
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Table 7.2 The Positions of the Suzuki Cabinet and the Chun Regime on the Kim Dae-jung 
'ftial, November-December 1980 
Date Content 
20 November The delegate of Keidanren had talks with President Chun 
21 November PM Suzuki called in the Korean Ambassador to convey Japan's serious concern 
over Kim's life. 
25 November The Chun regime reacted to the rebuke that PM Suzuki's remarks represented 
interference by Japan in South Korean domestic affairs. 
26 November The Deputy Minister of the Korean MOFA called in Muraoka, the Japanese 
Temporary Ambassador, to express displeasure with the statement of PM Suzuki. 
25-29 Sejima, Goto, and Shigeo Nagano visited Seoul and had talks with President 
November Chun. On I December, they reported to the Prime Minister the result of their talks 
about the Kim Dae-jung trial. 
28 Muraoka conveyed to the Korean MOFA the statement that the Japanese 
November 
government had no intention to interfere in South Korean domestic'matters. 
1-2 December Ambassador Sunobe met South Korean Deputy Minister of the MOFA and they 
agreed to cool down the situation. Sunobe talked with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kim Dong-hui, CIA Direcor, Yu Haksong, and Commander of the DSC, General 
Rho Tae-woo. 
3 December The Chun regime organised an anti-Japan rally of. 35,000 people. 
4 December Secretary General of the new ruling Democratic Justice Party, Kwon Jong-dal, 
visited Tokyo 
11-13 General Secretary of the Japan-South Korean Parliament League, Kim Yoon- 
December hwan, visited Tokyo as a secret emissary of Chun and had talks with Shintaro Abe, 
the Chairman of LDP Policy Research Council. 
17 December Former and present presidents of universities in Japan issued a statement to call 
for more strenuous efforts by the Suzuki cabinet to rescue Kim. 
18 December Sunobe had talks with the Secretary General of new ruling Democratic Justice 
Party, and South Korean Foreign Minister Rho Shin-young. 
Sources: Adapted from Asahi Shimbun, Yonditri Shimbint, Akahata, and NVatanabe(1999) 
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its concern over the Kim issue. 154 Before and after the sentence of the military appeal 
court, in November, Japan's concerns and pressures became even stronger. 155 The 
opposition in Japan was particularly anxious about the advent of a Republican President 
in the US who advocated "peace with strength. " 156 On 5 November, the opposition 
demanded that the Japanese government should take more direct action. 157 
As can be seen from Table 7.1, the pressure from Japan resulted in increased diplomatic 
strains between the two countries. Due to Japan's engagement, the Kim Dae-jung issue 
assumed international importance. Because of the Japanese intervention in part, the 
Chun regime could not avoid some kind of settlement because to do so would be to risk 
losing diplomatic recognition. 
7.7.2 Alliance Management and the North Korean Question 
In spite of its public efforts to rescue Kim, in practice the Japanese government used 
restraint in exerting pressure on the South Korean regime. Opposition politicians, such 
as Izumi Inoue, pushed the Suzuki Cabinet to deal with the Kim Dae-jung issue in terms 
of human fights and Japanese sovereignty. 158 However, the logic of the Suzuki Cabinet, 
in spite of its public appearance, emphasised the importance of a rigid status quo 
approach to alliance management. On 28 November, Ito underlined the position of the 
Suzuki cabinet as follows: 
Japanese expression of concern about the Kim Dae-jung trial does not have any intent to 
154 Interview with Takesada. 
155 The stream of human exchange between the two countries were rather exceptional in their 
contemporary history. 
156 DaWkai Sangiin Naikaku-iinkai Daillgo (27 November 1980): p. 40. 
157 DW934-ai Shugiin Gainut-iink-ai Dai6go (5 November 1980): pp. 2-3 
158 Ibid.: p. 3. 
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interfere in internal politics, but shows an apprehension for the future of South Korea as a 
member of the Western camp.... The isolation of South Korea is undesirable not only for 
Japan-South Korean relations, but also for peace in Asia. In this context, the Prime 
Minister's expression of his concern [to Ambassador Choi on 21 November] was the 
expectation and hope as a friendly nation to South Korea. 159 
In fact, the Suzuki Cabinet never used phrases such as "human rights", "the violation of 
the political settlement", or "Japanese sovereignty". Rather, even when the cabinet 
expressed its concems about the trial, the MOFA repeatedly stated that the death 
sentence against Kim did not infringe the political settlement of the Kim Dae-jung 
kidnapping incident. On the day after the NEK programme of 24 September, Suzuki 
reiterated Japan's intention not to intervene in South Korean domestic politics but to 
strengthen relations between the two countries. By the same token, after conveying his 
concern to the South Korean Ambassador on 21 November, the Foreign Minister 
stressed that the visit was at the South Korean Ambassador's suggestion. '60 The Suzuki 
cabinet emphatically explained its interest in the Kim trial from the perspective of the 
continuity and maintenance of friendly Japan-South Korea relations. 161 
By the same token, the Suzuki Cabinet did not attempt to have any direct dealings with 
North Korea. Nor did it push the Chun regime into any joint efforts with the Carter 
administration although it demonstrated that the Carter administration and the Suzuki 
Cabinet shared information and discussed optimal measures to deal with the Kim Dae- 
jung case. On 15 August, the MOFA leaked that the US and Japan often consulted each 
other about the Kim trial. On 19 September, Foreign Minister Ito Masayoshi traveled to 
Washington for talks with Secretaries of Iýte and Defense, Muskie and Brown. The 
159 Dai93kai Shugiin Gainut-iink-ai Dai8go (28 November): pp. 12,17. 
160 Dai93kai Sht(giin Gainw-Unkai Dai8go (28 November): p. 5; Interview with Sato. The South Korean 
MOFA also confirmed this point (Woegyokukbang Wionhoi, 1980): pp. 1-2. 
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issues of the Kim Dae-jung trial and Japan's increasing of defence capability were the 
main agenda items. However, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa declined US-Japan 
joint pressures on the Chun regime. 162 If the execution of Kim could be avoided, Japan 
was ready to restore its friendly fon-nal relations with the Chun regime. 163 
From the summer of 1980, North Korea activated its diplomacy to improve relations 
with the US and Japan in order to isolate the South Korea regime. The human 
exchanges between North Korea and Japan increased: the LDP's Asia-Africa Study 
Group members' visit to Pyongyang; the fifth JSP Delegate's visit to Pyongyang; and 
North Korean Workers Party invitation of JCP delegates to its party convention. Kim 11- 
sung, the North Korean leader, told members of the Asia-Africa Study Group of the 
LDP in early October that: "I am going to nullify treaties with the Soviet Union and the 
PRC immediately, provided that the US and North Korea resolve to substitute a truce 
agreement for a peace treaty. "16" The other way round, Kim 11-sung then proceeded to 
denounce the Chun regime as even worse than the Park regime, and made it clear that 
he had no intention to enter into dialogue with it. Even though the JDA cancelled a 
planned South Korean naval ship visit to a Japanese port, it also sought to prevent the 
cabinet from improving its relations with North Korea. In late October, Hisahiko 
Okazaki, Chief of Naik-yoku in charge of international intelligence and infon-nation 
within the JDA, made a controversial remark that North Korea was also a potential 
threat to the security of Japan. Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa and Foreign Minister 
Ito expressed their muted agreement to this remark. 165 The MOFA, if any improvement 
161 Dai93kai Sangiin Naik-aku-iinkai Daillgo (27 November): p. 41. 
162 Dai93ai Shugiin Gainut-iinkai Dai6go (5 November): p. 6. 163 Ibid.: p. 8. 
164 Sekai Shitho (14 October 1980). 
165 Dai93k-ai Shugiin Gahnu-iinkaiDaHgo (29 October 1980): p. 9; DaiMaiSangiin Anzenhosho, 
Okinawa, Hoppo Mondai-fokubetsuffitkai Dai3go (31 October 1980): pp. 1-2. 
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was necessary, was not prepared to go beyond economic and academic exchanges with 
the North. 166 Even though Suzuki hinted to the South Korean Ambassador that there 
was a possibility of changing his policy towards North Korea (on 21 November), it was 
not realised in practice. By the same token, the Suzuki cabinet did not agree to the 
opposition parties' Claim that the Chun regime had no legitimacy. 167 Rather, the Suzuki 
Cabinet decided to alleviate the South Korean rice shortage through the provision of tn 
300,000 tons of fice, based on Japanese Y credit, in response to a request in late 
October. 168 The differences between the Suzuki and Ohira cabinets in their approaches 
to the Chun regime are thus highly significant 169 and can only be plausibly understood 
in terms of alliance management. 
When it comes to the overall relations between the Suzuki cabinet and the Chun regime, 
they may be judged basically amicable despite some outward antagonism. 170 The Chun 
regime, at least on the surface, did not heed to the pressures from Japan, and reacted 
with an anti-Japan campaign. In substance, however, the frequent exchanges of visits 
between Japan and South Korea (see Table 7.1) increased their mutual understanding, 
which is why the two governments were able to restore their relations within a short 
period after the commutation of the death sentence in January 1981. On 23 January 
1981, Prime Minister Suzuki expressed his eagerness to rebuild good Japan-South 
Korean relations. A week later, the Japanese government agreed a Y19 billion loan to 
166 Dai93kai Shugiin Gainut-iinkai Dai6go (5 November 1980): p. 5. 
167 Ibid.: p. 3. 
168 Dai93kai Shugiin Gainut-iink-ai Dai3go (24 October 1980): p. 7; Dai5go (31 October 1980): pp. 2-3. 
169 While Ohira advocated new thinking of Japanese foreign policy by emphasising "political diplomacy", 
Suzuki, who started his political career as a member of JSP, was inclined to pay more attention to the 
harmony of Japanese domestic politics. In other words, Suzuki was attentive to the protest of Japan's 
progressive wings to deal with the Kim Dae-jung issue. The new Foreign Minister Ito had a slightly 
different attitude towards North Korea from the posture of his predecessor, Okita. Ito, whose electoral 
constituency contained relatively larger number of pro-North Korean-Japanese, took a smoother approach 
to the North Korean issue than Okita did. (Interview with Wada and Oh Jae-hee) 
170 Kown's interview with NHK in the spring of 1999. 
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South Korea for the 1981 financial year. On 2 March, Foreign Minister Ito visited Seoul 
to attend the inaugýural ceremony of President Chun. There he had talks with his South 
Korean counterpart Rho Shin-young, Proposals were agreed for an annual ministerial 
meeting for the improvement of bilateral relations. The next day, Ito conveyed a letter 
from PM Suzuki to Chun, on the basis of which it was agreed to hold a summit meeting. 
A month later, South Korean Foreign Minister Rho visited Tokyo at the invitation of Ito. 
The commutation of the capital sentence to Kim Dae-jung was of significance in that 
the new military regime was compliant with the least norms of international society due 
to pressures from Japan and political deal with the US. 171 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter has mainly examined the distinctive approach of the Japanese 
Ohira cabinet to dealing with the regime transition in South Korea. Referring to US 
displeasure with the rise of a new military regime, Sunobe recalled: 
The US, and the Department of State in particular, expected obviously that 
democratisation would be proceeding well. Even if there are observations that the 
Department of Defence might be different, in my impression at that time in Seoul, US 
Forces in South Korea, too, had such a hope. And it was also the case that Kim Dae-jung 
and Kim Young-sam could have got some brave resistance [against the Chun group]. 172 
Contrary to US expectations, Japan was aware of the rise of Chun at the earliest stage of 
the regime transition, and had a remarkably good relationship with the Chun group. 
Chun informed the Japanese Ambassador of his plan to arrest General Chong Sung- 
17 1 Hurd argues that "All systems possess some rules governing the conduct of actors, be they laws, 
directives, or norms, and these rules vary in the degree to which they are followed and the reasons for 
compliance" (1999): p. 383. 172 Sunobe (1981): p. 15. 
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hwa. Japan not only kept this secret from the US, but also gave side-support to Chun's 
plan by providing intelligence about the North Korean military moves before 12 
December 1979. Japan perceived that the fundamental confrontational structure of 
South Korean politics involved a tension between two non-institutionalised political 
forces of the Chun group and Kim Dae-jung and his followers, while the US supported 
a caretaker civilian government led by Choi and persisted with the existing official 
hierarchy of the South Korean military led by General Chung Sung-hwa. Japan had a 
deeper understanding and analysis of the South Korean situation than the US had. 173 By 
keeping a distance from Kim Dae-jung, Japan chose stability as its first priority. 
Following the 12 December Coup, the Japanese embassy in Seoul met Chun when it 
was necessary, but did not share all resulting information with the US embassy in 
Seoul. 174 In other words, Japan also needed to keep a distance from the US because of 
the obvious discrepancy in the two countries' policy orientations. As a result, there were 
delicate strains over the issues of the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping and the assessment of 
the Chun group, as became clear in the summit talks between Carter and Ohira. The 
most important point to make, however, is that the US and Japan had a definite mutual 
interest in maintaining stability in South Korea and strengthening security in Northeast 
Asia. Therefore, the delicate friction between them never developed to the point of 
public disputes. 
The new findings about the Japanese intervention towards South Korea in the regime 
transition are in accordance with the formal and official position of the LDP and the 
Ohira cabinet represented respectively by the resolution of the 37 th party on 23 January 
173 Interview with Huh Hwa-pyung. 
174 Interview with Sunobe. 
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, 
1980 and by the Comprehensive Security Policy Report on 2 July 1980.175 They also 
well fit the analytical framework of alliance management and also challenge 
conventional views of the behaviour of Japanese foreign policy. The empirical findings 
concerning Japanese intervention are considerably proactive. In articulating these 
provocative findings and the conventional wisdom emphasising passivity and inaction 
of Japan in the studies of Japanese international behaviours, it is useful to read an 
argument of Yonosuke Nagai. Nagai raises the question of Japan's "incommunicability", 
which is sometimes interpreted as "calculated inaction" or a "strategy of silence. " This 
incommunicability, Nagai argues, means that others cannot easily predict what Japan 
will do in the future. Furthermore, it tends to be seen as a sign of "abruptness" or even 
4C aggression". 176 This indicates that the "American pressure-Japanese response". model 
does not correspond to the reality. 
In Chapter 3, it was explained that, as an integral middle member of the trilateral 
alliance system, Japan has taken actions with regard to relations between the US and 
South Korea on the basis of one or more of three options: to step aside; to encourage co- 
operation between the other two member countries; or to assist the South Korean side. 
Chapter 5 investigated the novelty of Japanese action in redirecting the US policy of 
withdrawal of its ground forces from South Korea, and concluded that Japan here 
played the role of mediator within the TASS. At the same time, the analysis also 
examined the limits of Japan's capacity to reverse the US formula to change the South 
Korean political system. The present chapter takes the analysis further by showing that 
175 The resolution stated that: "Faced with the 1980s, we should counter the new volatile international 
situation accurately, particularly including the harsh protest against the Soviet invasion, and should 
advance again to contribute for the peace and prosperity of the world. " (Kekkan Jiyu Minshit (March 
1980): p. 309. The report placed lots of emphasis on the autonomous role and contribution to the peace 
and security of the world. 
176 Nagai (1980): p. 5. 
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Japan intervened in the South Korean regime transition very deeply and succeeded in 
putting the political forces most amenable to the Japanese national interests in place. ' 77 
Japan played the role of initiator when the US was confused between the priorities 
declared policy orientation for the establishment of a broadly based civilian government 
in alliance management. As the South Korean situation had been worrisome, Japan 
effectively intervened according to its alliance management approach. This is the central 
aspect of the political dynamics of the TASS. 
177 Michael Minor submits different models of Japanese foreign policy making, i. e., 'routine', 'political, ' 
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The term of the Carter Presidency, 1977-1980, is of particular interest for it witnessed 
the decline of US hegemonic leadership and the promotion of Japan's economic and 
political status. Thus, the Japanese formula for the Korean question was quite different 
from that of the US during the Carter administration. Japan was quite sceptical about the 
American initiative for tripartite talks between the US and the two Koreas. For Japan, it 
was imperative to maintain stability in the Korean peninsula and to support the Park 
regime. 178 This Japanese formula resulted in a different approach to intervention in 
South Korean politics from that of the US. 
As explained in Part Two, the US sought to establish a broadly-based civilian 
government through the adoption of a "nudging" policy in order to promote levels of 
security and democracy commensurate with South Korea's economic achievement. By 
contrast, Japan adopted a "selection" policy to support the new military leadership, 
which it viewed as the most amenable social force, following in the tradition of the late 
President Park Chung-hee, because it served the Japanese national interest and its broad 
East Asian strategy. Of the two policies, it was the Japanese which achieved the most 
effective results, since it helped to bring about the establishment of a new military 
regime. However, despite the serious differences between the two countries, they did 
not develop into a fundamental US-Japanese diplomatic conflict because the US also 
had a self-serving interest in maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula and Japan 
also wished to maintain the fundamental objectives of the TASS. 
and 'critical' decisions(1985). Japanese intervention in the period of this research is somewhere between 
; Folitical'and 'critical' decisions. 
8 Minister of International Trade and Industry, Kosaka, stated that peace and stability in the Korean 
peninsula was a vital issue to Japan (DaWkai Shugiin Shokou-iink-ai Dai9go, I April 1979): p. 19. 
262 
8 Conclusion 
CHAPTER8 
CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has examined the dynamics of intra-alliance politics between the US, Japan 
and South Korea. In so doing, the aim has been to overcome the limitations of existing 
theoretical debates in the analysis of East Asian international relations. This concluding 
chapter recapitulates the central arguments of the research in order to extract the main 
theoretical and practical implications. First, the emphasis is placed upon the validity of 
the analytical framework adopted in this study for investigating the inter-state behaviour 
of the three countries (Section 8.1 and 8.2). The recent changes of the TASS will be 
followed for a prospect of the future stage of the TASS, then, implications of the 
research to the studies of dernocratisation, regionalisation, and intra-alliance 
politics(Section 8.3). Finally the research limitations and possible directions for further 
work are considered (Section 8.4). 
8.1 INTRA-ALLIANCE POLITICS AND THE TRIANGULAR ALLIANCE 
SECURITY SYSTEM (TASS) 
The need for an appropriate theoretical framework for analysing US-Japan-South Korea 
relations is one of the most urgent issues in the study of East Asian international 
relations. In order to develop an analytical too], a systemic approach is necessary to 
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- understand the dynamics of the triad game of inter-state behaviour. The crucial issue is 
to determine the key factors that have detennined the shape of relations between the 
three countries. This study suggest unequivocally that the answer is common security 
concerns, and the theory of intra-alliance politics and the concept of alliance 
management provide a strong basis to comprehend the political interplay of the three 
countries. In terms of a systemic framework and the object of analysis, this research 
suggests the new term "triangular alliance security system (TASS). " The major benefits 
of an alliance security model are that, first of all, it has the capacity to explain the 
distribution of roles and the dynamics of political interplay within the alliance, and 
secondly it is able to furnish ideas more generally for the development of a regional 
security co-operation framework. 
The TASS is a regional security system in Northeast Asia, consisting of the US, Japan 
and South Korea and created during the Cold War era. This system has experienced 
continuous and substantial changes towards a broader sense of political community, 
even though its content has not been fully developed. It was formed when the US 
confronted its most serious immediate and direct challenge, the Vietnam War, and 
consequently sought to mobilise its East Asian allies to support the American war effort 
on the basis of a clear division of labour. Since then, it has had important stabilising 
effects in East Asia, and has also evolved a high degree 
-of 
regional cohesion which 
could be developed further as a sound basis for productive regionalisation in the Asia- 
Pacific region. 
The uniqueness of the TASS is twofold: its multi-layered structure and the uneven 
distance of the member countries from the sources of threat. It consists of one 
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superpower (the US), one regional power (Japan), and one local power (South Korea). 
These multi-layered states, in terms of national power, are located at different distances 
from the sources of threat. South Korea, the weakest member, shares a demarcation line 
with its adversary, North Korea, so it can be defined as a projected force and exposed 
state (see Chapter 2). Japan, the regional power, stands close to the exposed state, 
thereby sharing a common threat perception with South Korea. The US, as a 
superpower, is located far behind the front line in military terms, and manages its Asian 
allies from a global perspective beyond the scope of the regional- and local-level 
viewpoints of Japan and South Korea about policy options for dealing with the new 
sources of threat. Therefore, the triangular political interplay within the TASS has been 
affected by these diverse characteristics, and it follows that the alliance management 
policies of the US and Japan towards South Korea will not always be identical. As a 
system, however, the convergence of the broad national interests of the three countries 
is the main feature, and in the long run the superpower controls the behaviour of the 
other two allies. At certain times, however, the influence of the US has encountered 
significant constraints. 
As discovered in previous chapters, patterned interactions are not naturally given; some 
degree of trial and error is inevitable, even towards a more established level of inter- 
state behaviour among nations. Of course, no well-settled interactions can overcome all 
the sources of divergent national interests. On the contrary, the TASS, which is close to 
the "dissimilar-integrative" interactive type of alliance, in which economic and 
technological heterogeneity among actors leads to increasing interdependence, 
specialisation and mutual co-operation, has coped with a constantly shifting internal 
equilibrium. The record of the TASS confirms that the members' motivation to form or 
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join the alliance was not based solely on considerations of expediency. The interaction 
between the three countries has been geo-politically constrained in terms of the freedom 
to choose other prospective allies. In fact, Japan and South Korea did not explicitly 
attempt to go their own way in the face of US policy orientation, while there were 
several occasions which this did happen in the Middle East' and in NATO. 2 Hence, the 
external framework of the TASS structure remained intact, if not completely monolithic, 
in the Cold War era. This distinguishing feature of the TASS reinforces the validity of a 
systemic approach in this study because the TASS has had a relatively stable basis of 
political interactions among the member countries. 
The TASS model and the intra-alliance politics approach, as demonstrated in Part Two 
and Part Three, help to overcome the limitations of bilateral explanations of alliance 
behaviour, which cannot fully reflect the complexity of closely interwoven trilateral 
interdependence and interactions. At the same time, this approach also seeks to 
overcome the failure of attempts to apply the view that US anti -revolutionary strategy, - 
based on a low-intensity conflict concept towards the Third World states in Latin 
America, to the analysis of the Korean situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
8.2 THE POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS OF THE US AND JAPAN: 
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
The case of the political interventions of the US and Japan in the South Korean political 
power transition (1979-1980) was selected for in-depth examination in order to identify 
the main characteristics and dominant factors which determined the different 
I Gause 111 (1999): p. 14 
2 The change of outlook of President de Gaulle drastically altered the role of France in NATO. 
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international behaviour of the two countries and their ultimate convergence in their 
common interests in alliance with South Korea. To sum up the empirical processes very 
briefly, there were four critical junctures in the emergence of the new military regime in 
South Korea. First, after the coup of 12 December 1979, the US restrained from 
applying excessive pressure, and the Japanese protective role was established. Secondly, 
in early May 1980, General Chun Doo-hwan wanted to justify his military coup by . 
emphasising the North Korean threat. However, the US denied that there was any sign 
of an impending North Korean attack. In order to shorten the on-going political turmoil, 
Japan provided the intelligence that the Chun group desperately wanted. The third 
critical moment was in late May, when the military coup generals faced unprecedented 
protests in Kwangju. The Carter administration saved the Chun group by adopting a 
strategy of "short-term support, long-term pressure" on 22 May 1980, a decision which 
helped the military group to regain the momentum to retake Kwangju. In addition, 
Japan intervened by sending a special ambassador to Seoul. The fourth juncture was in 
June and July 1980, when the Carter administration avoided embracing the new military 
regime and exerted pressure on South Korea to move towards political liberalisation. 
The new military regime sought another source of recognition and assistance, and it was 
Japan that buttressed the new military regime by sending additional emissaries 
Table 8.1 A Comparative Summary of the Political Interventions of the US and Japan 
towards South Korea 
USA Japan 
Operational Principles The Flexible Status Quo The Rigid Status Quo 
Behavioural Modalities Offensive Intervention Defensive Intervention 
Implementing Options 
I 
The Nudging Policy The Selecting Policy ZP 
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In terms of the alliance management of the TASS, the characteristics of the political 
interventions of the US and Japan are outlined in Table 8.1. The Carter administration 
attempted to introduce a new fonnula for a stable regional security environment in East 
Asia (see Chapters 4 and 6) which would not necessitate a direct US military Presence, 
thereby avoiding the possibility of the US being dragged into an Asian land war. The 
flexible status quo was the operational principle behind this fonnula. In order to bring 
about a change of policy and government, the US embarked upon offensive or 
aggressive intervention in South Korean politics. After the death of President Park, the 
US sought to establish a broadly based civilian government through the adoption of the 
"nudging" policy in order to promote security and political development 
simultaneously. However, this American prescription was not acceptable to Japan (see 
Chapter 5). As Table 8.1 shows, the Japanese imperative, as an operating principle, was 
a rigid status quo policy that resulted in the adoption of defensive intervention aiming at 
the preservation of a particular regime or system. This was because Japan could not 
permit the distribution of power in the system to be materially changed to its 
disadvantage. The Japanese Ohira cabinet supported the Park regime, and after the 
demise of the Yushin System, Japan adopted the "selecting" policy to support the new 
military leadership, which it viewed as the most amenable social force. Japan played a 
more definitive role in South Korean internal affairs, particularly during the period 
which saw the emergence of General Chun Doo-hwan as the new autocratic President in 
1980 
These two contrasting sets of political interventions, however, converged into a set of 
common alliance interests in North East Asia, thus confirming the validity of the 
systemic approach. On the surface, two different external elements intervened in the 
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South Korean political power transition from opposite directions, and the Japanese 
approach succeeded in realising its policy goal, while the US failed to actualise the 
establishment of a broadly based civilian government. Japan's independent intervention, 
however, did not produce any serious frictions with the US. For example, there was an 
absence of US public protest about Japanese intervention. This was because the US had 
a strong self-serving interest in maintaining stability in the Korean peninsula and Japan 
also wished to maintain the fundame-ntal objectives of the TASS. 
The process surnmarised above suggests that the whole picture of the South Korean 
political power transition leading to the establishment of a new military regime can be 
fully understood within the selected analytical framework, provided the Japanese role 
within the TASS in tenns of intra-alliance politics is taken into account. As we have 
tried to show, a bilateral perspective is not capable of explaining fully the complexity of 
the dynamic interplay between the three countries. Similarly, the two countries' 
interventions cannot adequately be compared through the application of democratisation 
theories. A systemic approach based on theories of alliance management, however, is 
capable of providing a clear, coherent understanding of those interventions and their 
motivations. The combination of different national strategies and national power 
configurations led the US and Japan into different orientations towards the South 
Korean power transition. In ten-ns of political dynamics, it can be said that the US and 
Japan played a non-zero-surn game. 
The findings of this research reveal the following the key triggers of Japanese 
intervention in the political affairs of South Korea: (1) when the strategic focus of the 
3 Marshall (1959): 216. 
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US had tilted in an isolationist direction; (2) when the attention of the US was distracted 
away from the East Asian region; (3) when a response to a more immediate challenge 
from another region was demanded and US involvement seemed less effective; (4) 
when existing US foreign policy failed to cope with unexpected contingencies arising in 
South Korea; (5) when the US failed to signal a shift in its Korea policy; and (6) when 
Japan had doubts about US commitment towards East Asian security. These findings are 
supported by the analysis in Chapters 5 and 7. At the same time, it must be pointed out 
that Japan's relatively autonomous intervention in the domestic affairs of the alliance's 
weakest member was possible because Japan also stood firmly by the strongest member 
- the US - in dealing with the latter's two immediate and direct challenges, namely the 
Iranian and Soviet situations. Moreover, in implementing its policy, Japan avoided any 
explicit criticism of the America's South Korea policy. It took a low-strategic posture by 
admitting the "Carter formula, " which advocated that Japan should contribute to the 
creation of an international environment conducive to stability and peace in the Korean 
peninsula. In ten-ns of alliance management, Japanese intervention was basically 
supportive of US interests in Asia. 
Japanese involvement in South Korean politics tended to be of relatively short duration, 
and ceased immediately when the US political system showed signs of moving in a 
direction conducive to Japanese objectives. There were three main reasons for this. 
First, Japan wished to constrain its influence within clearly delineated boundaries. 
Secondly, the US would not countenance Japan wielding an influence greater than its 
own. Thirdly, no South Korean regime would welcome excessive Japanese intervention. 
In this context, Japan was supportive of US national interests by stabilising the unsettled 
political power transition in South Korea. One key point to bear in mind is that South 
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Korea, as an exposed state, enjoyed a leverage disproportionate to its general national 
power capability, and this allowed the Chun group selectively to accept or refuse US 
and Japanese interventions imposed on it before and after launching the coup. However, 
when it finally came to the need to secure political legitimacy, which it could not do on 
the basis of domestic politics, the new military regime earnestly sought formal 
recognition by the US in late 1980 and early 1981, and was willing to negotiate over the 
life of Kim Dae-jung. 
8.3 THE PROSPECTS FOR THE TASS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: 
OLD BOTTOM LINES AND NEW ARRANGEMENTS 
During the first decade of the post-Cold War era, three potentially disruptive elements 4D 
- the question of the US military presence in South Korea, the authoritarian political 
structure in South Korea, and the South Korean attitude towards the US policy of 
engagement with North Korea-have been settled or altered. The Bush administration 
decided that the status of the American military presence, the fundamental basis of the 
4 TASS, should not be changed in the post-Cold War period . Recently this view was 
conveyed indirectly to Japan and South Korea. 5 At the same time, the South Korean 
political system has been transfon-ned from authoritarianism to procedural democracy, 
thereby allowing mass participation in politics through popular elections. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, no human rights issues have caused any diplomatic strains 
between the US and South Korea. In addition, for the first time, the Kim Dae-jung 
government has encouraged the US and Japan to have direct contacts with North Korea, 
4 US Department of Defense (1992) 
5 McVadon (1999). He stated that: "Foremost, the alliances with Japan and Republic of Korea and U. S. 
military presence are important elements of the American vision of a security framework in Northeast 
Asia, even after North Korea is no longer a threat. " (p. 10) 
271 
8 Conclusion 
in order to lead it to adopt a Chinese or Vietnamese form of capitalism. In other words, 
the engagement policy of the US and Japan is unlikely to cause any serious disruption in 
the cohesion of the TASS. Indeed, in 1999, the over-sensitive reaction of the US and 
Japan to North Korean ballistic missile tests caused considerable apprehension in the 
South. In general, the TASS has solidified its operations and strengthened its structural 
arrangements, even though it has not yet developed to a more institutionalised level, for 
example some form of collective security organisation. Various kinds of military co- 
operation, including the installation of working-level hot lines between South Korea and 
Japan, testify to the alliance's increasing integrity in practical tenns. The US initiative to 
create a system of theatre missile defence (TNM) offers a further challenge to the 
cohesion of the TASS. Regardless of its real effectiveness, the TMD project has proved 
to be a political barometer of the willingness of Japan and South Korea to accept their 
6 
complete integration into US battle management. Japan has already committed itself to 
the joint research project, which in turn, from a systemic point of view, will expand the 
Japanese security role in the region. At the same time, Japan will be deeply integrated, 
thereby, will be monitored its autonomous military build-up by the US. In this context, 
South Korea has no reason to oppose Japanese participation in the TýM initiative. 
However, so far, the Kim Dae-jung government has expressed its reluctance to join in, 
and for three main reasons: concerns about its practical effectiveness, the North Korean 
nuclear issue, and the government's foreign policy stance on the China question. It is too 
early to assess whether South Korean reluctance is in fact a strategic decision or a 
tactical posture, or whether a future South Korean government might show more 
enthusiasm. Nevertheless, it is surely significant that the TASS is now exploring a way 
of integrating its battle management structure. For the last three and half decades, the 
6 Interview with Mr. Okazaki; the concept of early warning and battle management/command control 
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alliance has been augmented mainly by bilateral initiatives-for example in reducing 
transaction costs, monitoring compliance, accumulating the habits of dialogue, and so 
on 7; but recently there has been a noteworthy increase in the number of trilateral joint 
meetings for the purpose of enhancing the reciprocal benefits and cohesion of the 
alliance. More than ever before, policy co-ordination and military co-operation between 
the US, Japan and South Korea has flourished since 1994.8 Recently the three countries 
have established an official forum for discussion and co-operation. 9 Accordingly, it 
appears that the TASS is undergoing a gradual shift from a "dissimilar-integrative" type 
of interaction to a "similar-integrative" type in the political and security areas. 10 
In general, during the post-Cold War period, the US has emerged as the only remaining 
superpower, there has been no alternative to the American system, and there is no 
evidence that the core themes of NSC68 (outlined in the objectives of US 
interventionism) and NSC 48/5 (the priority of US foreign policy from the global 
perspective), introduced in Chapter 2, have been changed. This means that, in terms of 
alliance politics, Japan and South Korea can be pleased that they have been on the 
"winning" side. By and large, the TASS in East Asia has proven to be highly durable 
under the "American system. " It is now going through a process of "transitional fine 
tuning, I'll and continuity is likely to be the dominant aspect of the TASS in the future. ' 2 
The findings of this study cannot be fully or parsimoniously generalised to every 
communications (BpWC3) is introduced to the TMD. (US Department of Defense (1999): 2). 
7 The summit talks between South Korean Presidents and Japanese Prime Ministers have been relatively 
regularly held, and the bilateral contact channels have been comparatively formalised in the governmental 
level, and the dependence on the private or informal channels have been relatively decreased. 
8 Gurtov (1993); Hughes (1996). 
9 McVadon (1999): p. 11; Michishita (1999): p. 71-7. 
10 Conceptual barometers of regional cohesion, see Hurell (1994): pp. 38-44. 
" Interview with Prof. Moon. 
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regional security system. The prolonged alliance relations between the three countries 
have inevitably resulted in some patterned interactions and nonns as the basis for the 
development of a political community out of a security community. Therefore, as long 
as one superpower continues to exist and there is also a regional power in a certain 
region, the three-layered inter-state actions and behaviours will continue to be common, 
and the logic and findings of this research will be applicable, to some extent, to other 
cases, such as US-Japan-Taiwan relations and the changing relations between Russia, 
the PRC and North Korea. 
As this research has revealed, the role of the regional power, sometimes as a facilitator 
or mediator, but sometimes as an initiator and even challenger, deserves to be more 
deeply investigated in the political area, and not just in the military and security sphere. 
This suggests that the existing studies on Japan's international role can be furthered 
developed towards other countries. 
A large number of countries are stuck in the initial phases of a democratic transition, 
and, as Georg Sorenson notes, in tenns of the external influence to promote democracy, 
the negative job is easier for outsiders to prevent, hinder or block a process of 
democratisation than the positive role. 13 This study has implications for the analysis of 
external influences on dernocratisation in the developing or less-developed countries 
with special reference to the motives and goals of external diplomatic and political 
intervention. 
In addition, this research reveals how strategic concerns greatly affect regionalisation 
12 See Pyle (1998): pp. 135-136. 
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based on security communities in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the discussion of the 
TASS can be extended towards the establishment of a political or democratic 
community in Northeast Asia. The changing security environment since the end of the 
Cold War has highlighted the importance of regional security arrangements. The leading 
country of the TASS, the US, has suggested an embryonic response. The US 
Department of Defense's 1998 East Asia Strategy Report states: "Multilateralism in all 
its forms will become an important element of U. S. engagement in the region in coming 
years. "14 This suggestion, in accordance with the emphasis on US alliances with Japan 
and South Korea, and on the US military presence in South Korea, does not mean that 
future US security arrangements will be based on a liberal approach, but they will be 
pursued as a goal which is ultimately similar to the liberal research agenda. Thanks to 
the increasing cohesion of the TASS, it might be able to move towards a kind of 
pluralistic security community in which the legal independence of separate governments 
is maintained as long as they possess a compatibility of core values derived from 
common institutions, mutual identity, loyalty, and a sense of "we-ness". 15 As already 
discussed, the TASS is apparently moving towards a "similar-integrative" type of 
interaction from a "dissimilar-integrative" type. However, in order to accomplish this . 
transition and thereby form the basis of a democratic community, 16 the compatibility of 
core values will be decisive. Therefore, one of the priorities for further research should 
be to combine the structural realist factors in foreign policy decision-making and the 
liberal orientation of policy goals, and the constructivist approach to norms and other 
sociological endowments. 17 
13 Sorenson (1998): pp. I and 8. 
14 McVadon (1999): p. 11. 
15 Adler and Barnett (1998): pp. 6-7. 
16 See Modelski and Thompson (1999) 
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8.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
A study of alliance relations has intrinsic elements of a realist world-view in 
international relations theory. Balance of power theory, Which should not be excluded as 
a basis for explaining the fon-nation and dissolution of an alliance, has operated even in 
a bipolar world. Interaction means that there should be a seamless process of bargaining 
and compromising between more than two international actors. In this case, 
functionalism may be a suitable approach, and negotiation and bargaining theories can 
also be employed. Member states in an alliance or system tend to be like-minded, so 
that they have the nature of a plural group in which actors share some sense of 
community. In the course of protracted interactions, junior member states in an alliance 
tend to increase their homogeneity with the leader. In particular, a reduction in political 
heterogeneity implies the reduction of transaction costs in maintaining and pursuing the 
common goal of an alliance. In other words, the political democratisation of South 
Korea, represented by the Kim Dae-jung government, means the elimination of one of 
the main obstacles to smooth inter-state actions. As a result, the US and Japan are more 
conveniently placed to work together with a democratised South Korean government. In 
that sense, the influence of the South Korean government has now increased. 
Various theories can explain the political dynamics in an alliance. Even though it is true 
that all theories have some significant limitations in explaining an international 
phenomenon, it is necessary to make it clear which theory is the basis for a particular 
investigation. The present research, even though it reveals various aspects of inter-state 
behaviour, has not yet presented a comprehensive configuration of the various aspects 
17 Katzenstein (1996). 
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different schools of international relations theory. This consideration highlights one of 
the limitations of this thesis and points to the need for further research in the future. 
In reading and analysing recently declassified American documents, the researcher 
could not devote sufficient space to revealing how the US government mobilised 
international financial regimes and organisations to support the South Korean economy 
in recession. This tendency was regarded by liberal scholars as one of the most serious 
obstacles to the country's political development. The implications of US governmental 
restrictions on the high-profile visits of US business men, including influential figures 
from the US EXIM Bank and other international financial institutes to South Korea, are 
of significance to understand the liberal policy means and realist policy goals of 
international behaviour. However, this research could not deeply examine these aspects 
in theory. 
From a methodological point of view, one major limitation of the research is that there 
were no interviews with American practitioners. At the same time, reflecting the 
customary obstacles to the study of Japanese diplomatic history, the researcher did not 
obtain the hard Japanese government sources which could reveal the exact ranks of 
officials, the details of meetings with the Chun group, and the actual drafters or decision 
makers who provided intelligence regarding the alleged impending North Korean attack 
on the South. In an interview, Okazaki stated that there are classified materials within 
the JDA about the intelligence concerning the alleged North Korean invasion in May 
1980, but the archives will not be opened until 2005. Even then, it is not absolutely 
certain that the materials will be released in that year. In that sense, this thesis represents 
not the final word but rather the first effort to lay a foundation for understanding the 
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dynamics of US-Japan-South Korea relations. 
Therefore, the further investigation of sources within the Japanese government and the 
more elaborate analysis of Japanese political intervention towards South Korea are 
priorities for future research; and this also points to the need for other research 
investigations which will reveal the nature and scope of Japan's deeper and more direct 
involvement in the domestic politics of other foreign countries. 
In addition, this study did not devote much attention to exploring the intentions and 
actions of the PRC and North Korea towards the South Korean power transition. There 
are scripts of dialogues between Kim 11-song and the East German Secretary General E. 
Honecker in the early 1980s revealing the North Korean response to the emergence of 
the Chun regime. However, in order to concentrate on the US and Japanese rationales 
and actions, these materials were not utilised in the present research. This gap deserves 
to be filled in the future. 
As mentioned above, this research did not consider the impact of external actors in 
promoting democratisation in a foreign country such as South Korea, and there is a clear 
potential for extending research to cover this area, mainly by utilising a comparative 
politics approach. Development studies are also in part related to the contents of this 
research, especially to the nexus of economic development and political democracy. 
Therefore, this research points to the value of adopting such a perspective in the future. 
The differences in operational principles between the US and Japan, however, offer 
clear implications for understanding respective international behaviours, in response to 
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the new international agenda of promoting clemocratisation in the former Third World. 
Regardless of unspoken rationales and hidden objectives, at least on the surface there is 
a contrast between US offensive intervention, emphasising the support for 
clemocratisation and human rights, and Japan's relatively muted posture. There is 
obviously a potential to upgrade the support for liberal values in Japanese foreign 
policy-making and -implementation. However, at least so far, Japan has not tangibly 
demonstrated its positive role in the promotion of democracy other than the ODA 
declaration under the PM Toshiki Kaifu in 1991 on four ODA guidelines, to become in 
,, 18 June 1992 part of the "Official Development Assistance Charter of Japan. It is now 
perhaps time for Japan to find its own way between Asian values and more universal 
liberal values. The former demands the continuation of a strategy of defensive 
intervention, while the latter call for a Japanese version of offensive intervention in the 
promotion of democracy. 
18 Comments from Prof. Drifte. For a Japanese critical observation about the limited role of the US in 
promoting democracy, see Takashi Inoguchi (1999): p. 18 1. 
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Appendix: The Lists of Archival Sites and Interviewees; 
(1) The List of Archival Sites 
The Libraries of the University of Tokyo 
The Comprehensive Library 
The Library of the Faculty of Law 
The Library of the Institute for Social Science 
The Library of the Institute of Oriental Culture 
The Library of the Institute of Social Information 
The Japanese National Diet Library 
The Information Centre of Kyodo New Services 
The Information Centre of Mainichi Shimbun 
The Library of Japanese National Defence Academy 
Japanese Institute for International Policy Studies 
The Library of Institute of Development Economies 
The National Library of South Korean National Assembly 
The Information Centre of Monthly Chosun 
The 5.18 Institute, The Chonnam National University 
The Video Archives of the Korean Broadcasting System 
(2) The List of Interviewees and Dates of Interviews 
South Korean Interviewees 
Mr. Huh, Hwa-pyung, the then secretary for President Chun Doo-hwan (21 June 
1999) 
Mr. Kim, Kun-tae, National Assemblyman and former Chairman of the Federation 
of South Korean Youths for Democratisation (21 June 1999) 
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Mr. Lee, Sang-jin, the then Political Counselor for the Ambassador to Japan, 1980 
(18 June 1999) 
Mr. Park, Suk-moo, the then leader of the Kwangju Democratisation Movement in 
May 1980 (19 June 1999) 
Mr. Kim, Tae-ji, the then Chief of Asian Section of the MOFA, 1980 (23 June 
1999) 
Dr. Lee, Tong-won, former Minister of the MOFA, and the then National 
Assemblyman (20 July 1999) 
Prof. Lee, Mun-young, fon-ner speech writer and political advisor for Mr. Kim Dae- 
jung, 1980 (15 June 1999) 
Prof. Moon, Chung-in, Director of the Institute of National Unification in Yonsei 
University, Seoul. (14 June 1999) 
And an indirect interview done between NHK and National Assemblyman Kwon 
Ik-hyon, then Mr. Sejima's South Korean counterpart, and other senior. officials of 
the MOFA and journalists who requested anonymity 
Japanese Interviewees 
Mr. Sunobe, Ryozo, the then Japanese Ambassador to South Korea, 1978-1981 
(2 June &7 July 1999) 
Prof. Wada, Haruki the then Assistant Professor in the University of Tokyo who led 
the Rescue Movement of Mr. Kim Dae-jung (25 May and 3 July 1999) 
Prof. Okonogi, Masao, the then Keio University Professor and a member of 
Josei Kentok-ai (21 May 1999) 
Prof. Sato, Seizaburo, the then Professor of the University of Tokyo and a core 
member of the inner circle within the personal advisory groups for former 
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. (10 July 1999) 
Dr. Takesada, Hideshi, Research Professor of the Japanese National Academy (27 
May 1999) 
Mr. Hisahiko Okazaki, the then Chief of the Section of International Intelligence, the 
JDA, 1980 (23 June 1999) 
Mr. Toshihiro Nohara, the then Intelligence Attache to Japanese Consular in Pusan, 
South Korea, 1980 (13 May and 7 July 1999) 
Mr. Shigemura, Toshimitsu, the then Correspondent to Seoul of Mainich Shimbun, 
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and then a member of Josei Kentok-ai (12 July 1999) 
Mr. Motoi Tamaki, Researcher in Koria Hyoron and the then member of NK-kai (3 
June 1999) 
Mr. Uchiyama, the then Head Desk Officer of the Korean Peninsula, the JCIA, then a 
member of Josei Kentok-ai (7 July 1999) 
Mr. Kenichiro Hayashi, the then Correspondent to Seoul of Kyodo News Services (I 
and 9 July 1999) 
And others in journalism and academia who requested anonymity 
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